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ABSTRACT 
This thesis presents a study on 
(1) The impact of the announcement of a change to 
L.I.F.O on the share prices of firms quoted on 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange , 
(2) The efficiency of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE) . 
The methodology employed is a contemporaneous association 
test involving a market model extensively used in the American 
Literature. The model is a variation of the well known 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPH), however the assumptions 
of the CAPM are avoided. An extension has_ been made to the 
usual methodology in that a quasi-equivalent group of non-
change firms was selected as a control. 
The dissertation presents a discussion on the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (E~ll-I) with particular reference to the implications 
for Financial Reporting. Furthermore a conceptual framework 
is proposed for empirical research in accounting. 
The results obtained indicate a significant negative reaction 
to the announcement.of a change to L.I.F.O, in the aggregate, 
which was shown to be directly proportional to the size of 
the impact on reported earnings. The relative risk of the 
firms was shown to be an intervening variable in that the 
low risk firms experienced a less severe negative reaction. 
It is concluded that the JSE is an inefficient market since 
the information is impounded slowly. As the market appears 
to be unable to look behind the accounting numbers, further 
evidence of inefficiency is apparent. 
Finally the thesis concludes that the JSE may be developing 
as the most recent reactions were less negative and far quicker, 
on aggregate. 
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This thesis presents an empirical study on the relation-
ship between accounting data and share prices. More 
specifically a contemporaneous association test is used 
to simultaneously evaluate the validity of the EMH on 
the JSE and determine the impact of an accounting change 
to LIFO on share prices. 1 
The study constitutes the first test on the 'efficiency' 
of the JSE in the semi-strong form. Previous studies 
in the literature on the JSE 2 have been on the other two 
forms of the EMH 3 . This study further represents the 
most direct form of test on 'efficiency', being on the 
speed of adjustment of market prices to specific inform-
ation. 
This form of test provides not only useful environmental 
information to accountants 4 but also situation specific 
information on the market reaction to an accounting change 
to LIFO. No such similar accounting research has been 
attempted in South Africa. 
1.2 LIMITATIONS AND OBJECTIVES 
The 'efficiency' ~valuated will be limited to that concept 
7 
of 'efficiency' implicit in the EMH. The measurement 
of the speed of adjustment of market prices to this 
information will be limited to the particular market 
5 model employed. 
The objectives will be expanded on in the thesis 
justification
6 
however they may be stated as to : 
Provide evidence as to the efficiency or other-
wise of the JSE 
Evaluate the impact of a change to LIFO on 
share prices 
Present a conceptual framework for research 
into the relationship between accounting data 
and share prices. 
1.3 THESIS ORGANISATION 
An overview of the thesis organisation is shown diagram-
atically in figure 1. This illustrates the interrelation-
ship between the two basic themes which permeate this 
thesis. 
'l'he introduction is followed,, in chapter 2, by a bilateral 
justification of the study. The two basic themes 
introduced are : 
( i) Accounting Research 
(ii) Capital Market Research 7 
8 
Chapter 3 flows out of the second part of chapter 2, 
expanding on capital markets and introducing the concept 
of efficiency generally and the EMH specifically. 
Chapter 4 examines the implications of the EMH with 
emphasis on the implications to accounting. This is 
followed in chapter 5 by an examination of the information 
coritent of accounting changes and a proposed conceptual 
framework for empirical research in accounting. 
Chapter 6 introduces the market model and research 
methodology with a brief literature review. Certain 
limitations and econometric issues will be discussed in 
this section. 
The results of the study are presented in chapter 7, these. 
are further analysed within the framework of chapter 5 
and tentatively interpreted. 
Chapter 8 conclud~s the thesis w~th a short synopsis 
and a number of conclusions are drawn in relation to 











































































































































































































































































































































































1. Sunder (1973) claims that the two cannot be tested 
simultaneously, i.e. he states that eit.."'1.er efficiency 
should be assumed to test the impact of information or 
vice versa. This notion is examined and justified in 
chapter 6. 
2. See Affleck-Graves and Money (1975), Hadassin (1976), 
Gilbertson and Roux (1976) and Du Plessis (1974). 
3. Namely the weak form and the strong form. 
4. It is suggested that capital market efficiency has implications 
for accountants. 
5. The limitations of this model will be discussed in chapter 6. 
! 6. See chapter 2. 
7. This distinction is really artificial in that the results 
of each have implications for the other. It is this 
mutually supportive property that facilitates simultaneous 
examination of market efficiency generally and the relation-




The two basic themes of this thesis were introduced in 
chapter 1. The impetus for the thesis can be seen as 
bilateral in the context of these themes : 
Accounting research (environment) 
Capital market research (environment) 1 
It is hoped that as the study unfolds to the reader and 
the conclusions drawn and implications established the 
justification will be indubitable. 
However it is considered appropriate to give a brief pre-
liminary justification and indicate those economic agents 
to whom this discourse will be of interest. 
2.1 ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 
Accountants are often viewed as pragmatists. They 
tend to behave as though they are dealing with a discipline 
which is precise, accurate, quantitative and relevant. 
They speak as though accounting is a way of capturing 
real world transactions truthfully. One is left with 
the impression that accounting is merely a process of 
recording and reporting .· 2 
This view of accounting has come under fierce attack 
12 
particularly from accounting academics in the United 
States and the United Kingdom. 
The general trend that now eme~ges in accounting is 
in a measure I communicate . 4 environment. Although no 
unified theory has yet emerged the emphasis is now 
to perceive the accounting process within the overall 
5 
economy. The suggestions vary between an 'information 
economics' approach where accounting information is 
viewed as a normal commodity and a 'decision useful' 
approach wherein accounting satisfies user needs as 
6 a costless commodity (to the user). It is beyond 
the scope of this thesis to survey the approaches to 
accounting theory construction, let alone suggest a 
theory, however it is submitted that empirical work 
of the nature of this study has a place in accounting 
theory development. Being at the embryonic stage in 
maturation no di~cernable theory has emerged, merely a 
patchwork of ideas. The ultimate theory may be a unified 
global one or merely an open ended inter-disciplinary 
codification; it may be achieved through deductive or 
inductive reasoning, What is certain however is that 
empirical research will have to be carried out in a 
7 
number of spheres. 
It is imperative that South Africa draws on the experience 
of professional developnent in the rest of the world. 
However, it cannot be overemphasised that the local 
environment must be carefully researched so that the 
13 
politically, legally and socially induced differences ) 
can be discerned. Accounting academics bear the 
responsibility of applying only those relevant conclusions 
of foreign research to local studies. This holds true 
at every level of academic and professional endeavour. 
For example an accounting standard, though appropriate 
elsewhere, may not be optimal here due to differences 
in environment. 
This study, although similar to that of Sunder (1973)on fi 
the :NYSE, is a justified duplication in this environment.~ 
It is respectfully submitted however that the current 
study is far more ambitious in that it seeks to address 
market efficiency as well, thereby increasing its local 
relevance (see next section)~ 
More specifically, empirical research on the impact of 
accounting data on share prices is an indispensable 
constituent of any research programme in accounting. 
This is so because investment and consumption decisions 
are based on the individual's wealth and since share 
prices represent the individual's wealth, it is imperative 
that the preparer of information has some idea of the 
relationship between that information and the wealth 
of the investor in order that an optimal information 
set may be provided. Beaver ( 19 7 2) explains this by 
assuming the purpose of accounting to be a facilitation 
of decision making. Thus research must be directed 
14 
toward providing the optimal information set for some 
defined class of decision makers. In this case the 
class comprises of investors in the shares traded on the 
JSE. 
Further justification of share market/accounting 
research is seen in the following. Generally accepted 
accounting practice allows a number of alternative 
accounting methods for measuring and reporting economic 
events. Since it is possible that investors may react 
differently to various methods, the relationship between 
accounting changes (which represent a decision point 
between competing alternatives) and share price changes 
should be of vital interest to the following groups 
of economic agents 
The standard setting bodies 
Financial report preparers 
Investors 
The short term uses of the results of this study will 
be to : 
(1) indicate to both the management and investors 
of firms what the impact of a change to L.I.F.0 
has been on share prices, 
(2) provide investors with some information on 
the likely impact of future changes to L.I.F.0,
9 
(3) provide the management (report preparers) of 
15 
companies considering a change w~th 
information on the likely impact on their 
share price (relative). 
2.2 CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCH 
In the wider context the 'efficiency' of a share market 
should be of interest. There has .been a reasonable 
amount of debate recently on the efficiency of the JSE. i 
I 
However there has been very little empirical evidence. 
This study seeks to provide such empirical evidence. 
This justifies the study on the premise that the overall 
debate on share market efficiency is non-trivial. 
Although this will be examined in greater depth below 
(see chapter 4), the following economic agents should 
be concerned with share market efficiency : 
( 1) Investors - If share markets are 
efficient, no abnormal 
(2) Accountants 
(3) Management 
returns can be earned 
by the analysis of 
publicly available 
information. 
- Certain accounting 
dilemmas become trivial 
in that they are 
t . 1 10 cosrne ic on y. 
- In an efficient market, 
16 
(4) Regulators 
(Including - governnent 
- professional 
use of share prices 
in cost of capital 
estimates will be 
11 
accurate. 
- The fair game 
properties of an 
efficient market 
accounting bodies have real implicatiops 
and share market for these agents. 
overseers) 
As the share market is an important process in a capitalist 
economy, its 'efficient' operation is of interest to all. 
This property should be continually monitored.
12 
This role of ~ share market will now be expanded on to 
develop the concept of efficiency as pronounca:lin the EMH. 
This chapter has been presented to justify the study in 
general terms. Specific justifications, such as for method-






1. See footnote 7, chapter 1. 
2. This is reflected in the emphasis of most research in this 
country having an obsession with questions of cost allocation 
and revenue recognition timing. Furthermore the fact that 
there is not even one research journal in South Africa is 
reflective of the unquestioning attitudes of accountants 
in this country. See Affleck-Graves and Money (1980) for 
a comparative review of research development in accounting. 
3. See Tricker (1979). 
4. Support for this view is found in Sterling (1972, p.401) 
5. See Caplan (1972, p.438) and Sterling (1972, p.401). 
6. Sterling (1972), Beaver (1972) and Hendriksen (1977) refer 
to these categories inter alia. 
7. The 'all in' nature of accounting development was acknowledged 
by the American Accounting Association's Committee on 
Research Methodology (1972). This committee suggested that 
accounting was at such an undeveloped stage, 'research in 
all possible directions was iustified. 
8. Sunder (1973) was able to assume market efficiency based on 
the voluminous empirical evidence which is lacking in South 
is 
Africa. 
9. It is assumed that the current study will have no influence 
on market reaction to future L.I.F.O changes! 
10. See figure 1 in chapter 4. 
11. ·.see chapter 3. 
12. This is expanded upon in chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS 
3 .1 PREFA'rORY COMMENTS 
As indicate~ in chapter 2, this study seeks to lend 
empirical evidence to the debate on the 'efficiency' of 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). However it 
is not the efficiency (or otherwise) per se that is of 
importance, but the implications for the various economic 
agents. It is at this juncture in the extension of 
the debate, i.e. where a reasonable consensus has been 
achieved (or assumed) vis a vis efficiency, that confusion 
abounds, particularly in determining the economic and 
accounting implications of the degree of market · efficiency . 
It seems that the cause of such confusion is the restrict-
ive definition of 'efficiency' as annunciated in the EMH. 
Thus, in anticipation of this problem, it i~ considered 
appropriate to examine the purpose or role of a stock 
exchange in order that a . market's effectiveness in 
fulfilling such may be evaluated and the implications 
to the particular role envisaged in the EMH may be 
discerned. 
3. 2 .THE PURPOSE OF CAPITAL MARKETS WITH PARTICULAR 
REFERENCE TO THE STOCK EXCHANGE 
The economic problem is stated in a most general way 
as being the allocation of scarce (limited) resources to 
20 
satisfy limitless needs. Thus the allocation of capital 
resources of an economy is of fundamental importance. 
Speaking in the loosest terms, an appropriate allocation 
of .capital is a necessary condition for the attainment 
of maximum satisfaction by society. The distribution 
of this satisfaction in the society is likely to be 
determined politically. However, different political 
structures, although equally efficient in terms of their 
economic objectivesw could result in completely different 
configurations of capital allocation. In both market 
and centrally controlled economies capital is the 
l 
J 
determinant of future well being, thus unless the allocative 
configuration is congruent with the objectives, an 
economy will have, at best, only short term influence 
over the well being of the community.1 
Further, all growth is dependent on appropriate allocation 
of capital resources enabling those industries with 
increasing product demand to expand to satisfy such in 
line with the collective desires of the community . • 
The process of allocation (either market or committee) 
will determine the effectiveness of allocation. The effective-
ness of allocation is in.:luenced by a number of factors 
and is measured in a number of ways. Hitherto only 'real' 
capital has been discussed, namely physical assets, e.g. 
plant, equipment, factories, inventory, etc., which 
constitute this factor of production. One of the distinguish-
ing characteristics between market and centrally controlled 
21 
economies is that in the latter the allocation process 
tends to be performed 11 manually 112 , whereas in the former 
a market performs this function. The market has developed 
in these economies away from the physical aspect to a 
more sophisticated financial capital or money market 
which controls the allocation of real assets. It is in 
this 'second order' market category that a stock exchange 
plays a role. 
Thus the term 'capital market' normally refers to the 
financial capital of an economy. The control of the 
financial markets over the asset allocation process is 
very strong, albeit indirect. 
The 'money market' is influenced by a number of agents 
including banks, financial institutions, insurance companies, 
etc., and of course the State which will influence the 
market through its fiscal arid monetary policies. It is 
thus the primary function of the whole financial capital 
spectrum to regulate the allocation of real assets and 
determine the dynamic configuration of real capital. 3 
Thus the share market should be seen as only a part of 
a larger capital market, one step remova:i from the real 
assets of the economy which determine the communal welfare. 
On closer scrutiny the share market can be distinguished 
from the rest of the financial capital market : whereas 
22 
finacial markets are dynamic institutions through which 
money flows, i.e. borrowed from investors and lent to 
entrepeneurs, the share market is really a 'static pool'.4 
Although financial capital may initially be supplied by 
the issue of shares, this cash flow is not a permanent 
feature of the stock market. The other institutions 
in the capital market also supply equity capital, but 
unless raised via the stock market the shares so acquired 
normally have restricted transferability with the con-
comitant increased control. 
This distinction cannot be regarded as trivial when one 
considers how little financial capital is raised on the 
share market once a company is afloat5 nor when one inspects 
the mechanism of distribution of funds : the capital 
markets have a direct control on the flow of funds to 
the users of real capital and thus can ensure that only 
the most productive receive money. The share market, on 
the other hand, has direct control only once at the 
initial issue, thereafter its control over the users of 
real capital is merely indirect. However, this will be 
expanded upon below. 
Thus the share market can be viewed as a secondary financial 
capital market, being two steps removed from the real 
assets market. It can be viewed as a primary capital 
market when funds are directly received by corporations. 
It is emphasised that the above treatise on share markets 
I 
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does not purport to be exhaustive, however the perspective, 
through its simplicity, will facilitate the discussions 
on the implications of the E~lH. 
There are a number of important functions served by the 
share market which the primary capital market could not 
perform and which justify its existence : 
(1) The share market provides a unique mechanism for 
the separation of ownership and management of the 
real capital assets. The management of these 
assets is left to those economic agents with a 
comparative advantage in making production decisions. 
(2) Further it permits long term finance to be provided 
by short term funds. That is, investors may be 
prepared to risk only short term investments which 
are traded, however this does not interfere with 
the initial long term capital provided. 
(3) Another aspect to this function is that large 
quantities of finance are provided by a large 
number of investors, each of whom possess only 
a miniscule amount. Thus a wide ownership of assets 
are consolidated for optimal size usage by the 
agents with the comparative advantage. 
(4) The transfer of funds is allowed with the minimum 
of cost and administrative effort. 
(5) It provides a liquidity pool whereby investors may 
24 
exchange claims to consumption in different 
time periods in such a way that each participant 
improves his lifetime consumption pattern. 
(6) The pricing mechanism provides management with a vital 
inpu~ variable for their investment decision 
process by way of the cost of capital. This varies 
inversely with the price of a company's share. 
Thus the optimal investment strategy is undertaken 
by reference to this price.6 
(7) The pricing mechanism also provides a barometric 
measure of relative strength of corporations to 
investors and lenders. 
(8) The pricing mechanism allocates financial resources or 
consumption claims among participants. 
(9) Regulatory role : Unlike the primary capital 
markets a share market has only a once-off direet 
control of resources. However its indirect 
regulatory role is indispensable to optimal 'real 
asset' allocation. 
On the other hand primary capital markets are able 
to directly discipline the management of real 
assets by the allocation of funds, that is, bad 
management is punished b~/ the removal or increased 
cost of finance. One might ask : Why should 
management care about their company's share price 
once they have raised their initial finance capital 
in that market? The obvious answer is that corporations 
25 
are aware of their future capital needs and thus 
have an interest in maximising their share price. 7 
Considering how little investment by corporations is 
financed by new issues relative to other sources 
of furids, such as retairied earnings, 8 this conclusion 
is not adequate. On the surface it would appear 
that once management have raised their initial 
finance they can escape the disciplinary directives 
of the market. 
The secondary capital market (share market) is 
able to keep the economy's collective nose to the 
grindstone by a number of indirect regulatory 
mechanisms 
(a) Relationship with shareholders 
Although this group of economic agents have 
little control over the day to day use of assets 
they do wield ultimate control over management. 
Consequently, management would rather keep 
them content and by what better way than by 
operating effectively and thereby maintaining 
a buoyant share price? 
(b) Alternative sources of finance 
The performance of a company in terms of its 
profitability can be assumed to be reflected in 
its share price performance, thus this latter 
performance has a strong influence on the terms 
on which the firm is able to raise finance 
26 
elsewhere. ~his is so because the share market 
will provide a basis for risk assessment. 
(c) Exposure to takeover risk 
Sub-optimal production behaviour by corporations 
is likely to result in a poor performance in their 
share price relative to their optimal-production 
competitors? thus exposing the former to takeover 
by the latter. Such takeovers result in the 
victim's operations being utilised more effectively. 
This process obviously results in a reallocation 
of real asse.ts. 
(d} Public relations - political stature 
From a sociological point of view a corporation 
is extremely concerned about its public image 
which is moulded to a large degree by the capitalisation 
value on the stock market. The repercussions of 
a loss of image would be, inter alia, a decline 
in the effectiveness of its marketing strategy 
leading to a dimunition in demand for its products 
causing the firm's ultimate economic demise (or 
takeover). 
(10) Influence on other markets : 
It is submitted that the share market has a regulat-
ory influence even on non-quoted firms. Although 
the bulk of private sector business is controlled 
by quoted firms 1~ even those unquoted are disciplined 
27 
to a greater or lesser degree as a result of the 
share market's influence on the primary sources 
of financial capital. This occurs because risk/ 
prospects assessrrents for an industry are often 
based on the share price performance of the con-
stituent quoted companies with reference, of course, 
to their share of the market. Thus funds are 
provided to these non-quoted companies on 
commensurate terms cognisant of their different 
status. 
The list is not exhaustive. However, it is felt that 
the major functions have been highlighted. The exposition 
has been discussed on an intuitive and simple (though 
hopefully not simplistic) level for the sake of clarity. 
It is within this framework that the concept of efficiency 
will be discussed including the EMH and its implications. 
To summarise 
(1) Two distinct categories of resources have been 
highlighted ; 
(i) Real capital, and 
(ii) Financial capital. 
(2) Three capital markets have been defined 
(i) The market for real assets, 
(ii) Primary financial capital markets, and 
(iii) The secondary capital market. 
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(3) Two categories of economic agents have been defined; 
(i) Producers (corporations) 
(ii) Investors in capital markets. 
In the real world the interaction between the above 
categories of economic agents, real and financial assets 
is highly complex. The role of the share market in 
this milieu has been isolated for discussion. 
3.3 THE EFFICIENCY CONCEPT 
The term 'efficiency' has been used so extensively in 
reference to the share market that it has become 
jargonistic. This is not the fault of the fine 
empirical research that has been carried out, but 
probably due to various interpretations of such works. 
To avoid this jargonistic usage a discussion on the 
concept in a share market context is considered appropriate 
before formally introducing the EMH. 
The term 'efficiency' implies effectiveness of. purpose, 
therefore if a process has a multiplicity of purpose 
it must have a multiplicity of potential efficiency. It 
is this very multiplicity of purpose of the share market 
that has created confusion on the efficiency of the 
process and the implications thereof. 
In the previous section ten major roles (functions) of 
a share market were highlighted. Although these functions 
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are mutually supportive, it is submitted that three 
distinct categories can be defined. The value of this 
trichotomous distinction is probably more academic than 
real,but it is proposed merely to clarify the distinct 
concepts of efficiency. 
(1) Exchange Efficiency 
Functions 1 through 5 (see section 3.2) can be 
viewed as supplying a forum for exchange and thus 
the degree of effectiveness in fulfilling these 
can be seen as 'exchange efficiency' , that is, 
participants are not forced to create exchange 
arrangements not already provided by the market. 
(2) Production/Allocation Efficiency 
Functions 6 and 9 are viewed as interfacing with 
the production/allocation process in an economy. 
When an economy is said to be efficient in a production 
sense, it is a necessary condition that all value 
maximising firms make pareto optimal production 
d 
. . 11 ec1s1ons. This will be facilitated if the share 
market performs said functions effectively. 
(3) Information Efficiency 
All functions that are achieved, or sought to be 
achieved, which are dependent on the pricing mechanism 
can only be as effective as that pricing mechanism. 
A share market is said to be' information efficient' if 
(i) All share prices are costlessly known to 
all participants, and 
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(ii} All available information is fully 
reflected in share prices. 
It is only this second category in this third type 
of efficiency to which the EMH alludes. 
Caveat: It is noted however that this concept 
should be approached cautiously so as not to 
ascribe too wide an interpretation to it nor to 
restrict it too greatly, bearing in mind that 
the information process affects all the functions 
of the share market to some extent. 
It should now be apparent that the statement, 
'An efficient capital market results in an optimal 
allocation of resources' is too general to have any 
real meaning. 
3.4 THE EFFICIENT IvlARKET HYPOTHESIS 12 
Due to the fact that much of the empirical work on 
the EMH and RWT occured prior to the development of the 
requisite theory, there has been a reasonable amount 
of confusion regarding the relationship between the E~Jl 
and RWT. For this reason, before tracing the chronological 
development of the EMH, which had its genesis in the 
RWT, the hypothesis will be formally explained within 
a theoretical framework. Further, for the sake of clarity, 
a careful distinction will be drawn between the weak 
form of EMH, the RWT and other fair game models. 
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3.4.l THE EMH AS AN EXPECTED RETURN OR 'FAIR GAME' 
MODEL 
The EMH states that in any efficient market 
prices will 'fully reflect' all available 
information (see Fama(l970)). 
It has been further defined in terms of three 
information sets : 
(i) The weak form At this level the information 
set that is fully reflected 
is the historic price 
sequence of each share. 
(ii) The semi strong Under this section the 
form : information set is defined 
as being all publicly available 
information regarding each 
share, thus including the 
historic price sequence. 
(iii) The strong form This final category defines 
the information set as all 
known information including 
the previpus sets and any 
other information known by 
I• • d I 13 ins1 ers . 
It is implicit.in the above that if prices are 
to fully reflect certain information sets, new 
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information will be impounded almost instant-
aneously in an unbiased fashion. 
Fama acknowledges that as stated the EI"'J-I has 
no empirically testable implications so in order 
-
to rectify this he expanded on the meaning of the 
'fully reflect' concept. 
However, he derives testable implications couched 
in the assumptions of 'expected returns theo.ry' . 
This general theory posits that market equilibrium 
can be stated in terms of expected returns. More 
specifically, the expected return conditional 
on a specified information set is a function of 
I • k I 14 ris . 
'Notationally 
15 
Where E = expected value operator 
pjt = Price of share j at time 
interval t 
r't+l = the period percentage return 
(pj,t+l - pjt) I Pjt 
<Pt = sym·ool for define3. in:!:ormation 
= random variable indicator 
set 
In this context 'fully reflect' means that all the 
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information defined by the set ¢t is utilised 
in the share price formation. 
It must be emphasised that any inference drawn 
from tests of such derived implications are as 
much dependent on the general concept of market 
efficiency as the validity of the expected returns 
notion. The expected returns theory, however, 
introduces risk at this level in a very general 
undefined way. 
There are two assumptions implicit in the above : 
(i) Market equilibrium can be stated in terms 
of expected returns, 
(ii) Expected returns are formed on the basis 
of information set ¢t· 
The major empirical implication of equation (1) is 
that no trading system based only on information 
ct>t will have expected returns in excess of 
equilibrium expected returns. 
Thus let 
Then 
In economic terms, x. t+l is the difference 
J I , 
between the observed price at the time interval 




on information cpt. 
Let 
a ( cp t) = { a i ( cp t) , a 2 ( cpt) , • • . . , ar ( <Pt)} 
be any trading system based on<Pt' which directs 
the investor to invest a of his funds in each 
r 
security where a is the proportion of total 
r 
funds in ~hare j. 
The total excess market value at t+l that will 
be generated by such a system is 
Coupled with the 'fair game property' of (3), 
if expressed in terms of return rather than price, 
then 
There are a number of models which can be seen as 
being included in this general category. As 
there has been confusion in the empirical literature 
as to which model is being tested (probably dtie 
to the lack of statistical understanding of some 
researchers), the different forms will be distinguish-
ed. This s~ould prevent any confusion in the chapter 
on the implications of the EMH. 
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3. 4. 2 . 'I'HE SUBMARTii:'1GALE MODEL 
Assume for (1) that for all t and ~t 
E(pj,t+1l¢t)~Pj,t , 
or {4) 
Then the price (return) sequence is said to follow 
a second order Martingale. The implication is 
that successive price changes are :Uncorrelated. 
Since each time-interval price is based on the 
current information set ¢t' any change in price 
is related to a change in information. Such 
incremental information exhibits non-randomness. 
If a sub Martingale is evident then the incremental 
information sets must be uncorrelated. It is 
essential to distinguish between the correlation 
and independence concepts statistically. Whereas 
correlation is a necessary condition for dependence 
it is not a sufficient one. The necessity for 
this seemingly trivial distinction will become 
evident later. 
A Martingale model is one in which (4) is an 
equality. 
3. 4. 3 THE RANDOiVI WALK MODEL (STRICT FORM) RWM 
The loose random walk theory implies no discernable 
pattern in successive price changes (see infra) 
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however in its strict form the RWM posits 
two distinct hypotheses : 
(i) Successive price changes (or one 
period returns) are independent, and 
_(ii) Successive price changes are identically 
distributed. 
Where both these hold the RWM is satisfied. 
When the distribution referred to in (ii) is 
normal the stochastic process is said to be of 
the Wiener type. 
Formally : 
f(rj,t+1!<l>t) = f(rj,t+l) ' (5) 
That is, the conditional and marginal probability 
distributions of an independent random variable 
are identical. 
Stated in terms of the general model, (1) is 
restricted by the assumption that the expected 
return on share j is constant over time. 
We have : 
(6) 
This satisfies the independence condition but not 
the distribution condition. It defines <j>t as 
share j's price history. 
The KWM thus implies considerably more than tile 
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general assertion of (1). Although the work of 
Paul Samuelson ( 1965) and Benoit Mandelbrot (1966) 
have rigorously shown that the independence of 
successive price changes is consistent with the 
EMH, it is submitted that a lack of correlation 
would be sufficient to support the weak form EMH 
in an economic sense. That is,a lack of correlation 
would prevent abnormal returns by trading strategies 
based only on ¢t' defined as the past price history. 
Thus it should be seen that the rejection of 
the RWM does not necessarily constitute a rejection 
of the EMH. However it must be emphasised that 
the assertion of an efficient ma~ket is vastly 
stronger than the assertion that successive 
changes in share prices are independent of one 
another. 
Cheng and Deets (1971) explain the EMH as requiring 
successive price changes to be mutually stochastic-
ally independent and not just pairwise independent16 
which would be sufficient for the RWM. It is 
submitted that this statement illustrates some 
of the confusion in the literature and is rejected 
in economic terms. In the word~ of Fama 11970): 
'Thus it is not surprising that empirical 
tests of the "random walk :i model that are in 
fact tests of "fair game" properties are 
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more strongly in support of the model than 
tests of the additional (and, from the 
viewpoint of expected return market efficiency, 
superfluous) pure independence assumption.' 
(p.387) 
3. 5 HISTORICP.L DEVELOPMENT OF RWT ?.ND EMH 
A brief description of the theory's development is 
considered appropriate which will consist of a chrono-
logical survey. However, it must be borne in mind that 
the theory as explained in this discourse was not 
developed until after most of the early empirical work. 
It was not until the work of Samuelson (1965) and 
Mandelbrot (1966) in the mid sixties that the 'fair game' 
or RW theories were developed. Till then however, a 
fair deal of work was done normally on the sub-Martingale 
model. 
The term 'random walk' was first coined by Karl Pearson 
and the Rt Hon Lord Rayleigh in 'The problem of the 
Random walk' in the context of establishi.ng the most 
efficient search strategy for a drunk who had been left 
in the middle of a field. Such a walk was purported 
to have no discernable pattern and the most efficient 
search strategy would be to merely look at the starting 
point. 
As applied to market prices, Bachelier (1900) made a study 
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of French commodity prices and found them to be of a 
random nature, that is, in speculative terms, he 
concluded that the current price of a conunodity was 
an unbiased estimator of its future price. This, of 
course, was a Martingale. However the work of 
Bachelier was ignored although it was 'pregnant with 
meaning' 17 for investors. In such a market the 
expected profits of speculation are nil. 
Working (1934) theorised on the random nature of prices. 
However Kendall (1953) in 1953 added some empirical 
evidence to the debate of the random character of 
commodity prices in a competitive market. In 1959 
Osborne (1959) (a physical scientist) carried out 
empirical work on the NYSE and likened the pattern of 
successive price changes to the random movement of 
particles in solution (known as Brownj_an movement) . 
None of these researchers attempted to expound an 
economic rationale on the phenomenon. 
Alexander (196l)used the 'filter rule' technique to 
determine whether abnormal returns were possible by an 
analysis of the historical prices. Although this crude 
study showed slight abnormal returns (they were considered 
too small to cover even transaction costs), it represents 
the emergence of a theory for, having introduced the 
'fair game' explicitly, Alexander impliedly suggests 
that the fair game assumption was not sufficient to lead 
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to a strict random walk. 
In the mid sixties Samuelson, Mandelbrot, Cootner, 
Fama, et al, articulated the EMH. 
3.6 MARKET CONDITIONS CONSISTENT WITH EFFICIENCY 
To discuss the evidence for the EMH in any market it 
is necessary to understand the underlying economic 
rationale so that the implications are carefully discerned 
and distinguished. 
If the prices in a market are to fully reflect a certain 
information set at all times it is obvious, by definition, 
that incremental information would need to be impounded 
instantaneously for the hypothesis to hold true. 
If this were the case and because there is no reason 
to believe that information generating events occur 
non-randomly, successive changes of price in an efficient 
market would be random. Non-randomness would indicate 
a slow adjustment to information in that there would 
be a trend through successive time periods as the price 
moved towards a new equilibrium. Such a market would 
be inefficient by definition since the share price 
would not 'fully reflect' all information at each time 
interval. 
The following conditions are generally accepted as being 
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sufficient for an efficient market : 
Zero transaction costs 
All information is costlessly available to 
all participants 
All participants have homogeneous expectations 
with regard to prices. 
In testing for the validity of the EMH one is really 
trying to establish the extent to which these conditions 
are satisfied, for in this extreme form the condition 
is a tautology with respect to efficiency in the Fama 
18 sense. 
Fama shows that these conditions can be considerably 
relaxed and still conform to market efficiency which 
manifests in prices fully reflecting available inform-
.ation. 
Namely : 
Information is available to a sufficient number 
of participants 
Transaction costs are reasonable 
In the absence of homogeneous beliefs there 
be no evidence of consistent superiority or 
inferiority by significant participants. 
In this form however, the condition is difficult to 
achieve in the real world. The terms are too nebulous 
to be of real value, e~g. the extent of the term 
' 
'sufficient', and the meaning of 'reasonable' do not 
• 
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lend themselves easily to empirical analysis. 
That is why the efficiency concept as embodied in 
the EMH can only be tested in an indirect fashion. 
These tests may be categorised : 
.. 
(i) Weak form tests : Fair game implication tests 
(a) statistical 
(b) investment strategy 
(ii) Semi strong form tests : Direct tests of the 
'speed of adjustment' property 
(iii) Strong form tests : Fair game property with 
inside knowledge. 
To epitomise the relationship between the concepts 
introduced and the implications of such, the following 
points are emphasised : 
An efficient market will exhibit the fair 
game property of the Martingales. 
The strict RWM is a stronger assertion than 
the Martingales. 
A rejection of the RWM ~s not necessarily a 
rejection of the Vartingales and thus weak form 
EMH. 
The efficient market assertion is stronger than 
the RW:-1. Thus an acceptance of the RWM is only 
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consistent with the fair game property 
of the weak form EMH and not sufficient to 
't 19 prove i • 
Having closely examined the functions of a share market 
and the concept of efficiency and having formally 
introduced the EMH, the implications of this hypothesis 
will now be examined in Chapter 4. 




2. That is the variables are treated as controllable and 
overall allocation is attempted via allocation models. 
3. The allocation of real capital is not static but constantly 
moving to new equilibria for optimal use. 
4. No flow of funds between share market investors and real 
asset investors. 
5. Although no statistics were found pertaining to South African 
market, Donaldson (1961) presents evidence of management 
reluctance to raise new capital on the~qsE. 
6. Applying marginalist theory (in a micro-econ~micsense} to 
finance capital the.perceived marginal efficiency of investment 
(MEI} will be distorted and thus the MEI:= MEC (marginal 
efficiency of capital} parity construed will be sub-optimal. 
(See Junankar(l972)J 
7. Sunder's assumption re one of the objectives of management 
as being to maximise the share price is ignored. Sunder (1973). 
8. See footnote 5. 
9. The term "competitor" is used in the widest possible sense, 
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taking the view that all firms compete for financial resources. 
10. Again no local statistics available, however inferred from 
U.S. evidence. See Baumol (1966). 
11. That equilibrium will be reached where no-one is able to 
become better off without making someone worse off. 
12. A hypothesis adaptable to any competitive market. The validity 
of the hypothesis can only be considered in the context of 
a specific market. To cite empirical support for the EMH 
per se is meaningless since the evidence is non-transferable, 
support in a particular market does not constitute support 
in another, but merely provides evidence of 'efficiency' in 
the tested market. 
13. The distinction of form was first proposed by Harry Roberts 
(1959). 
14. There is scope for much debate on risk definition. In this 
thesis only. the beta (B) risk is considered. This will be 
expanded on in chapter 6. 
15. The notation used is that initially used by Fama (1970). 
l6. Mutually stochastic independence implies pairwise independence 
but not vice versa. 
17. See Hamilton and Lorie (1973) (p.72). 




19. The difficulty in grasping these concepts is acknowledged by 
Fama (1973) and LeRoy (1976). Further the works of Gilbertson 
and Roux (1976) and Strebel (1977) (in the South African 
literature) seem to confuse these issues. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS 
4.1 PREAMBLE 
In this chapter the implications of an efficient share 
market as defined in the EMH will be considered from the 
viewpoints of a variety of economic agents. An emphasis 
will be placed on those implications for the accounting 
l process. 
However, before leaving the definitional domain introduced 
in chapter 3, a brief caveat will be issued on the EMH 
with particular reference to an alternative perspective 
and a definition of efficiency in the share market context. 
Furthermore, a survey of empirical work on the Efvlli on 
the JSE will be presented before introducing the impli-
cations of the EMH. 
4.2 A CAVEAT TO THE INFORMATION EFFICIENCY CONCEPT IMPLIED 
BY THE EMH2 
Although the various limitations of the EMH will be 
acknowledged during the discussion on the implications, 
it is considered appropriate to expose the theoretical 
definition of the EMH, as illustrated in the previous 
chapter, to certain criticisms. 
In Fama's definition3 , he claims that an efficient market 
is one in which prices fully reflect all publicly known 
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information on future share prices. Tha~ is, the market 
is said to be 'efficient' in relation to a generally 
defined information set. This is a trivial definition 
in a perfect market composed of rational individuals 
with homogeneous beliefs about future prices since it 
is obvious that if all market participants (a) have all 
information and (b) know their beliefs are shared by all 
as to the implications of their information, then the 
information will b~ 'fully reflected' in prevailing share 
prices. 
. 4 
If the assumption of homogeneous beliefs is dropped, 
and the real world heterogeneous beliefs phenomenon is 
admitted to the discussion, 5 i~becomes apparent that 
. a remarkable number of investors could behave in a sub-
optimal fashion, but that the market would still be 
defined as 'Fama-efficient'. This is illustrated by 
the following example : if an investor knows.only a 
portion of all information and/or believes his information 
not yet to be impounded into share prices and/or has a 
different view to other participants as to the implications 
of an information set, he is likely to perceive certain 
shares to be over- or undervalued. As a result he is 
likely to diversify inefficiently. However, he may be 
unable to earn an abnormal return and thus the market 
will simultaneously harbour fairly pervasive suboptimal 




An attempt has been made in academic literature 6 to 
refine the information efficiency concept in order to 
remove the abovementioned inconsistency and to extricate 
it from the Expected Returns domain. 
Rubinstein's work is of great interest. 7 He distinguished 
between new information and all information and defined 
three types of beliefs, namely homogeneous beliefs, non-
speculative beliefs and consensus beliefs. 
Non-speculative beliefs are those beliefs for which no 
portfolio revision is an optimal strategy. 
Consensus beliefs can be defined as those beliefs held 
by an individual who perceives all the information he 
has to be reflected in share prices . 
. Rubinstein then proves theoretically, in a fairly general 
context, a definition of efficiency which includes volume 
.of trading. He distinguishes between trading volume 
per se and speculative trading. 
Moreover, he developed the following axioms 
(1) If all: individuals have homogeneous beliefs 
then all individuals have non-speculative beliefs. 
(2) If an individual has consensus beliefs then he 
has non-speculative beliefs. 
Thus he proves : 
The condition of homogeneous beliefs is sufficient and, 
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if consensus beliefs are unique, also necessary for all 
individuals to perceive all information fully reflected 
in prices. 
The condition of consensus beliefs is necessary and 
sufficient for all individuals to perceive new information 
fully reflected in prices. 
If all individuals had non-speculative beliefs this would 
be a necessary and sufficient condition for each individual 
to perceive his new information fully reflected in share 
prices 819 
The purpose of this caveat was not to lindermine the EMH 
but rather to delineate the ambit of its application to 
(accounting) information research. 
Although Rubinstein and Verrecchia have explicitly 
attempted to extend the information efficiency concept, 
the existence of consensus beliefs is of little use 
outside· the academic world unless it is established what 
information is implied by each consensus belief. 
It is submitted that from an accounting standpoint the 
crucial area to address is not share market efficiency 
per se, but this implied underlying 'information market'. 
The above treatise illustrates various relationships in 
this market although it was not explicitly defined. 




, the analysis will be undertaken 
within an expounded conceptual framework. The purpose 
is to explore the underlying information market 11 , 
and the various factors which may intervene and influence 
its operation. This approach is directed purely towards 
accounting research and is presented in chapter 5. 
4.3 THE EVIDENCE FOR THE VALIDITY OF THE EMH ON THE JSE 
4.3.1 OVERVIEW 
A brief survey follows of the empirical evidence 
for the efficiency or otherwise of the JSE 12 . 
As there has been a relative scarcity of share 
market studies in South Africa, the survey will 
examine various methodological and technical issues 
encountered in these studies. 
The studies will be surveyed through the various 
levels of the EMH 1 namely : 
(1) Weak Form Tests 
(A) Non Correlation Property~ 




(ii) Runs tests 
(i) Distribution 
tests 
(C} Fair Game Property } (i) Trading Rule 
(TR) tests 
(2) Semi Strong Forffi Tests 
S d f A ~. t 13 pee o OJUstmen tests d . 14 No E:.tu 1es 
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(3) Strong Form Tests 
Mutual Fund performance tests 
4.3.2 WEAK FORM TESTS 
(A) Tests of the non correlation of returns property 
(i) Serial correlation tests 
Recall equation (6) of chapter 3 
(1) 
Where ¢t defines the share price history, thus 
(1) represents the independence condition of 
the strict RW.M. Bearing in mind that a lack 
of correlation in share returns is a sufficient 
condition for acceptance of the weak form 
EMH, tests evidencing a lack of such correlation 
in a series of share returns would constitute 
15 support for the weak form EMH • 
One of the first share market tests in South 
Africa was published by Affle~~-Graves and 
Money (1975). They performed a serial correlation 
test on the returns of 50 shares quoted on 
the JSE. They used weekly data on 10 lag 
categories 16 , thus 500 coefficients of correlation 
were calculated17 . 
The result was that 33 of the 500 were more 
than 2 standard deviations from zero, of which 
14 were in the lags of 1 and 2 weeks. Accordingly 
I 
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they concluded that the condition of zero-
autocorrelation was a reality for lags of 
greater than 2 weeks. They admitted that 
the existence of 7 out of 50 coefficients 
greater than 2 standard deviations from zero, 
for lags of l and 2 weeks may indicate dependence. 
They concluded that the results were consistent 
with what would be expected for weak form 
efficiency for 80% of the market. Furthermore, 
they suggest that what little dependence may 
exist would be.useless to a Technical Analyst 
attempting to earn an abnormal return by 
analysing price histories18 . 
Although in support of the weak form EMH the 
results a~e by no means categoric. The authors 
acknowledge that the conclusions drawn, although 
logical, are dependent on the implicit assumptions 
which underlie the tests, namely, normally 
distributed returns and finite variance. 
In a further test on the same data Affleck-
Graves (1974} applied the non-parametric 
Wald-Wolfowitz test 19 . The results led to 
similar conclusions as the parametric test 
referred to above. The null hypothesis (i.e. 
that returns were random} was rejected for 
a number of sh.ares, however the weak form Ei.fil 
was an accurate description of most of the 
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market. Affleck-Graves performed runs tests 
reviewed in the next section. 
Two other works on serial correlation were 
subsequently published indicating support for 
the weak form EMH 20 . Howeve~,in both tests 
a certain amount of dependence was observed 
but not to such an extent as to constitute 
support for rejection of the weak form EMH. 
The researchers simultaneously reported the 
results of runs tests which are reviewed in 
the next section as well. 
It is submitted that an acceptance of zero-
autocorrelation is not unjustified on the 
JSE,thus providing evidence consistent with 
the weak form EMH. The Technical Analyst could 
argue that non-linear correlations would 
escape detection in such tests. These correlations 
could be capitalised on and thus earn the 
analyst abnormal returns thus contradicting 
the EMH. This emphasises how zero-autocorrelation 
is a condition consistent with the weak form 
EMH and not a proof. The argument of the 
analyst is unsupported empirically. 
(ii) Runs Tests 
A runs test is a test of randomness where a 
run is defined as a sequence of the same sign 
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in a time series of data (i.e. positive, 
negative or zero). In this case it is a 
sequence of increasing, decreasing or constant 
price changes that determine the runs. 
Affleck-Graves (1974) performed runs test on 
the same .data used in the serial correlation 
tests referred to above. His results accepted 
the null hypothesis of randomness at a 95% 
confidence interval thus concurring with 
the conclusions of his previous tests. There 
was evidence consistent with the weak form 
efficient market condition. 
In contrast to their serial correlation tests 
both Hadassin (1976) and Roux and Gilbertson 
(1977) found evidence of non-random behaviour. 
Hadassin reports significant dependence in 
share price changes of 24 out of 30 shares 
using a differencing interval of 1 day and of 
12 out of 30 for a differencing interval of 
4 days. He thus concluded : 
'(The JSE) .•• has been proved to be an 
inefficient market •.• thus ... chartists 
... should be able to make greater returns 
than those of the market.' (p.24) 
Roux and Gilbertson admit evidence of non-random 
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behaviour and thus for rejection of the weak 
form EMH. However, they point out that a certain 
dependence has been exhibited by erstwhile 
efficient markets as shown by Solnik (1973) 
on the Paris Bourse and by Fama (1965) on the 
. l'JYSE21 • 
Strebel and Saloner (1977) carried out runs 
tests on 10 highly traded shares and obtained 
results that evidenced non-randomness, thus 
being consistent with the weak form EMH. 
However,they found the converse on 10 thinly 
traded shares. Their observation on the 
dependence of Beta (13) on volume and the implied 
inefficiency of the thinly traded section of 
the market is addressed in the next section. 
The evidence from runs tests is not conclusive 
even if any shortcomings in method are ignored. 
The general conclusion drawn from tests on 
the correlation condition is that the JSE con-
forms to a weak form efficient market. 
(B) Homogeneous Distribution 
Roux and Gilbertson (1976) and ozen (1977) 
reported strongly leptokurtic characteristics 
for the distributions of share returns, i.e. 
strongly peaked distributions with long tails. 
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On 6 highly traded shares Schlosberg (1976) 
compared the distributions to the normal, 
stable Paretian, Student-t and Compound 
normal models. He showed that the Student-t 
and Compound normal provided the best fit. 
Further, he showed that over short periods 
share returns do exhibit homogeneous 
distributions. These short term distributions 
' 22 
have been shown to be normal or leptokurtic • 
Over longer periods these distributions combine 
to form the Student-t or Compound normal 
observed by Schlosberg. 
Strebel {1977) suggests that thinly traded 
shares exhibit non-randomness and have lepto-
kurtic distributions. He does however acknowledge 
the very limited number of shares examined. 
This conclusion he finds consistent with his 
own runs tests referred to above. He also 
acknowledged the limited extent of these tests 
being on only 10 highly traded and 10 thinly 
traded shares. 
The major import of this evidence is not merely 
to the acceptance or rejection of the RWM but 
to the appropriatness of· statistical tests 
involving the assumption of a normally 
distributed population. Strebel states that 
any test on the JSE which involves an explicit 
I 
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or implicit assumption of normality would 
only be appropriate to highly traded shares. 
He further defines highly traded as those 
shares with an.annual traded volume of 250 000 
and more. 
This conclusion seems to be based on 3 
studies involving only 31 shares : 
(1) Strebel and Saloner (1977) using 
runs tests on 10 shares of each category 
(i.e. highly and thinly traded) showed 
that the highly traded shares exhibited 
randomness while thinly traded shares 
exhibited non-randomness. 
(2) Schlosberg (1976) showed that 5 of 
the 6 highly traded shares he studied were 
best described as having a Student-t or 
Compound normal distribution of returns. 
Thus not too great a departure from normality. 
The distributions were symmetrical. 
(3) Ozen (1977) showed on tests of only 
5 shares that those with leptokurtic character-
istics exhibited non-randomness while those 
with quasi-normal characteristics exhibited 
randomness. 
Although each study is internally valid, the 
general conclusions drawn from each as to the 
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whole market are to be cautioned, in view 
of the limited number of shares examined. 
It is respectfully submitted that Strebel's 
final assertion, based on the above, that 
thinly traded shares on the JSE have lepto-
kurtic distributions of returns is not justi-
fied. 
In another paper Strebel {1978) argues that, 
inter alia, linear regression tests on thinly 
traded shares would be worthless as the normality 
assumption was not valid for these shares. 
The normality assumption of Ordinar~1 Lease 
Squares Regression {OLSR) only applies to 
the tests of significance of the parameters 
calculated, e.g. F-tests. Notwithstanding 
any distribution that may prevail the OLSR 
model, as applied in this study, establishes 
the best linear unbiased estimate of the 
relationship being explored. 
However the departure from zero-autocorrelation, 
which Strebel suggests is associated with 
thinly traded shares, could present a problem 
to the current model. The estimates,of course, 
would be unbiased and considering the lack 
23 of pervasive evidence to the contrary , and 
the existence of evidence supporting zero-auto-




it is submitted that the assumption is valid 
for the current study. A departure from 
auto-correlation is unlikely to be an under-
25 mining factor to this study • 
(C) Fair Game property tests. 
Trading Rule (TR)Studies. 
The rationale behind such an approach to testing 
the weak form EMH is that for the fair game 
property to hold 26 , no mechanistic market 
strategy based on historic prices (and volumes) 
should be able to consistently outperform the 
market. 
Roux and Gilbertson (1976) used the TR approach 
on the JSE. This is the only published work 
in this category. 
They applied 4 different TRs to 24 shares and 
found that a buy and hold (B&H) strategy 
consistently outperformed the TR in each case. 
This result, they claim, constitutes evidence 
consistent with the weak form EMH. 
Bear and Stevenson (1976), have suggested that 
the TR approach is the only method of testing 
market efficiency directly. It is respectfully 
submitted however that the TR approach is the 
most indirect test of market efficiency, in 
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that failure to establish a TR which con-
sistently outperforms the market is merely 
consistent with the notion of efficiency. 
This is certainly far short of asserting 
efficiency. Admittedly the existence of a 
TR which consistently outperformed the market 
would constitute a rejection of the EMH, 
subject to the below-mentioned constraints. 
These constraints, the first three of which 
were acknowledged by Roux and Gilbertson and 
. 27 partially adjusted for subsequently , are : 
(1) The comparison is biased toward 
rejection of the TR due to the differences 
in expected returns with the B&H. 28 
(2) Shore term interest rates on uninvested 
.cash should be accounted for. 29 
(3) The outperformance by the B&H must 
be consistent. 
(4) The implicit assumption, that all 
transactions can be executed at the price 
which signals action, may not be valid. 30 
Strebel (1977) points out that the TR approach 
does not avoid the importing of some implicit 
d 1 'th tt d t . f l'd't 31 mo e wi a en an questions o va 1 1 y. 
This is so because to compare the two sets of 
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returns they must be positioned in the same 
risk class. Thus a market model is implied. 
In an interesting application of the TR 
approach to their previous results, Roux and 
Gilbertson applied the TRs to the shares 
which had exhibited non-randomness in their 
serial correlation tests referred to above. 
The TRs failed to outperform the B&H strategy. 
They concluded that the correlation exhibited 
• was insufficient to be capitalised into a 
trading rule to earn an abnormal return. 
However, they ignore the possibility of the 
existence of a more sophisticated rule which 
could outperform a B&H strategy on the shares 
exhibiting non-randomness in particular and 
the market in general. 
The general appropriateness of the TR approach 
and the results of this particular study are 
inconclusive. 
The reader is referred to Jensen (1967) Levy {1967) 
Praetz {1976) and Bear and Stevenson {1976) 
for a full debate on the TR approach and for 
empirical evidence for and against the existence 




Conclusion on the evidence for weak form Efficiency 
Despite Strebel's objections it seems that the 
evidence reviewed supports, in the main, the valid-
ity of the weak form EMH on the JSE. Further work 
is obviously required to validate the complete 
veracity of the assertion. 
4.3.3 STRONG FORM TESTS 
MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE 
Tests of the performance of professionally managed 
portfolios, such as unit trusts, are generally 
classified as strong form tests, (see Dyckman, 
Downes and Magee (1975,p.31)), the rationale being 
that the managers of these funds are more likely 
to have access to inside information than the 
average investor. Thus if these funds could be 
shown to outperform the average or overall market 
performance it could be concluded that the market 
was not efficient in the strong form. However 
if the premise that the managers do have access 
to inside information, is incorrect then it is the 
semi-strong £orm of the EMH that would be negated.
32 
This is so because the funds would be earning an 
abnormal return by analysing publicly available 
information. Alternatively, it may be the fair game 
property of the weak form EMH that would be contra-
dicted. 
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On the other hand if the funds are proved not to 
be outperforming the market this would indicate 
consistency with the strong form EMH, on the premise 
of access to inside information. If the premise 
is incorrect·and the managers only have publicly 
available information, consistency only with the 
semi-strong form may be inferred. Thus the Mutual 
Fund tests would only be giving the negative assurance 
of a TR test. 33 
The above illustrates the further problems encountered 
in hypothesis setting on venturing beyond the weak 
form EMH. This problem is compounded by the use 
of indirect negative assurance tests such as mutual 
fund performance measurement. 
Tests of this nature carried out in the United 
States can be criticised on the above grounds. 
However certain cognisance has been taken of the 
problem and the literature indicates that the con-
clusions have been drawn cautiously. The reader 
is referred particularly to Jensen (1969(a)) and 
Friend, Blume and Crockett (1970). These studies 
indicated that the Funds tested did not outperform 
the market. There has been a certain misconception 
that based on these results portfolio managers 
are proved incompetent. Jensen (1969(a)) asserts 
that this notion is unjustified as the efficiency 
of portfolio management should be measured and 
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compared with the market in ex ante terms and not 
in ex post terms as in the studies. 34 
There have been two studies published of this type 
on the JSE; Du Plessis (1974) and Roux and Gilbert-
son (1976). 
Although in-valving a number of unresolved method-
ological issues (see Roux and Gilbertson (1976) 
and Strebel (1977) the results indicate that the 
funds did not outperform the market. In view of 
these unresolved methodological issues 35 , and 
the hypothesis setting problems referred to only 
very tentative conclusions should be drawn from 
these studies. · Suffice to say that the results 
constitute negative assurance vis a vis efficiency 
on the JSE subject to the reservations cited. 
4.3.4 CONCLUSION ON THE EVIDENCE FOR THE EMH IN THE 
CONTEXT OF THE JSE 
The evidence is by no means voluminous nor conclusive, 
and seems particularly weak when compared to the 
evidence on the efficiency of the NYSE. 36 Further, 
Strebel suggests that the results are not conclusive 
because the tests to date may have been bedevilled 
by the phenomenon of 50% of the shares on the JSE 
being thinly traded. 37 The current study will be 
defended in chapter 6. The methodology presented 
is considered invulnerable, in the main, to this 
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confounding effect .. Notwithstanding Strebel's 
posture on this issue, it is submitted that the 
evidence for acceptance of the weak form EMH 
outweighs evidence to the contrary. However no 
statement is made,even tentatively,on the EMH in 
any other form in the context of the JSE. It is 
emphasised that this conclusion does not imply 
that the JSE is inefficient but merely that its 
efficiency has not been established. Presently, 
it is not possible to discuss the implications 
of the JSE market condition. The following section 
introduces the implications of efficiency in any 
market of proven efficiency. 
4.4 THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS 
The implications will firstly be discussed in a general 
way. The purpose of this will be to highlight those 
which are relevant to most of the classes of economic 
agents. The implications will then be presented from the 
standpoint of various classes of these agents. Within 
each category the presentation will be directed at each 
form of the EMH. Finally, the categories of economic 
agents involved directly in the accounting process will be 
grouped. 
4.4.1 THE GENERAL IMPLICATIONS 
The general implications illustrated here are really 
manifestations of an efficient market. It is 
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those conditions that create the implications for 
the economy as a whole. 
It is considered useful to proceed by listing these 
conditions 38 : 
(1) Prices fully reflect an implied information 
set depending on the form of efficiency ~sso~£d. 
(2) Incremental information is instantaneously 
impounded into prices in an unbiased 
fashion. 
(3) Price changes conform to a random distribution. 
(4) The price of a share will be euqal to its 
intrinsic value in an efficient market of 
the strong form. However, even in a semi-
strong efficient market the price is likely 
to fl,uctuate randomly about this value. 
'Intrinsic value' is defined as that equil-
ibrium price which would prevail if each 
individual published all his information, 
i.e. a market within which all participants 
have homogeneous beliefs. 
It is emphasised that the information referred to 
is a subset of all information. This subset is 
that information relevant to future prices known 
currently. This observation uncovers the competitive 
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nature of the various sources and types of inform-
ation. Accounting constitutes only one source of 
firm specific information which competes with all 
other sources of firm specific information and 
11 . d . f t. 39 a economy wi e in orma ion sources . 
4.4.2 THE IMPLICATIONS TO THE ECONOMY 
40 Lord Keynes stated 
"When the capital development of a country 
becomes a by-product of the activities of 
a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done.u 
Although made prior to the appearnace of the EMH 
the comment was made in the context of share 
' 
markets, referring to the random nature of share 
prices. However, certain writers have relied 
on the sentiments expressed to suggest that an 
implication of the EMH would be a capricious 
allocation of resources 41 , both financial and real. 
It was their intent to undermine the propriety 
of the efficient markets paradigm. 
Presumably the writers have been alluding to the 
unpredictability of share price movements and 
thus are equating such movements to the outcome 
of an unbiased roulette wheel. The share market 
and the casino do share the uncertainty condition 
with regard to the future. To extend the comparison 
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beyond this attribute would be to ignore the 
underlying process of causality. ~he numbers 
successively emergent from an unbiased roulette 
wheel are caused by the condition of 37 equi-
probable outcomes 42 , and, more importantly, each 
outcome has no information on future or past 
outcomes. The numbers successively emergent in 
a share market are the products of economic events 
and each share price reflects the more likely 
future value based on current information. It is 
the random nature of economic events that consequent-
ly give share price returns their random nature 
in an efficient market. 
The misconception does highlight two implications 
of the EMH 
(1) In an efficient market share prices adjust 
quickly and without bias to new information 
and, 
(2) the information is effectively impounded 
into share prices. 
The proponents of the casino-like nature of the EMH 
seem to have ignored the second implication. 
(see Keane (1979,p.196) 
It is submitted that the capital allocation is more 
likely to be a by-product of the activities of a 
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casino in an efficient market. Lord Keynes seems 
to have uncovered the paradox of heterogeneous 
beliefs in an efficient market. 43 
The implications of the EMH to an economy are 
-best viewed in relation to the functions of the 
share market as expounded in chapter 3. 
The pricing mechanism would be as accurate as 
the underlying information market will allow it 
to be. However, the market would be fulfilling 
efficiently only those functions mentioned in that 
chapter. The EMH gives no insight into the overall 
economic efficiency of a share market, that is, 
the other functions of a share market may not be 
working well and yet exhibit efficiency in the 
EMH sense. 
The implications of an inefficient market are, of 
course, the most interesting : there would be a 
capricious pricing mechanism and a number of the 
share market's roles would be performed badly 
resulting in an immediate misallocation of funds 
among investors and ultimately in sub-optimal 
financial resource allocation to firms with the 
attendant misallocations of real resources in the 
economy. 
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However, the above statement is strongly qualified 
within the perspective of chapter 3 on the role 
of share markets. Assuming all other institutions 
to be operating effectively, the implications 
of an inefficient market would be dampened. 
Further, there is a need to consider the extent of 
inefficiency. For example, the market may be 
reacting correctly to information, but slowly. 
This will not have as disruptive an effect as 
the market wherein the information is reacted to 
slowly and incorrectly. 
The main objective of this section has been to 
clarify certain misconceptions of the EMH. However, 
it was designed to re-emphasise the conclusion 
reached in chapter 3 of the limited ambit of the 
EMH which then illustrates the limited implications 
of this hypothesis. 
4.4.3 THE IMPLICATIONS TO THE INVESTMENT COMMUNITY 
In the weak form the EMH implies that all efforts 
of analysing a share price history to predict future 
prices and so to earn an abnormal return, are 
futile. That is, the efforts of the technical 
analyst (chartist) are valueless. It is an easy 
task to construct a chart and show what the pattern 
of share price movements has been and illustrate 
signals after the event. What the EMH in its weak 
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form suggests is that accurate prediction cannot 
be made before the event ; it is not possible to 
indicate in advance which shares will follow 
which patterns or when they will do so. No 
academic work has shown that charting has an abnormal 
return. The reader is referred to Black for 
support of these views. 
It has been acknowledged by Lorie and Hamilton 
(1973) that abnormal returns could be earned by 
the fundamentalist if the magnitude of funds 
invested were sufficient 45 , or if there was sound 
originality employed in the analysis. 
The further implication of the EMH is imparted 
by.the fair game property previously referred to. 
This implies that no participant is able to earn 
a larger return than the overall market~ that is, 
the investor cannot 'beat the market'. That is not 
to say that in ex post terms a particular share 
will not be able to earn an above market average 
46 return . However, it does imply that an investor 
cannot have a greater expected return than that 
commensurate with the ex ante risk relation to 
a market portfolio. 47 Moreover, it should be noted 
that in an efficient market investors' expected 
returns are not zero, but that it is merely the 
expected return from analysing defined sets of 
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information which is zero. 
It is submitted that the major implication of 
share market efficiency to the investment 
community is the import of modern Portfolio 
Th 48,49 eory • 
Since the implications of Portfolio Theory to 
accounting will be expanded upon in the next 
section, it is sufficient to state that the under-
lying explicit assumption of the theory is market 
efficiency. Thus a major implication of the EMH 
to an investment community in which such a hypo-
thesis is evidenced as being a reality is the 
general appropriateness of applying portfolio theory. 
Conversely, if a market is not efficient a modern 
portfolio selection approach would not seem 
appropriate. 
This is illustrated by the passive strategy sugg~sted 
by Black (1971) which will be referred to in the 
following section. 
The far-reaching impact of the EMH on the investing 
community has been highlighted. However, there 
is a certain paradox between the E~M and its 
implications for investment which was succinctly 
illustrated by Lorie and Hamilton (1973). 
"There is a curious paradox. In order for the 
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(efficient market) hypothesis to be true, it 
is necessary for many investors to disbelieve 
it. That is, market prices will promptly 
and fully reflect what is knowable about the 
companies whose shares are traded only if 
investors seek to earn superior returns, make 
conscientious and competent efforts to learn 
about the companies whose securities are traded, 
and analyse relevant information promptly and 
perceptively. If that effort were abandoned 
the efficiency of the market would diminish 
rapidly. 11 (p.98) 
This paradox can be compared to the paradox on 
any competitive market where abnormal profits are 
competed away so that participants earn only that 
return commensurate with the risk taken. 
4.4.4 THE IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL REPORTING 
The term financial reporting has been used to 
emphasise the reference to external, as opposed 
to internal accounting. The dichotomisation of 
accounting into external and internal categories 
is particularly useful for discussing the implications 
of the EMH for accounting.so Obviously it is the 
external report that constitutes an element of 
publicly available information and not internal 
reports. It is the implications of the semi-strong 
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form of the EMH that are important to the accountant. 
Although the objectives of accounting have not 
been clearly divided or agreed upon universally, 51 
it is reasonable to assert that the primary function 
of accounting is to provided information useful 
to economic decision making. Support for this 
premise is given by Beaver (1972) where he states 
the premise as follows 
•.. the purpose of accounting is to 
facilitate decision making' (pp 408-409) 
Further support is given by both the Trueblood 
52 and Corporate reports. 
Given this objective and given the fact that 
investors in the share market constitute a major 
class of economic decision makers, any insight 
into the workings of this market should be useful 
to accountants. Thus if accountants ignore the 
evidence, both theoretical and empirical, on how 
the market impounds information, it is unlikely 
that the stated objective of financial reporting 
can be fully achieved. 
Furthermore, if the objective as stated, could be 
expanded to that of providing an optimal information 
set
53
, which is intuitively appealing, an insight 
into the impact of accounting data on share prices 
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is indispensable. 
The two aspects of the EMH previously delineated, 
namely, 
(1) the aspect whereby relevant information 
is impounded quickly in an unbiased 
fashion and, 
(2) the aspect whereby the relevant information 
is effectively impounded, (see Beaver (1973, 
p51)) 
are the most important to accounting. 
The implication of (1) vis a vis accounting is 
that only relevant accounting information will be 
impounded instantaneously. Relevant information, 
in this context, refers to that information with 
predictive content, vis a vis future prices, not 
previously known to the market. This drastically 
reduces the focus of attention to only a sub-set 
of accounting information in a competitive information 
environment. 
The implication of (2) is that the market will not 
be fooled by alternative accounting methods that 
have the same real informational value but generate 
different numbers. 54 
The implications that flow from this market condition 
for standard setting are substantial. 55 This is 
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so, not only because of efficiency per se but 
also because of the implications of modern 
Portfolio Theory. The acceptance of the EMH by 
the investment community will have certain 
implications for accounting. Reference was made 
in the previous section to particular works on 
Portfolio Theory and its development. Although 
this theory is fairly complex an attempt will be 
made, in a cursory comment, to convey the essence 
of that theory so that the implications to accounting 
may be discerned. The reader is referred to Beaver 
(1972) for a more in depth discussion. 
Portfolio Theory had its genesis in the seminal 
work by Markowitz (1952) and later Tobin (1958). 
However, this was prior to development in Operations 
Research of such techniques as quadratic programming 
and prior to the development of modern computers. 
The relevance of this observation is that the 
Markowitz technique was extremely complex and 
required a formidable amount of mathematical 
computation. Without the convenience of modern 
technology the general acceptance of Markowitz' 
work was dampened for practical investors. 
From the Markowitz' model Sharpe (1963) ,Lintner 
(1965) and Mossin (1966) independently developed 
the well known Capital Asset Pricing ~odel (CAPM). 
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It is emphasised that the various market condition 
assumptions introduced in developing the CAPM 
constitutes an assumption of the EMH. 56 The 
model states, notationally57 : 








O(R.t,R t) i m . 
02 (Rmt) 
= variance 
= The expected value 
= The return on share 
operator 
i for period t 
Rf t = The return on a risk free asset for 
period t 
Rmt = The return on the market portfolio 
period t 
Thus the expected return on a particular share 
for 
is a lineat function of its systematic risk defined 
by B., that is, its responsiveness to the market 
l. 
factor. 
The major import of the above is that the only risk 
of investment in a share that an investor is keen 
to know is $i the systematic risk defined above. 
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This is so because the risk of an investment has 
two components, the B. and what is referred 
l 
to as unsystematic risk which is that risk 
peculiar to the firm. This is really a function 
of specific risk factors that have no association 
with the market or other firms in the market. 
The theory suggests that what is of concern to 
the investor is the expected return at a particular 
level of risk; however it is the risk of the 
portfolio as a whole that determines this return. 






is the variance of the market factor, 
is the average B squared, 
the number of shares in the portfolio, 
is the overall portfolio risk factor, 
the average variance of the 
58 
individualistic factors uit 
It can be clearly shown that the impact bf the 
individualistic risk factors of each component 
. 59 
.on the risk of the overall portfolio , can be 
driven to zero by increasing N, the number of shares 
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in the portfolio. 
The systematic risk ( S) however cannot be removed , 
hence the ten~s diversifiable ana non diversifiable. 
It is considered necessary to discuss the implications 
of the EMH for Financial Reporting within the 
context of an environment where risk averse investors 
hold well diversified portfolios of which the 
reporting entity is only one element. 
It is important to establish the ·level at which 
the discussion takes place and further to indicate 
60 such changes in level as the discussion proceeds. 
The different levels are 
the individual level 
the market leve1. 61 
It is emphasised that what is true for the individuals 
comprising a market may not be true for the market 
. 62 
as a whole. Thus what is observable at an 
individual level may manifest in a completely 
different manner on aggregation to the market level. 
The major implications of the EMH are at the market 
level. This does not mean that the EMH has no 
significant implications for individual behaviour, 
but rather that these implications are a consequence 
of the 1ridi viduc:.l investor accepting the EMH. 
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STANDARD SETTING 
There have been four Accounting Standards of 
Generally Accepted Accounting Practice (GAAP) 
issued by the National Council of Chartered 
Accountants 63 (SA). At least two of these are 
redundant in an efficient capital market. 64 
There is of course no substantive evidence of share 
market efficiency in S.A. Their redundancy stems 
from the fact that an efficient market is able 
to see behind purely bookkeeping entries. Thus 
it is a waste to expend resources defining such 
terms as "extraordinary items", "abnormal items", 
11 prior year adjustments" and "interperiod tax 
allocation". The standard setters in an efficient 
market should focus attention on areas of accounting 
which may improve the information or predictive 
content of financial reportsr e.g. replacement cost 
accounting, inflation adjusted accounting, etc. 
To illustrate, it is proposed that these trivial 
accounting issues could be distinguished from 
the non~trivial by the following decision process 
(diagrammatically shown in figure I) . 65 
The starting point is an accounting dile:rnrrla 
(1) Define the dilerrma : 
- For example, should Deferred Tax be 
provided? Should Extraordinary Items 










--:> No issue 
(trivial) 








(2) Is it a purely bookkeeping entry? 
Deferred Tax is a purely bookkeeping 
entry. So is the disclosure of 
Extraordinary Items 'below the line'. 
(3) Are the conflicting methods translatable 
either way? 
Deferred Tax is only translatable when 
provided, i.e. it can be reversed by 
the user. Once separately disclosed, 
the extraordinary item is translatable 
both ways. 66 
(4) Is there an additional cost to the preparer 
to provide either method? 
Unlikely for deferred tax as both the 
tax allowances and accounting deductions 
are computed whether def erred tax is 
provided or not. No cost to show the 
extraordinary item above or below. 
(5) Is there a cost of adjustment to the user? 
- No, in both cases. 
Thus there is a prima f ac~e evidence for providing 
deferred tax, but the dilemna of showing extra-
ordinary items "above or below the line" becomes 
trivial. It is of no consequence in the efficient 
marketplace. 
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'I'hus most accounting dilem:mas are solved within the 
cost constraints by ensuring that the rrethbd chosen is 
translatable to the alternative (or merely reversible). 
This would be achieved by disclosing one method 
with sufficient footnote disclosure to allow trans-
lation to the other method. 
This simple solution in an efficient market would 
allow the Accounting Standards Committee to 
concentrate on the substantive issues including non-
translatable methods, excessive costs methods to 
preparer or users and qualitative information issues, 
e.g. inflation adjusted accounts rather than 
historic cost accounts. 
This illustrates that once the major concern that 
the market will be deceived by accounting numbers 
is removed by the assumption of efficiency many 
accounting problems. will be reduced to trivia. 
However, it could be argued that the individual 
investors may be deceived and that the standard 
setting body has an obligation to these naive 
investors. In the light of the fair-game property 
of the EMH in which the na.Lve investor is a price 
taker, a more sophisticated investor has no advantage 
by virtue of his greater knowledge of publicly 
available information. Furthermore, portfolio theory 
I 
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{see above) indicates that the well-diversified 
investor is not concerned with the unsystematic 
risk attaching to individual components of his 
portfolio. 
The standard setters in an efficient market should 
actively discourage investors from trying to utilise 
accounting data to detect undervalued or overvalued 
shares. 
As Beaver (1973) wrote : 
"(EMH and portfolio theory) implies that 
the FASB should actively discourage investors' 
beliefs that accounting data can be used to 
detect overvalued or undervalued securities. 
This also implies that the FASB must not 
attempt to reduce. the complex events of multi.-
million dollar corporations to the level of 
understanding of the naive, or, perhaps more 
appropriately labeled, ignorant investor. 
We must stop acting as if all - or even most -
individual investors are literally involved 
in the process of interpreting the impact of 
accounting information upon the security 
prices of firms." (p.53) 
In the same paper Beaver suggests that the role of 
the standard setter in the efficient market is a 
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pre-emptive one : to prevent insiders from being 
able to use information not publicly available 
to earn abnormal returns once the information is 
subsequently released. Thus the lack of cost of 
disclosing an item is prima facie evidence 
that the item should be disclosed. 
The naive investor is more likely to be harmed by 
other investors earning abnormal returns as a 
result of monopolistic access to information than 
by being deceived by the accounting data. 
The EMH, if validated in South Africa, would have 
an effect on the approach to standard setting. 
To illustrate; the reader is referred to figure I 
in which the possibility exists of a cost benefit 
decision arising. This decision would need to be 
made in the context of the EMH and a competitive 
information market. The relevant question then follows: 
Is the cost of supplying the information in the 
annual report more or less than the cost to the users 
of gaining this information from alternative sources? 
To summarise : 
In an efficient market environment the standard 
setting Bodies should take cognisance · of : 
(1) Investors with well diversified portfolios 
of which the reporting entity is any one 
component. 
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(2) The competitive nature of information. 
(3) The protection an efficient market affords 
nai'.ve investors. 
(4) The potential harm to investors of un-
disclosed information. 
(5) The market will not be deceived by purely 
bookkeeping entries. 
ACCOUNTING THEORY AND PRACTICE 
Research on efficient markets has substantially 
improved the understanding of external accounting 
infonnation. (See Dyckman, Downes, ~agee (1975, 
p.87)) : 
(1) Firstly, by providing a research method-
ology by which the association between 
accounting data and share prices may be 
investigated. 
(2) Secondly, by providing an economic rationale 
for such methodology. 
Beaver (1972) suggested that the accounting dilemna 
insolvable by the simple solution in figure I could 
be resolved by observing the association between 
the various alternatives .lts,t.1&-Ef ficient markets research 
methodology, the alternative having the largest 
impact on share price, should be chosen as the most 
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suitable. He claims that it is the method with 
the largest impact on share prices that has the 
greatest informational content, the rationale being 
that the share price change reflects the revealed 
preferences of the market. This is intuitively 
attractive reasoning for there has been considerable 
t t t . f d t' . t . t . 6 7 a en ion ocuse on ne posi ive ques ion : 
"What do investors want or use?" Thus share market 
studies do at least investigate revealed preferences. 
Beaver's assertion has come under attack from 
various quarters : May and Sundem (1973) point out 
that the approach provides an incomplete basis for 
ranking alternative procedures since it cannot 
allow for the potential impact of alternatives that 
would produce information currently unknown in 
the market. Gone des and Dopuch (19 7 4) consider the 
ability of the market to provide signals for firms' 
information - production decisions under a series 
of five conditions. They prove that the EMH fails 
to provide criteria for optimal information-production 
decisions when individuals are able to obtain free 
access to information that is produced and need not 
decide which information to purchase. Furthermore, 
since non-purchasers cannot b~ excluded under the 
current institutional framework, the impact on 
share prices cannot be used to establish optimal 
information production policies. 
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However, the authors acknowledge the use of such 
associations referred to by Beaver in determining 
the effects of various accounting methods on share 
prices. 
Dyckman, Downes and .Magee (1975) observe that 
accounting policies are determined politically. 
Further, decisions are taken on the policymaker's 
belief as to the market reaction to such policies. 
They also claim that the FASB entertains arguments 
for and against various accounting methods based 
on beliefs of market reactton. As a number of the 
examples cited, e.g. extraordinary term disclosure 
and lease capitalisation, are issues on which the 
South African profession has expressed interest,
68 
it is likely that similar arguments have been used 
locally. As the various accounting bodies do not 
make public their proceedings in South Africa, 
this speculation cannot be positively verified. 
If it be indeed the case, empirical evidence is 
required to substantiate these beliefs. This concern 
over potential market reaction is rooted in a 
concern for the undiversified investor. Even if 
there are undiversified investors in the market, 
which could arise in a market with na1ve investors 
or investors with heterogeneous beliefs, it is 
submitted that this should not influence the policy 
maker in an efficient market environment. This 
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viewpoint is supported by Beaver (1974) 
"(Nondiversification) at the individual 
investor level is not sufficient to warrant 
a consideration of unsystematic risk when 
making information policy decisions. 
It is important to distinguish between 
the private value of information (which 
considers one investor in isolation) and 
the social value of information (which 
considers all investors in the market). 
While an individual investor may be willing 
to pay to reduce his unsystematic risk, this 
in no way implies that society as a whole 
would be willing to expend real resources in 
the same manner. 0 (p. 569) 
The implications for accounting of the EY'J-1 do not 
include the.question of quantity or quality of 
accounting information. The EMH merely implies that 
accounting data will be used by the market to the 
extent that they have informational content not 
previously supplied to the market. Thus an efficient 
market condition should not be viewed by accountants 
as a reflection of the process of their endeavours. 
The major implication is the perspective afforded 
:Qy the EMH of the market to which accountants report. 
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Beaver's conunents above swnmarise the posture that 
should be adopted. 
It is emphasised that all the implications for 
accounting which have been examined only pertain 
to th~t function of accounting related to share 
markets and furthermore, only to share markets 
with exhibited efficiency. It is quite possible 
that the other functions of accounting (see the 
Trueblood and Corporate Reports 69 ) warrant a 
posture which contradicts the EMH implications. 
Uses of financial statements by the other classes 
of economic decision makers such as regulatory 
bodies, merger transactors, etc. are not affected 
by the EMH. 
The stance taken by Beaver has been criticised 
as extreme ?O However, it is submitted that this 
is due to a misconception of the perimeters 
within which the EMH has implications for 
accounting. These delimitations of efficiency 
per se have an impact on accounting research. 
The co-existance of market efficiency and 
suboptimal diversification due to heterogeneous 
beliefs as referred to earlier in this chapter 
is likely to have implications for the accountant 
in his relationship with individual investors. 
I 
92 
Bearing in mind the limitations, the current 
study investigates the validity of the EMH on 
. the JSE. However, the approach taken is to 
attempt to establish an insight into the 
underlying market for information referred to. 
A conceptual framework for share market studies 
is now proposed, in chapter 5, to investigate 
the process by which accounting data are 




1. The attest function is excluded from this definition of 
accounting process. There may be certain implications 
for the Auditor's legal liability. The reader is referred 
to Anderson (1977) for a discussion of this aspect. 
2. It is the semi-strong form of the EMH that is to be 
emphasised in this chapter. 
3. See Fama (1970). 
4. Homogeneous beliefs vis a vis information and share prices 
is that state where each participant is aware of the 
implications for share prices of the information publicly 
available. Furthermore, each participant is aware that 
all other participants have the same information and 
attitudes on the implications for prices. 
5. Heterogeneous beliefs are held where there is no general 
agreement between participants on the implications of 
information for prices. The knowledge of their fellow 
participants' attitudes is irrelevant. 
6. See Rubinstein (1974) and Verrecchia (1979). 
7. op. cit. 
8. op. cit. (p.819) 
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9. Verrecchia (1979) proves the existence of consensus 
beliefs theoretically. See also Lintner (1969) and 
Telser ( /11)-) • 
10. i.e. it is the speed of adjustment of share prices to 
incremental information that is being examined. 
11. This market has been alluded to by Gonedes and Dopuch 
(1974). 
12. As evidence for the EMH is not transferable from one 
market to another it is considered inappropriate to 
review the copious evidence for the EMH on the NYSE. 
The interested reader is referred to the didactic review 
of such by Fama (1970). 
13. The current study constitutes the first of this type. 
14. This fact is further acknowledged by Roux and Gilbertson 
(1976). 
15. Such evidence would not necessarily prove the RWM.. 
16. These lag categories were lags of (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 
15 and 20) weeks. 
17. This was repeated for bi- and tri-weekly data. The results 
were substantially the same as for weekly data. 
18. See section 4.4.3 for the implications for the Technical 
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Analyst of weak form efficiency. 
19. Being a non-parametric test the Wald-Wolfowitz approach 
is independent of the population parameters from which 
the sample is drawn. Thus no specific assumptions of 
distribution are made.· 
20. Hadassin (1976) and Roux and Gilbertson (1977). 
21. Their rationale for citing such presumably being that 
a small amount of dependence is not sufficient to 
reject the null hypothesis of randomness, and not the 
fact of consistency with the observations of efficient 
markets. 
22. See Ozen (1977). 
-
23. Strebel only examined 20 shares in total. 
24. See Affleck-Graves and Money (1975) and Affleck-Graves (1974) 
and Roux and Gilbertson (1976) . 
25. A defence of the methodology is presented in chapter 6. 
j 26. The fair game property of the EMH was described in chapter 
3 section 3.4.1. 
' • 
27. See Roux and Gilbertson (1978). 
I 28. See Praetz (1976). 
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29. See Roux and Gilbertson (1978). 
30. See Jensen (1967). 
31. Ref er to Strebel' s concern for the appropriateness of 
statistical models assuming normality for thinly traded 
shares. 
32. This would of course simultaneously negate the strong form. 
33. Negative assurance rreans that the evidence does not contradict 
the hypothesis ; however it does not prove it. 
34. It is submitted that the failure of a Fund to outperform 
the market merely indicates that the managers are com-
peting in an efficient market,not that they are incom-
petent. 
35. These are not central to thecurrent study but flow from 
Strebel's assertion on the inappropriateness of statistical 
models assuming normality in the context of thinly 
traded shares. Furthermore, Strebel and Saloner (1977) 
claim that because of the volume dependence of B (Beta) 
for these shares the CAPM is inappropriate. See also 
Saloner (1977) for the evidence of the volume dependence 
of B (Beta) for these shares. 
36. See Fama (1970). 
37. See section 4.3.2. 
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38. These were discussed in chapter 3. 
39. The competitive nature of accounting numbers will be 
expanded upon in chapter 5. See Gonedes and Dopuch 
(1974). 
40. See Keynes (1936}. 
41. Findlay III (1977} and Whittington (1979). 
42. Ignoring the colour and odd/even combinations and 
assuming a roulette wheel with 1 zero. 
43. Lord Keynes (1936} states in this regard : 
'For it is not sensible to pay 25 for an investment 
of which you will believe the prospective yield to 
justify a value of 30, if you believe that the 
market will value it at 20 three months hence.' 
The reader is referred to section 4.2 of this chapter 
where the problem of heterogeneous beliefs is addressed. 
44. See Allen (1975}. 
45. The relative size of the abnormal return would be small, 
however with large quantities invested the absolute 
magnitude of returns could be large. 
46. The average concept obviously implies amounts larger and 
smaller than the mean. 
I 
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47. See Beaver (1972). 
48. See Seneque (1977). 
49. A digression will not be made into the topic, but the 
reader is referred to Markowitz' (1952) seminal work 
and to later developments in the works of Sharpe (1964) 
Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966}. A most readable 
account on the topic in the South African literature, 
by Seneque (1977), is recommended. 
50. Gonedes (1972) acknowledges this fact. 
51. See Dopuch and Sunder (1980). 
52. These reports were issued by the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (1973) and the Institute 
of Charte~ed Accountants in England and Wales (1975) 
respectively. 
53. Gonedes and Dopuch (1974) refer to this objective. 
54. An example would be the straight line method of depreciation 
vs the reducing balance method. 
55. See Beaver (1972) (1973). 
56. Essentially a perfect market was assumed, 
(1) Equilibrium prices 
(2) No transaction costs 
(3) Risk averse investors with the same one period 
horizons. 
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Naturally in such a market prices would react equally in 
an unbiased fashion to information. 
57. Beaver's (1972) notation is used. 
58. These define the risk peculiar to each share and are 
thus individualistic factors. In this context they 
refer to that portion of share price volatility not 
caused by covariance with the market. 
59. Bearing in mind the risk-return relationship. 
60. This delineation is important in all branches of economics 
and the reconciliation between micro- and macro-economics 
is not a resolved issue. See Samuelson (1970). 
61. This is specifically referred to by Beaver (1972). 
62. See Beaver (1972,p.408). 
63. Now the South African Institute. 
64. The statements issued are : 
1.001 The disclosure of accounting policies 
1.002 Taxation in the financial statements of 
Companies 
1. 00 3 Extraordinary i terns and prior year adjustments 
1.004 Earnings per share. 
65. This process is not meant to be prescriptive but merely 
a simple exposition on how in an efficient market certain 
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issues may be easily resolvec_. 
66. By translatable it is merely meant that the numbers 
generated by one accounting method may be adjusted, with 
available information, in order to ascertain the numbers 
that would have been generated by an alternative method. 
67. See Benston (1980) and Hendriksen (1977). 




on Extraordinary items 
on Lease Capitalisation 
on Depreciation. 
69. See footnote 52. 
70. See Bierman (1974) and Anderson and Meyers (1975). 
No attempt has been made to answer these criticisms 
specifically; Beaver adequately does so himself. 
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CHAPTER 5 
A PROPOSED CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACCOUNTING CHANGES AND SHARE PRICES 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
~ \ 
This chapter seeks to provide a framework, within which 
the current study is couched, which may provide a useful 
guide to further empirical research of this nature. 
The limitations of the implications of the EMH for 
accounting are introduced notationally in section 5.2 
with particular reference to the inability of capital 
market efficiency per se to justify the use of share 
prices in assessing the desirability of alternative 
accounting methods. Section 5.3 introduces the concept of 
the competitive nature of accounting information. Section 
5.4 suggests the use of empirical research on accounting 
changes in a capital market setting for an insight into 
the role of information in share price generation. This 
is within a proposed conceptual framework. Section 5.5 
extends the proposed framework with particular reference 
to the current study. There will be elements of methodology 
justification in this section, however it refers only to 
the rationale of partitioning the study population as 
described in chapter 7 in which the empirical results will 
be presented. Section 5.6 introduces the rationale behind 
the choices of the accounting change to L.I.F.O in the current 
study. 
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5.2 THE LIMITATIONS OF THE IMPLICAtIONS OF THE EMH FOR 
ACCOUNTING 
The importance of capital market efficiency vis a vis 
accounting has been adequately dealt with in chapter 4. 
However, it is considered necessary to illustrate the 
limitations of the implications of the EMH for accounting. 
Capital market research studies that seek to establish 
efficiency have been referred to as Finance Studies 2 , 
whereas research studies concerned with accounting inform-
ation have been referred to as Accounting Studies. The 
latter seek to investigate relationships between accounting 
information and share prices, i.e. they attempt to 
establish the informational content of accounting numbers. 
The accounting studies have generallly assumed the con-
dition of efficiency and examined the effects of accounting 
information. The assumption of efficiency on the JSE 
would be untenable~ 3 In this study an attempt is made 
to test efficiency as well as investigate the impact of 
accounting numbers. This simultaneous test of efficiency 
and informational content is justified in the following 
chapter. The distinction between finance studies and 
accounting studies has been introduced to illustrate how 
additional research is required on behalf of accounting. 
The condition of market efficiency as demonstrated in 
the finance studies is not an adequate description of the 
domain in which accounting performs its role. Thus although 
efficiency has substantial implications for accounting it 
is submitted that the extension of accounting research on 
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capital markets involves more than merely observing which 
accounting methods are the most highly associated with 
share prices and assuming these to be the most desirable. 
Thus the writer respectfully disagrees with Beaver (1972) 
who states : 
'If the efficient markets hypothesis is adopted, then 
the association with security prices provides a 
simplified p~eference ordering with which alternative 
measurement methods can be ranked. That method which 
is more highly associated with security prices is 
more consistent with the underlying information set 
used in setting equilibrium prices. Hence, subject to 
a more complete anlalysis involving competing sources 
of information and costs of alternative methods, 
the finding provides prima f acie evidence that the 
method which is more highly impounded ought to be the 
method reported in financial statements.' (p.428) 
Support for the submitted criticism is found in Gonedes 
and Dopuch (1974) who theoretically showed that capital 
·market efficiency was not sufficient to justify the use 
of share prices in determining the most desirable accounting 
methods. 4 
To illustrate in a simple way the limitations of efficiency 
per se for accounting research, the following notational 
sequence is presented 
The activities of the reporting entity can be regarded as 
I 
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a series of economic events which determine the economic 
reality of that entity. Accounting seeks to measure 
and communicate this reality. If the premised objective 
of accounting is to facilitate economic decision-making, 
it is implied that the accounting process would seek 
to describe this economic reality as fully as possible.
5 
The reporting of the reality perfectly would constitute 
the optimal information set previously referred to. 
In the complex dynamics of modern business an economic 
reality is difficult to conceive let alone capture 
completely in accounting numbers. However, accounting 
should strive to ultimately provide or rather contribute 
to this optimal information set. 
Define : f. as a particular accounting method 
l 
x as the economic reality to be reported 
yi as the accounting information generated by fi 
(1) 
Let : g represent the process of information consumption 
l represent the market's interpretation of the x 
Then 
reality x 
l represent the equilibrium /1<.iu generated by p 
I represent all other information 
That is {(I+yi)t = ~t)} 
g(yilr> = xl = Pl 
available. 
describes how the market uses the information y 1 . 
x 
If the market has been proved efficient, the process g 
l 
will utilise any incremental information not already in 
(2) 
105 
I but present in yi to interpret the reality, then 
instantaneously and unbiasedly generate an equilibrium 
price p 1 . However, if y 1 represented a complete descript-
ion of x, ceteris paribus, an efficient market would 
interpret y 1 as reflecting x and generate p 0 , the optimal 
equilibrium price. 
Thus if, and only if, f 1 was the ultimate accounting 
measure, 
l 
and l 0 x = x p = p . 





0 x x p p . 
Thus the prices generated in an efficient market are as 
optimal as the information provided. The fact that 
x1 ¥ x would be indicative of accounting information 
constituting a source of market imperfection. 6 
It should be noted that if yi contains no better a 
description of x than already available in I,the market's 
interpretation x 1 would remain unaltered and thus the 
share price (ceteris paribus) would be unchanged. 
This simple notational sequence highlights three phenomena 
which are considered critical to empirical research 
investigating accounting information and security prices~ 
In the light of the fact that very little is known about 
the process g, apart from possibly the institutional 
characteristic of efficiency, the value of empirical 
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insight into this is apparent from the accounting point 
of view: 
(1) The existence of a multitude of accounting 
methods which generate different numbers and 
which in turn may result in the generation of 
different equilibrium prices, should be of 
concern to the accountant. An efficient market, 
however, would be able to distinguish the 
cosmetic or purely bookkeeping differences 
if sufficient information is provided. 2 
(2) The fact that the process g applies to a full 
information set underlines the competitive 
nature of information. The accounting researcher 
should find empirical evidence on the relation-
ship between accounting and other information 
useful for determining the optimal information 
set. 
(3) An insight into the process of information 
consumption and ~rice generation (g) would be 
useful for providing the optimal information 
set. 
Thus it should be noted that although finance studies and 
accounting studies may tend to be mutually supportive, 
their respective emphases diverge beyond share market 
efficiency. 
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5.3 THE COMPETITIVE NATURE OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION 
Although this phenomenon will not be directly incorporated 
into the empirical study, it is considered appropriate 
to give a brief perspective of the phenomenon as it is 
central to understanding the information consumption 
and price generation process. 
From equation (2) it is implied that the accountant does 
not have a monopoly on all information pertaining to 
the description of the entity's economic reality. 
To illustrate, the economic reality of a firm could be 
viewed as a manifestation of all economic impingement on 
its resources. This impingement could be trichotomised 
as follows : 
(1) Economy wide factors 
(2) Industry wide factors and, 
(3) Firm specific factors. 
The economic reality is not merely determined by (3) 
being those factors peculiar to the entity, but also by 
the economic milieu in which it operates. 
As modern communication and information systems develop 
all information on these factors becomes increasingly 
more available and threaten the informational content 
of the accounting numbers. 
The economy wide factors would include, inter alia, 
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statistics such as, the money supply changes, rate of 
inflation, interest rates, government expenditure, 
all of which are becoming increasingly more available. 
For example the Bureau for Economic Research (BER) at 
Stellenbosch University and the government Depa.rtment 
of Statistics issue this sort of information regularly 
and timeously. 
In an efficient market the impact of fluctuations in the 
economy on the firm's operations would be estimated and 
thus such fluctuations would have potential informational 
content for the valuation of the firm. 
The industry specific factors would be subject to a similar 
analysis by the market. Naturally the causal link 
between industry specific factors and the firm's operations 
is likely to be more easily discernable. Factors in this 
section would include, product demand statistics, input 
factor statistics such as prices for labour and raw 
materials, growth projections for the industry by trade 
organisations etc. 
The accountant does not even have a monopoly on firm 
specific information, various announcements and forecasts 
by company officials on the firm's earnings, complete 
with the published accounting numbers. The possibility 
of cross-sectional information transfer adds to the 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.needs to have informational value, that is, it must 
contain some information on the valuation of a future 
share price hitherto unknown. Informational value is 
virtually synonomous with the term predictive content. 
That is incremental information will be impounded into 
share prices if and only if it predicts the future value 
of a share. Thus predictive content could be explained 
as that characteristic of information a prior knowledge 
of which, ceteris paribus, would enable the prediction 
of a future price. Beaver, Kennelly and Voss (1968) 
suggest the predictive value criterion for the evaluation 
of accounting data. 
No attempt will be made in the current study to empirically 
investigate the competitive nature of information, 
however the above exposition was provided as a general 
perspective on the information market. The study does 
however investigate a potential differential market reaction 
to accounting information depending on particular variables 
already known to the market. Thus the relationship between 
accounting sources and other sources of information is to 
be considered. 
5.4 THE PROPOSED CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Generally accepted accounting practice permits a number 
of alternative methods for accounting for the various 
economic events impinging on a firm. These alternative 
methods generate different numbers and thus may be interpreted 
I 
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by the market differently. To establish empirically 
whether there is a substantial difference in the market 
interpretation of various accounting methods presents a 
formidable task. This is so because a comparative analysis 
of different firms using different methods is not possible. 
Current technology would not permit a filtering out of 
all other informational factors specific to each firm. 
The only alternative is to examine the use of two different 
methods by the same firm. Howeve~ as a firm cannot account 
for the same event by two different methods simultaneously 
it is submitted that accounting changes are the best 
phenomenon to examine in order to establish an insight into 
how the market interprets various methods. An accounting 
change occurs when a firm discontinues using a particular 
method for interpreting an economic reality and proceeds 
with another method. Thus an accounting change represents 
a decision point between various accounting methods. This 
phenomenon permits an accounting change to be studied 
empirically in relation to share prices as a comparative 
analysis of the old.and new method. The two methods are 
juxtaposed, as it were, and the market reaction to the 
change itself should render an insight into the information 
consumption process. 
Although empirical studies on accounting changes may not 
be able to determine the most desirable accounting alternative
9
, 
the policy maker should be aware of the market reaction to 
such changes. 
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In any study on the impact of accounting changes on share 
prices the results observed may be : 
(1) a reaction to the accounting change per se, or 
(2) a reaction to the specific informational 
content of the new method. 
Implicit in (1) is that certain categories of accounting 
changes may have informational content in themselves. 
For example, an accounting change may reflect a changed 
management style or the market may interpret management's 
motives for making the change. 
A reaction of the category (2) type may reflect the fact 
that there has been a gain or loss of information with 
regard to the economic reality being reported or rather 
to that aspect of the economic reality reported by the 
pair of accounting alternatives. 
In order to interpret the results of such studies and 
draw conclusions on the effect of a specific accounting 
change the confounding effect of the market reaction to 
the general attributes of the change should be established 
as these may override the specific effects. 
The importance of the distinction between (1) and (2) above 
is illustrated by the following hypothetical example : 
An accounting standards committee had empirically observed 
that a change from f 1 to f 2 which was merely a bookkeeping 
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change10 caused a particular reaction in the market which 
they found was consistent with the conclusion that f 2 was 
a better measure of the economic reality, x. Then, based 
on this conclusion (among other considerations) they 
issued an accounting standard making the use of f 2 
mandatory. Thus all firms would have had to change their 
accounting methods to f 2. Changes subsequent to the issue 
of the hypothetical statement would of course be non-
discretionary. If the initial market reaction had been 
caused by the market's interpretation of management's 
motivation or expectations in making the change this element 
of information would be lost and ceteris paribus there 
would subsequently be no market reaction to a change from 
f 1 to f 2 . The initial results were not due to the new 
method employed, but to the accounting change itself. 
Although a simple example, the point remains that the 
market reaction to a new accounting method may not be a 
reflection of the market's assessment of the informational 
content of the numbers per se, but of some insight gleaned 
from the change. 
The following framework is proposed on a conceptual level 
which should be of some interpretational value. It is 
acknowledged that to empirically evaluate and distil 
completely these confounding effects is an impossible task, 
for reaction to the change itself is a necessary concomitant 
of adopting the new accounting method. However, an Analysis 
of Variance approach applied to the residuals 11 of all the 
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categories of accounting changes proposed should lend 
some insight on the market reaction to particular kinds 
of changes. These results would then be useful in 
tempering the conclusions drawn from studies of particular 
accounting changes. 
The framework is a classificatory one which seeks to deter-
mine those characteristics of any accounting change which 
may lend the change,per se,informational value. 
The framework is presented in Figure 2, and shows a 
three-dimensional matrix of the possible categories of 
accounting changes, namely : 
- discretionary I non-discretionary 
- translatable / non-translatable 
- with economic implication / without economic implication. 
There are thus eight possible classifications of accounting 
changes. 
It should be noted that the description of a change from 
f 1 to f 2 may be c (where c is the category of change per 
figure 2). However a change from f 2 to f 1 may be c as 
well. The only criterion in terms of which accounting 
changes are consistently reclassified on reversal is the 
criterion based on the sign of the impact of the change 
on the unreported numbers. Although this criterion is 
shown in section 5.4.4 below to be a non-substantial criterion, 
each type of change presented in figure 2 could have either 













A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE CLASSIFICATION OF 
CHANGES IN REPORTED ACCOUNTING METHOD 
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Thus there are sixteen possible types of accounting 
changes. 
This classification system will be justified intuitively 
at the level of each criterion before reviewing the system 
as a whole. 
5.4.1 TRANSLATABLE v. NON-TRANSLATABLE12 ACCOUNTING CHAi~GES 
In an efficient market it has been assumed that 
providing an accounting change is supplemented with 
sufficient information to permit a translation of 
the numbers generated by the new method into the 
numbers of the old method, the market will ignore 
the change, Le.it will not be deceived by the numbers 
in the sense that the same economic reality is being 
13 reported upon. 
Notationally. 
fl(x) = Y1 





were a complete description of the 
economic reality x given any pair (f ,y) the reality 
x would be discernable or that portion of the total 
reality that either method purports to reportr 
i.e. : 
-1 
f (y 1 ) = x ~Po 
-1 
or f (y 2 ) = x ~Po 
As either method is unlikely to give a complete 
description nor is each portrayaJ likely to be 
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identical the following set applies 
-1 
f (yl) = xl => P1 
-1 
f (y 2) = x2 => P2 
where, 
and 
However, provided that a technique and sufficient 
14 
parameter values are available to the· user to 
establish both x 1 and x 2 with either method an 
accounting change from f 1 to £ 2 will not affect a 
movement from p 1 to p 2 . This is so because the 
market is aware that the difference between x
1 
and 
x 2 is merely a function of the different methods 
and that x 2 describes the same reality x. Thus 
where the following condition is met the change is 
translatable. 
h(fl' f2' Y2 I I) = Y1 (3) 
where : 
fl is the old method rules. 
f 2 is the new method rules. 
Y2 is the ne'.11 numbers generated. 
h is the technique required to translate. 
The requirement isthat sufficient information to 
1'-€.vE-'K£.. the change should be available to the user. 
Further in a situation where the above condition 
119 
prevails and there is no change in the reality x, 
the accounting change is cosmetic and, ceteris 
paribus the market will not react whether there 
was a positive or negative impact on the accounting 
numbers. 
It could be argued that if the different perspectives 
of x displayed by x1 and x 2 jointly describe the 
economic reality more fully than the two perspectives 
alone, a change which according to the above criterion 
was cosmetic (without informational value) may 
actually not be so. This implies that equation (3) 
above is an inadequate definition of a cosmetic 
accounting change. However, ignoring the criterion 
of discretionary/non-discretionary (section 5.4.2} 
it is submitted that the above does define a cosmetic 
change and that the argument contradicting such would 
only apply if x 1 and x 2 taken together fully described 
the economic.reality. Thisis unlikely as x 1 and 
x 2 can only purport to be interpreting a portion of 
this reality. 
An accounting change that is translatable is unlikely 
to have information content as the market will be 
aware of an unchanged economic reality. Conversely 
if there is a changed economic reality, an accounting 
change that is translatable will not be able to 
hide the fact from the market behind the numbers of 
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a new accounting method. 
On the other hand however, if the condition described 
in (3) is not met and the change is classified as 
non-translatable it is possible that a movement 
from x 1 to x 2 by the market could occur. Although 
the market would be aware that the difference between 
x1 and x 2 would be due to a function of the difference 
between f 1 and f 2 , it could not be sure that the 
economic reality had remained unchanged. Thus it 
may attribute part of the change in x 1 and x 2 to a 
change in the economic reality. 
Examples of translatable accounting changes are : 
The change from F~I~F.O .. to L.I.F.O. in 
South Africa. 
The change from the non-provision for deferred 
tax to the provision for deferred t~x. 
Examples of non-translatable accounting changes are 
The change from F.I.F.O. to L.I.F.O. in 
15 the U.S.A. 
A conversion from the Historic Rate method 
to the Current Rate method of translating 
foreign subsidiaries on consolidation. 
Thus the translatable/non-translatable criterion is 
considered important when examining an accounting 
change. This section particularly illustrated that 
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where a change is translatable the market reaction 
is not likely to be a function of the translatability. 
The converse is, however, true for non-translatabil-
ity. The non-translatability of an accounting 
change would have to be regarded as a confounding 
effect in a study on such changes. 
5.4.2 DISCRETIONARY AND NON-DISCRETIONARY ACCOUNTING CHANGES 
This attribute was referred to by Harrison (1977) 
as being a source of differential market reaction to 
accounting changes. This observation will be 
referred to when appropriate. 
A discretionary accounting change is defined as an 
accounting change which is decided endogenously to 
the firm. That is, the decision to report the new 
method is decided by agents internal to the firm 
in the absence of external pressures to report a new 
method. 
Conversely, a non-discretionary change is defined 
as an accounting change d.ecided exogenously to the 
firm. That is, the decisions taken internally place 
the entity in that situation where a change in the 
reported method is forced by external factors. These 
external factors include the issue of a statement 
of GAAP, legislation, etc. The decision to change 
per se was not taken by the agents of the entity. 
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A discretionary change which increases the income 
figure that would have been reported in terms of 
the old method, could be subject to the following 
interpretation by the market. 
The change may reflect management's expectation of 
a future decrease in income. This motivation is 
thus interpreted as being to cushion the visual impact 
of this expected decrease on the income figures. 
However, a non-discretionary change could not reveal 
any of management's motivations behind the change 
as the decision to report a new method was not taken 
by them. Although this type of change may reflect 
the exact magnitude of management's conservative 
bias in previous reports it is submitted that a non-
discretionary change with a positive impact on 
earnings will not have as confounding an effect as 
a similar discretionary change. 
This intuitive assertion was supported by the empirical 
evidence of Harrison (1977) who concludes 
"However, the negative return differences 
for discretionary changes, contrasted with the 
positive return differences for non-discretionary 
changes, suggest that the discretion available 
to management in making the ACs possess 
information content."(p.105) 
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The converse situation of a discretionary change 
decrea~ing earnings may be interpreted as being 
a reflection of management's confidence as to future 
earnings. However, a non-discretionary change of 
this type may be interpreted by the market as 
being a reflection of management's liberal bias 
in previous reports, thus resulting in a reassessment 
of management. Again however, a non-discretionary 
change is less likely to have a confounding effect 
than a discretionary change. 
To summarise, it is submitted that discretionary 
accounting changes may have informational content 
in themselves, a reaction to which may mask the 
potential reaction to the new method. This is not 
likely to be the case for non-discretionary changes 
which are regarded as neutral vis a vis market 
reaction. 
Examples of non-discretionary changes are : 
(1) a provision of deferred tax in response 
tO l. 002 t 
(2) a switch to L.I.F.O once a decision is 
taken to use the method for tax. 




5.4.3 ACCOUNTING CHANGES WITH ECONOMIC IMPLICATION AND 
WITHOUT ECONOMIC IMPLICATION 
An accounting change which heralds a change in the 
economic reality of the entity should have information-
al content for the market, unless this change in 
the reality has already been gleaned by the market 
from other sources. 
Thus a change without an underlying economic cause 
should, ceteris paribus, cause no reaction in the 
market, irrespective of the sign of the earnings 
change. 
A change in the economic reality heralded by an account-
ing change resulting in a change in the earnings 
figure of the same sign, i.e. increase or decrease, 
should cause the same reaction in the market, i.e. 
either positive or negative, assuming all other signals 
to be neutral.. Thus the cause of the change cannot 
be established in a market of unproven efficiency. 
The reaction may be to the new reality or merely a 
blind reaction to the accounting numbers. To invest-
igate such a change it would be necessary to examine 
the reaction of a general class of changes with 
economic significance and another general class without 
economic significance and observe any differential 
reaction. Further, general classes of accounting 
changes with positive and negative impacts on accounting 
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numbers would need to be examined for differential 
reactions. The results of these two sets of tests 
would be the equivalent of efficiency tests in that 
it could be established whether or not the market 
blindly reacted to the earnings figures. However, 
if no clarity was achieved the results of the test 
on the specific change could only be interpreted 
cautiously as the real cause of the reaction cannot 
be isolated with certainty. 
This classification is most useful however, while 
there is a change in the economic reality which is 
inversely related to the change in the accounting 
numbers. For, holding other signals neutra~ the 
observed reaction will display the overriding cause. 
The problem mentioned above does not arise in the 
case of an accounting change without an economic 
implication and any reaction observed holding other 
attributes neutral would be due to the accounting 
numbers themselves. 
Thus this classification criterion is proposed as 
it distinguishes a potential informational signal 
(with economic implication) and a neutral one 
(without economic implication). 
Examples of accounting changes with an economic 
implication are : 
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(1) Any reported accounting change which 
coincides with a commensurate change for 
tax purposes, e.g. F.I.F.O to L.I.F.O. 
(2) The introduction of the equity method of 
accounting for an investment after a 
changed relationship; the new relation-
ship warranting the new method. 
Examples of accounting changes without an economic 
implication would be : 
( 1) A change from the deferral method for 
accounting for deferred tax to the 
liability method. 
(2) A provision for the investment tax allowance. 
5.4.4 THE GLOBAL VIEW OF THE FRAMEWORK 
It will be noted that the sign of the impact on the 
accounting numbers of an accounting change are not 
discussed separately. It is felt that this is not 
a substantive classification. 
It is not considered separately because neither class 
(positive or negative) presents a neutral category. 
Instead it is viewed-as a co-variable which was 
considered within each category. 
The essence of this conceptual classificatory frame-
work is that three pairs of neutral/active categories 
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have been discerned. Neutral implies that the 
attribute per se, has no informational value, 
whereas active implies a potential informational 
value of the attribute. The result is shown on 
.figure 2 above. There are eight categories of 
change within which each change may have a positive 
or negative impact on the reported earnings. 
Thus sixteen possible types of accounting changes 
are established. 
Taken as a whole the framework provides a system 
for ration~lly establishin~ the potential confounding 
effects on the int~rpretation of the results 
of an empirical study. 
The classification isolated the most neutral two 
categories l+ and 1-, being non-discretionary 
translatable accounting changes without economic 
implication. These are defined as the cosmetic 
categories. The accounting changes in these categ-
ories are not likely of themselves to have any 
informational value. Thus any reaction by the 
market, perceived empirically, is safely attributable 
to the new method itself. However, in view of the 
conclusions drawn in S.5.4.l the new method is unlikely 
to have any additional information content. 
The most active categories would be 8+ and 8-, being 
' 
discretionary non-translatable changes with an 
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economic implication. All these factors will be 
potential information sources. Therefore all the 
factors may obscure the impact of the new method. 
It is submitted that it may prove impossible to 
make the suggested framework completely operational 
for empirical research. To do so the whole universe 
of accounting changes reported in a market would 
need to be classified according to the framework. 
The current model which will be introduced in the 
next chapter could be utilised to establish the 
residuals for each general category thereby reflecting 
the impact of such. One would expect a differential 
16 
reaction between categories. A three way ANOVA 
could be applied to the results and the individual 
factor effects established relative to one another. 
Naturally, the parameters of ANOVA technique would 
have to be adhered to. Assuming there were sufficient 
different specific changes constituting each general 
category the results of the ANOVA would provide a 
table of reference for expected results for all 
empirical studies on accounting changes in a particular 
market. 
This would constitute a very_ interesting and useful 
research project on its own. No attempt is made in 
the current study to provide this empirical evidence. 
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A table of reference would provide the accountant 
with an insight into the operations of the information 
market and further provide a basis for establishing 
the effect on the market of a new accounting method. 
The following two questions will now be addressed 
(1) Would the framework apply only in an 
efficient market ? and 
(2) Of what use is the framework on the 
conceptual level to studies seeking to 
investigate empirically the relationship 
between accounting methods and share prices ? 
The answer to (1) is yes and no. Yes, in as much 
as the intuitive rationale implicitly assumed 
efficiency in the justification of categorising the 
characteristics as neutral or active. However, an 
empirical.evaluation of the market reaction to 
general classes of accountihg changes would be a 
useful insight even into a mildly ine£ficient market. 
A mildly inefficient market is one which takes some 
time to impound information, yet it impounds such 
consistently. 
Question (2) refers to the use of the conceptual 
framework prior to the establishment of empirical 
evidence for a differential market reaction between 




changes categorised with more than one active 
element the confounding effect cannot be removed. 
This would apply to categories 4, 6, 7 and 8. 
Further, it would also apply to those accounting 
changes in category 2 in which the impact on 
earnirigs of the change was directly related to the 
economic implication. In such cases a positive 
economic development is accompanied by an increase 
in and a negative development by a decrease in 
earnings. In the absence of contrary evidence the 
researcher could not adequately interpret the 
market reaction which could have been caused by the 
accounting numbers or the economic implications. 
However, the other categories 1 and 5 and the 
remainder of 2 are empirically testable within the 
framework. 
5.5 AN EX'I'ENSION OF THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK TO TESTS OF SPECIFIC 
ACCOUNTING CHANGES 
Having categorised the accounting changes according to the 
framework of figure 2 and considered the possible confounding 
effects of the various factors, the researcher must decide 
whether, in the absence of the empirical base suggested, 
it is intuitively meaningful to study the impact of a 
specific accounting change on share prices. If an insight 
is sought on the market's reaction to the new method, the 
confounding effects of the informational content of the 
change itself may render the experiment meaningless in the 
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absence of a technique to account for these effects. 
Having decided that the confounding effects are unlikely 
to occur or are likely to be counter directional to the 
reaction being investigated, the researcher may proceed. 






g is the information consumption process, 
yi is the accounting information generated by the 
accounting method f., 
1 
xi is the market's interpretation of the market 
reality x based on ¢t where ~t = (yi+I), 
p. is the equilibrium price so generated. 
1 
An accounting change from fi will result in a new yi 
which will be analysed by the market. The characteristics 
proposed in the fr~mework of figure 2 are likely to 
influence this perception. However, apart from these 
'co-variables', that is, variables describing the change, 
there may be other factors known to the market (contained 
in I) which may influence the market's perception of Yi 
and thus xi resulting in a price movement away from pi. 
As such factors mediate between the accounting numbers 
and the share market they have been referred to as inter-
vening variables. The existence of such variables does 
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assume that accounting information is jointly processed 
with other information, i.e. the competitive nature of 
accounting information is assumed. 7 
The term 'intervening variable' was coined by Abdel-Khalik 
and McKeown (1978) who wrote : 
;1 intervening variables mediate between 
accounting based information and the securities 
market in processing of the signals provided by 
such information. Different intervening variables 
may alter the interpretation of the same accounting 
event. 11 (p. 851) 
Their ideas are adopted here and tailored into the curr~nt 
framework. It is proposed that a distinction be made 
between what could be referred to as endogenous inter~ 
vening variables and exogenous intervening variables. 
Endogenous intervening variables are those variables in-
herent in an event. For example the variables proposed 
in the framework of figure 2 are endogenous to a particular 
accounting change. They are really signals emitted 
simultaneously with a particular event and are thus defined 
in y. in equation 2. 
l. 
Exogenous intervening variables, on the other hand, are 
those variables already available or from another source 
and would be defined in I of equation 2. 
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The endogenous type have been considered in the proposed 
framework. There may be a number of others, but these 
are considered to represent the first order group of 
endogenous intervening variables. 
A multitude of exogenous intervening variables may mediate 
between accounting information and share prices and no 
attempt is made here to suggest a criterion for establishing 
those most important or first order variables. 
In an adaptation of the diagram presented by Abdel-Khalik 
and McKeown (1978, p.863) an overview of these relation-
ships is presented in figure 3. 
To revive our hypothetical researcher from pagel31 above.: 
He should now determine the first order exogenous variables 
which are most likely to intervene in his investigation. 
Then he should partition his group into categories determined 
by the intervening variable. For example, the population 
would be categorised.into high relative risk firms and 
low relative risk firms if the relative risk were the inter-
vening variable. 
Having taken cognisance of the first order exogenous 
intervening variables an interpretation of the res~duals 
obtained in a contemporaneous association test (explained 
in chapter 6) should provide useful insight to our 
researcher on the accounting change being investigated. 





































































































































































































































































should lend insight into the information consumption 
process. If the partition criterion is an exogenous 
interveining variable a differential reaction could be 
expected. 
It is useful to consider that the process being investigated 
may not remain constant through time. Thus it is hypothes-
ised that as the market develops the information consumption 
process may change. Therefore, it is recommended in this 
framework that the researcher examines accounting changes 
in successive chronological partitions. If a differential 
reaction is apparent the hypothesis may be accepted. A 
further implication is that the most current reaction is 
the most likely to be the same for similar accounting 
changes in the near future. 
This framework has been proposed at an intuitive level 
under the implicit assumption of a reasonably efficient 
market. It does not purport to be a rigid theoretical 
structure nor does it address the empirical question of 
verification. A cursory observation on a possible .empirical 
route was made. However, as proposed, the framework is 
considered to be a useful guideline for empirical research 
on accounting changes. It cautions the interpretation 
of results in certain cases in which the confounding effects 
of intervening variables are apparent. 
Although the methodology is to be presented in the following 







of the particular accounting change chosen in this study. 
5.6 THE CHOICE OF THE ACCOUNTING CHl~NGE L.I.F.0 WITHIN THE 
PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
A change in accounting method from F.I.F.O to L.I.F.O 
would be classified according to the proposed framework 
as a 2- change. It is a translatable non-discretionary 
change which has an economic implication and a negative 
impact on earnings. This negative impact on earnings 
is counter-directional to the economic implication which 
is positive. 
5.6.1 A BRIEF BACKGROUND ON L.I.F.O 
L.I.F.O refers to the Last-in-first-out cost flow 
assumption of inventory valuation whereby it is 
assumed that the costs of the most recent purchases 
of merchandise should be charged to the most recent 
sales of such. Thus in times of rising prices a 
lower earnings figure results. This is the qonverse 
of the F.I.F.O approach which refers to the first-
in-first-out cost flow assumption of inventory 
valuation whereby year end inventory is valued at 
the most recent purchase price. 
Although only given a cursory mention in the appendix 
to ED10 18 , L.I.F.O was mentioned as an acceptable 
cost formula for financial reporting in IAS2 19 , 
provided that additional information was disclosed 
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(see para 26) which was tantamount to ensuring 
that a switch to L.I.F.O was translatable. 
L.r.F.O is given an economic significance by 
virtue of the fact that if ap9lied to tax reporting 
reduced liability for tax is incurred. Thus the 
present value of future cash flows is increased 
because the present value of future tax payments 
decreases. The result is an increase in economic 
well being, in times of rising prices. 
With the increase in price levels witnessed in 
recent years, this characteristic has enticed a 
number of South Af.rican companies to change to 
L.r.F.O to improve their inflation squeezed cash 
positions. There are certain immediated implications 
of a switch to L.I.F.O. The more important are 
listed below : 
(1) Section 22(5) of the Income tax Act 
No. 58 of 1962 requires that if a Company 
uses the L.I.F.O system for tax purposes 
it must use L.I.F.O for financial 
reporting purposes. However, this section 
does not prohibit the simultaneous 
footnote disclosure of F.I.F.O information. 
(2) The reported book value of the firm 
diminishes as inventory is valued at 
older prices. 
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(4) If there is a rev~rsal of current trends 
and the price level falls earnings will 
be inflated above the F.I.F.O figures and 
an increased tax will become payable. 
(5) L.I.F.O removes the unrealised holding 
gains reported on a F.I.F.O system and 
thus the difference between the two earnings 
figures (L.I.F.O and F.I.F.O) may measure, 
to a degree, the firm's exposure to in-
flation. 
It is noted that it is, of course, possible for a 
firm to report L.I.F.O and not take it for tax 
purposes, in which case a change to L.I.F.O would 
have no economic significance whatsoever. No such 
case has been encountered on the JSE. 
5.6.2 IS L.I.F.O A NON-DISCRETIONARY CHANGE? 
It could be argued that as the decision to report 
L.I.F.O for tax was taken endogenously, a change in 
the reporting for financial purposes is discretionary. 
It is submitted, however, that management abdicated 
their discretion vis ~ vis reported accounting method 
by taking an economic decision, to optimise their 
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cash/tax configuration. 
As regards the framework, the importance of 
deciding whether an accounting change was discretion-
ary was the potential confounding effect on the 
inte~pretation by the market of management's motives. 
As the motives for a switch to L.I.F.O are fairly 
apparent, namely for improved cash flow, the 
potential discretionary nature of the change is 
unlikely to have a confounding effect. The issue 
is that the translatability and non-discretionary 
characteristics are neutral which means that any 
reaction to a change to L.I.F.O will be either 
(1) a reaction to the improved cash flow 
(positive economic significance), or 
(2) a reaction to the deflated earnings figure. 
These effects being counter-directional, the 
overriding effect will be identifiable. 
Thus accounting changes to L.I.F.O lend themselves 
very readily to investigation within the current 
framework. 
It appears that there will be little confounding 
effects caused by endogenous invervening variables. 
In this study the exogenous intervening variable 
examined will be the relative risk of firms defined 
by Sor the co-variability of the share price with 
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the market . 
. 
Further, the magnitude of the impact on earnings 
will be examined for potential differential market 
reaction. Finally, a chronological sequence of 
partitions will be employed to investigate how the 
market's response may be changing through time. 
5.6.3 POSSIBLE CONCLUSIONS TO BE DRAWN FROM THE STUDY 
The potential conclusions of this study are manifold 
and are briefly listed for the sake of clarity. 
(1) Empirical evidence of market efficiency 
may be obtained. 
(2) An insight into the information consumption 
process should be derived. 
(3) Any differential reaction to the intervening 
variable S would indicate that relative 
risk was indeed an intervening variable 
in the market perception of a change to 
L.I.F.O .. 
(4) Any differential.reaction to the chrono-
logical sequence would indicate a developing 
market information consumption process. 
In all, the results could afford the accounting 
academician an interesting insight into the process 
by which accounting information is employed in the 




1. The term accounting change is not synonymous with that 
definition by the AICPA in APB 20. The AICPA (1978) 
defines an a'ccounting change as a •:change in (a) an 
accounting principle, (b) an accounting estimate, or 
(c) the reporting entity ... 11 The current use of the 
term would fall into sub-section (a) of the above, 
namely that point where an accounting method is discarded 
in favour of an alternative method. 
2. See Findlay III (1977) for this distinction between finance 
studies and accounting studies. 
3. See chapter 4 for a review of the empirical evidence for 
the efficiency of the JSE. 
4. This has been illustrated in chapter 4. 
5. This premise has been supported by Beaver (1972). See 
chapter 4. 
6. The idea that accounting constitutes a source of market 
imperfection will not be expanded upon here. The interested 
reader is referred to Birkett and Walker (1974) and 
Amernic (19 75) . 
7. The concept of cosmetic accounting changes is expanded on 
later in this chapter. 
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8. These alternative sources of information were represented 
by I in equation (2). 
9. See Gonedes and Dopuch {1974). 
10. In this context a bookkeeping change refers to an accounting 
change which does not herald a change in the economic 
reality being reported. 
11. Residuals will be fully defined in the research methodology 
of chapter 6. 
12. This section draws on ideas from the work of Park, Evering-
ham and Harbecke {1979). 
13. See Kaplan and Roll {1972). 
14. Parameter values are any other sources of information 
necessary to translate a method. For example, to provide 
for depreciation in a set of accounts not providing such, 
a parameter value required would be the expected life of 
the assets to be depreciated. The expected life of the 
assets in this hypothetical example is a parameter value. 
15. L.I.F.O firms may not report F.I.F.O informatio~ in their 
financial statements. The information of F.I.F.O however 
is likely to be in the S.E.C 10-K form, where the current 
cost of inventories is required. 
16. ANOVA refers to the statistical technique the Analysis of 
Variance. 
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17. See section 5.3 . 
. · 18. ED 10 is the South African exposure draft on inventories. 
19. IAS 2. is the statement on inventories issued by the. 






THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces the research methodology employed 
in the current study. It proceeds with an overview of 
the various types of accounting empirical studies with 
a particular justification of market level studies. The 
two stage time series methodology is introduced in section 
6.2.2 followed by a literature review of selected account-
ing studies employing this methodology. The methodology 
is explained before introducing the data in section 6.4.2 
which is followed by an explanation of the procedure 
taken. The model is defended in section 6.5. Finally, 
the chapter concludes with a section on hypothesis setting 
in general and a justification for· simultaneously testing 
efficiency and market reaction to accounting changes. 
The hypotheses are set and tested by reference to the results 
of the study which are presented graphically in chapter 7. 
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6.2.1 WHY MARKET LEVEL STUDIES? 
There has been a marked trend in accounting academic 
literature 1 in the United States toward market level 
studies. According to Benston (1980) the trend 
has moved from the nor13)ative 'What should investors 
need' approach to a more positive 'What do investors 
want' approach. 







Share market studies 
I individual level 
~ aggregate level 
Laboratory studies observe the reaction of certain 
individuals to accounting information in a simulated 
environment. These studies permit the researcher 
to focus the attention of the subject on the item 
of interest. Yet, they contain certain serious 
shortcomings which reduce their validity : 
Firstly, the observed actions of the subjects are 
made in vacuo in the absence of the large body of 
information which would exist in reality. 
Secondly, the subjects may not be representative of 
the investing population and thus the conclusions 
drawn from such studies may not be generalised. 
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Thirdly, it has been the case in most of these 
studies that the subjects are biased in that they 
are normally a class of students who have undergone 
the same education process. 
The most well known example of such a study was by 
Ijiri, Jaedicke and Knight (1966) who performed 
such a laboratory study and found that their subjects 
were deceived by the different numbers generated by 
various accounting methods. In other words, their 
decision process did not adjust for differences in 
accounting method. This study gave rise to what is 
now known as the Funcional Fixation Hypothesis 3 
{FFH) which suggests that the user of financial 
statements becomes fixated with the earnings figure 
and bases all decisions on this figure irrespective 
of the accounting method. If the FFH is valid, a 
change to L.I.F.O would result in a negative impact 
on share prices because the investors would perceive 
the reduced earnings as a diminishing economic well-
being. 
The survey method does remove the b1as of the lab-
oratory study as real investors are questioned. 
However, a new bias is introduced known as the non-
response bias. A feature of these studies has been a 
very low response which is not peculiar to accounting, 
but is true of most types of Su.'T'-Vf..,y studies. The 
consequence of a low response is that the views of 
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the non-repliers are not accounted for. Furthermore, 
where the surveys merely request a listing and ranking 
of the respondents' preferences vis a vis accounting 
information, it is not assumed that the respondents 
would actually use the information if it were supplied 
to them. 
The third drawback of the survey method is that the 
non-respondants are likely to be the real decision 
makers since the opportunity cost of such individuals' 
time would prevent them from wasting time on the 
survey in the first place. 
Examples of such works are Jensen (1966) and Dyckman 
(1966). Jensen surveyed a number of professional 
security analysts using a comparative case study 
approach of two almost identical f irrns using different 
accounting methods. He concluded that accounting 
differences did affect the analysts' evaluation of 
share prices. This constitutes evidence for the FFH. 
Share market studies are superior to the laboratory 
and survey methods as an examination is made of the 
investors' revealed preferences. The study is 
carried out in situ as it were, and thus the results 
are more easily generalised. Such aggregate level 
studies are not without their shortcomings, particular-
ly where designed to answer the abovernentioned positive 
question ; there can be no revealed preference to 
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information not presently provided. 
There are two general approaches within the share 
market category. The first is based on a valuation 
approach where a valuation model is constructed for 
share prices. The impact of the event of interest 
is evaluated in terms of this model. For example, 
O'Donnell (1965) suggested the simple price earnings 
ratio (P/E) as the model and measured the mean P/E 
of three groups of electric utilities using different 
depreciation methods. Comparing the trends in such 
through time, he concluded that the market perceived 
the additional earnings reported as a result of a 
change in depreciation method to be real earnings. 
Another study of this type was by I•llynarczyk ( 1969) . 
He suggested a fairly complicated valuation model 
whereby a share price was defined as a function of 
accounting earnings, expected growth, revenues, 
debt equity ratio and 2 dummy variables, one of which 
was the use of alternative accounting methods. His 
conclusion, consistent with that of O'Donnell, was 
that different accounting methods did influence share 
prices. Summers (1968) used a similar method to 
0' Donnell, but did not draw the same con cl us ion, 
i.e. he suggested that alternative accounting methods 
did not effect share prices. Another example of 
studies of this type is that of Gonedes (1969). 
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~here are however some major criticisms of the 
valuation approach to share market studies. Firstly, 
the models are arbitrary and generally lack a 
theoretical underpinning. Secondly, to date such 
arbitrary models have emphasised the relationship 
between the level of earnings (and other variables) 
and level of share prices. Such correlations are 
of less interest to accounting researchers than the 
association between accounting changes and changes 
in share prices. Further, the valuation approach 
is likely to be biased by the scale factor inevitable 
in examining absolute rather than relative values. 
This is easily understood in view of the fact that 
it is not the absolute impact on share price levels 
of accounting information that is of interest, 
but the relative impact on changes in share price. 
Thirdly, each share price is examined in isolation 
thus ignoring crbss-sectional associations that 
may exist between share price changes. 4 
The second and by far the most popular approach in 
both the finance and empirical accounting literature 
is the two-stage time series methodology initially. 
employed by Fam~ Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) (FFJR) 
in -the first direct test of market efficiency on 
the NYSE. As this methodology is to be employed in 
the current study, the model will now be formally 
introduced followed by a brief literature review of 
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the accounting studies employing this methodology 
or variants thereof . 
6. 2. 2 THE TWO-STAGE TIME SERIES METHODOLOGY IN MAR.1<ET LEVEL 
STUDIES 
The model is formally introduced in this section in 
order to facilitate the literature review in section 
6.2.3 below. However, an explicit explanation of 
the market model will be presented in section 6.3. 
The first stage of the methodology is an attempt to 
remove those movements in share prices attributable 
to market wide or common factors. These are factors 
common to all shares. King (1966) has shown that 
on the NYSE about 50% of the variance in share prices 
is due to these common.factors. It is questionable 
whether such evidence is transferable to the JSE, 
yet it does provide a likely indicator in the absence 
of local empirical evidence. The relationship 
between the movements in each share price and changes 
in the market is established by regressing a time 
series of each share's returns with a time series 
of returns on a market index. This index is a 
surrogate for a market portfolio. The return on 
share j for time t is defined as 




and the return of the market factor is defined as 
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It - It-1 R = mt (2} 
1t-l 
where pjt is the price of share j in period t 
It is the value of the market index in 
period t. 
The subscript t refers to the end of period t and 
in most studies below represents a monthly interval. 
The regression model takes the form of equation (3} 
below which represents the best linear unbiased 
estimate of the constants s. and a .. uJ.t represents . . J J 
the individualistic factor which has an expected 
value of zero. ujt represents the individualistic 
factor which has an expected value of zero. As 
a result of this regression assumption in (3), 
periods for which these u.t values are unlikely 
J 
to be zero must be deleted from the time series for 
an unbiased estimate of a. and $ .. The obJ'ect of . J J 
these studies has been to establish whether there 
are any abnormal movements in these individualistic 
factors which may be attributable to the event in 
question. Thus the period around the time of the 
event of interest is deleted from the time series 
data used to estimate a. and S .. 
J J 
= (3) 
The first stage thus establishes estimates of a. 
. . . J 
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and Bj based on the non-deleted period for each share 
in the study. 
The second stage in the methodology seeks to examine 
the abnormal residuals (if any) which may be 
attributable to the event in question. An abnormal 
residual is defined as the difference between the 




S.R t J m (4) 
Thus for each share a ujt value is established for 
each time interval in the deleted period. 
In order to remove or reduce the effect of any 
events not common to each share in the study, an 
average residual is established for each time interval 
defined as : 
l ~ ~ ' = - '--' U· 
N j=l Jt 
t = - ( X-1) I • • • t X (5) 
where there are 2x intervals in the deletion period 
and week 0 defines the time of the event common to 
the N number of shares in the study. Qt is also 
referred to as an abnormal return in period t, 
being that return observed from an equally weighted 
portfolio over and above the market return after 
risk adjustment. Bj represents the risk of each 
share being a measure of its co-variability with 
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the market. Finally, a cumulative abmormal return 
(residual} defined by equation (6) below is established 






t = - (x-1} I • • . ,-x (6) 
ut and ut both have an expected value of zero and 
therefore any movements in a plot of ut away from 
zero are attributed to the common event. Considering 
that the deleted periods are different chronological 
periods for each share, the potential effect of 
abnormal market behaviour in particular time periods 
is eliminated. 
The product of stage 2 is thus 2x values of cumula-
tive abnormal residuals (CARs} which are plotted 
graphically. If the accounting event being studied 
has any informational value, a movement is expected 
away from zero at week zero. Further, if the market 
is efficient the movement away from zero is expected 
to occur rapidly and then the CARs should remain 
constant at the new level. This aspect is carefully 
analysed with schematic examples in section 6.6. 
6.2.3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
It is considered appropriate to present the reader 
with a brief literature review of accounting studies 
using this methodology (or variants thereof} . The 
review does not purport to be exhaustive, however 
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this presentation of the more significant studies 
should be useful. An exhaustive approach is not 
considered necessary as none of the studies,mostly 
being concerned with tests on the NYSE,relate to 
the JSE. 
The first study to employ this methodology was by 
Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) who examined 
the impact of the announcement of stock (share) 
splits by companies on share prices. The rationale 
was that stack splits were normally announced by 
companies which had been prospering in their recent 
past and the majority of such companies were able 
to increase their dividend payouts after the splits. 
The ability to pay out increased dividends derived 
from increased profitability and obviously not 
from the split itself. The premise was that only 
firms with increasing profitability ventured stock 
splits. Thus it was posited that there was a high 
association between the announcement of a stock 
split and an increase in dividend. As the improved 
profitability should ha~e been perceived by the 
market because information of such would be publicly 
available, the researchers hypothesised that the 
announcement of a stocks split would have no impact 
on share returns since the increased dividend associated 
with such should have been an~cipated, based on the 
publicly available information set. Their result 
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was consistent with what would be expected in an 
efficient market (semi-strong) • The CARs in the 
pre-announcement portion of the deletion period 
showed an increasing positive value until month 
zero when the CARs levelled off. This illustrates 
how the announcement itself had no informational 
content despite its apparent high association with 
subsequent dividend announcements. They further 
showed a differential reaction in the post announcement 
period between firms increasing dividends (anticipated) 
and those decreasing dividends (unexpected). The 
dividend increasersexhibited CARs with a slight 
upward drift, however the decreasers' CARs showed a 
drastic reduction. 
It should be noted that this study has been briefly 
reviewed to cite the emergence of this methodology 
although the work itself was not an accounting study. 
Accounting studies have borrowed the model from 
the finance literature. 
The review of the accounting studies will concentrate 
on those studies on the association between accounting 
changes and changes in share prices employing the 
model presented. The study by Sunder (1973) on the 
impact of a change to L.I.F.O on the HYSE will 
dominate the short review as it is considered the 
most relevant. A list is provided in table 1 of 
156 
accounting studies employing the model or variants 
of it. Their detailed source references are available 
in the bibliography. 
Sunder (1973) used the two-stage market model 
methodology to examine the association between the 
announcement of a change to L.I.F.O and changes in 
share prices. He used a 12 year inclusion period 
and a 2 year exclusion period. The 2 year deletion 
spanned 1 year before the announcement and l year 
after the announcement which was arbitrarily assumed 
to have been made on the last day of the financial 
year in which the change was reported. 
The behaviour of the CARs derived by Sunder in the 
second stage of the test are reproduced in figure 1. 
As he used monthly returns there were 24 points on 
the deletion period graph. The results show non-
random positive behaviour in the pre-announcement 
residuals, however after the announcement a random 
pattern emerged. The author acknowledged three 
different interpretations. 
(1) As the post period residuals are random, 
the announcement had no impact on share 
returns. 
(2) The abnormal positive returns observed in 
the pre-announcement period may have been 
caused by the impending switch to L.I.F.O, 
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information of which had leaked to the 
market prior to the official announcement. 
(3) The results may be a reflection of a sample 
bias in that improved earnings in the pre-
announcement period may have caused the 
abnormal returns on one hand and motivated 
management to make the accounting change on 
the other. Sunder posits an income smoothing 
motive. Thus he implies that only firms 
experiencing good times economically make 
such a change to L.I.F.O. 
The implications of interpretations (1) and (3) are 
that a change to L.I.F.O has neither a positive 
effect due to improved cash flow nor a negative effect 
due to decreased earnings, on share returns. 
However, interpretation (2) implies a positive effect 
as the market reacts to the news of improved cash 
flows. 
Interpretation (1) is viewed as extremely tenuous 
as the month 0 in the study may not be the month 
of the announcement. It is submitted that Sunder's 
arbitrary choice of announcement date is quite 
unjustified and thus the interpretation is spurious. 
Honth 0 may not represent the date of announcement 






5 x x 











-11 0 +12 
MONTHS RELATIVE TO ANNOUNCEMENT 
159 
cross-sectional association. It has been suggested 
by JY:eyers (1973) that the announcement is more 
likely to have been made in the interim reports and 
thus the month O should be around month -6 in the 
diagram. Thus at least a portion of the observed 
positive CARs may be a reaction to the L.I.F.0 switch. 
The selection bias suggested in interpretation (3) 
is acknowledged by the writer (see section 6), in 
so far as post selection bias may be problematic 
where non-random residual behaviour is observed 
prior to the announcement. In such cases the announce-
ment may only be made by firms with such symptoms 
and thus, it is submitted, it is difficult to assume 
that the announcement caused the symptoms. In view 
of the arbitrary timing decision, however, little 
can be inferred. 
Interpretation (3) ignores the fact that dispite 
this potential duality of cause the market did not 
react to the favourable content of L.I.F.O. Thus 
although only firms enjoying good times may switch 
to L.I.F.O, the announcement should herald a period 
of even better times due to increased cash flow. 
This perspective changes Sunder's interpretation 
somewhat. If the positive CARs reflect the good times 
being experienced, it appears that these are reversed 
in the post announcement period suggesting that 
• 
160 
L.I.F.O actually dampened the abnormal returns 
which may have continued to be enjoyed by the firms. 
Thus it could be concluded that the market reacted 
to the accounting numbers and not the underlying 
economic reality. 
Subject to the timing criticism, interpretation (2) 
seems the most acceptable. The potential pitfalls 
in interpreting a graph of CARs are adequately 
covered in chapter 7. 
Sunder used a control group comprising of twenty-two 
firms which reported a change from L.I.F.O back to 
F.I.F.O, with the reverse effects. The results showed 
reasonably random returns to month O and then a series 
of a non-random negative returns. This then suggests 
a negative impact, implying that the market reacts 
to the underlying economic substance and not to the 
accounting numb~rs. Yet, the criticism mentioned 
above as to Sunder's arbitrary choice of the date 
of announcement apply here equally. Further, Sunder 
examined the potential impact of the switch to L.I.F.O 
on the relative risk of firms (as measured by their 
B factor). His tentative conclusion was that a 
change to L.I.F.O increased the relative risk of 
firms. 
A more recent study by Brown (1980) investigated what 
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he referred to as the short term impact of L.I.F.O 
on share returns. 
This study differs from Sunder's in the following 
respects : 
(1) Weekly data was used. 
(2) A 100 week inclusion and 30 week exclusion 
method was employed in stage 1. 
(3) Only changes announced in 1974 and 1975 were 
examined. 
( 4) The date of the announcement was deemed to 
be the date of the publishing of the interim 
results. 
(5) An attempt was made to use a non~equivalent 
control group of non-changers. 
The results, interestingly enough, reflected a swift 
and negative impact on share returns after the date 
of the announcement. Furthermore, in so far as 
only changes in a short period (two years) were 
examined, the contemporaneous association test 
employed is undermined to a certain extent in that 
the exclusion periods for each firm is not significant-
ly different. The attempt to do away with the 
arbitrariness of the selection of announcement dates 
constitutes an improvement on Sunder's work. Non-
theless, it is submitted that the only acceptable 
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approach is to establish unequivocally the exact 
date on which the announcement was made. The use 
of a non-equivalent control group can be criticised 
in that a random selection of exclusion periods in 
the control firms implicity matches each control 
.. 
firm with a change firm. Thus the confounding 
industry effects may cloud the results. Moreover, 
if a particular industry is disproportionally 
represented in the control group as compared with 
the change group, the results will be biased. 
It is acknowledged that the use of weekly data will 
increase the sensitivity of the test. 
Kaplan and Roll (1972) employed the two stage 
methodology to examine_the market reaction to two 
accounting changes which increased earnings without 
any economic implications. They used weekly data 
and a sixty week exclusion period. Although the 
inclusion period varied between firms, the vast ' 
majority included over three hundred observations 
in the first stage. 
The two accounting changes were : 
(1) A change to the flow-through method of 
accounting for the investment credit, and 
(2) A change to straight line depreciation. 
Their conclusions suggested that the market saw 
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through the numbers and that there was thus no 
significant association between the changes and 
share returns. 
Archibald (1972) investigated the market reaction 
to a single accounting change. This change was the 
depreciation switch-back examined by Kaplan and Roll 
(1972). He used monthly data and used a 156 month 
inclusion period and a two year exclusion period. He 
concluded that the market was able to see behind 
the increased earnings numbers and no abnormal asso-
ciation was observed. 
The study by Harrison (1977) has been referred to in 
chapter 5. Employing the two stage methodology he 
concluded that there was a differential market reaction 
to discretionary and non-discretionary accounting 
changes. 
Abdel-Khalik and McKeown (1978), also referred to in 
chapter 5, employed the two stage methodology to 
investigate for differential market reaction to a 
change to L.I.F.O depending on the sign of the expected 
growth in EPS before the announcement \;las made. They 
concluded that the sign of the expected growth in EPS 
was indeed an intervening variable and that the market 
reacted positively if the sign was positive and negatively 
if the sign.was negative. 
Cassidy (1976) replicated the Kaplan and Roll (1972) 
study on the accounting change from the deferred to 
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SOME ACCOUNTING STUDIES USING THE MARKET MODEL 
TABLE I 
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the flow-through method for accounting for the 
investment tax credit. By respecifying the market 
index used by Kaplan and Roll, Cassidy concluded that 
an unexpected accounting change may temporarily 
deceive the market. 
Ball (1972) studied the association of a number of 
different accounting changes. The changes were 
categorised according to their directional impact on 
earnings. Using the market model he concluded that 
the market was not deceived by the changes in earnings 
reported as result of a change in accounting method. 
The general conclusion of these studies, taken together, 
is that in a market of proven efficiency such as the 
NYSE accounting changes without economic impact that 
are non-discretionary have little informational value 
and do not deceive the market by reporting higher 
or lower earnings numbers. The reader is referred 
to table I for a list of some of the accounting studies 
using this methodology. 
6.3 AN EXPLANATION OF THE METHODOLOGY 
It is considered necessary to present a narrative description 
of how the methodology employed in this study is able to 
establish the association between the announcement of a 
switch to L. I.F.O and abnormal changes in share price returns. 
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The two major problems encountered in studies of market 
reaction to particular events are : 
(1) The timing of the relationship, and 
(2) The confounding effects of a multitude of other 
factors on share prices. 
It will be shown that the two problems are not entirely 
independent. 
The problem of timing relates to the establishment of the 
exact date of the release of the information to the market. 
To be able to draw inferences on a relationship it is 
obviously necessary to pinpoint the timing of any release 
of information to the market. This is not always easy and 
in fact most studies have merely assumed an arbitrary date, 
such as the end of the financial year. 5 The other problem 
related to timing is the possibility of information leakages 
prior to the official release of information. There is an 
obvious motivation for individuals to seek information not 
available to the market which accentuates the likelihood of 
such leakages. Thus, although the exact date of the release 
may be established, any inferences drawn about the relation-
ship may be rendered spurious if the informational value 
of such a release has already filtered through to the market 
and been impounded into share prices. 
The current methodology has overcome the first problem by 
establishing the exact timing of the release of a change to 
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L.I.F.O to the public at large. The second problem 
(potential leakages) is acknowledged. However, by 
examining the CARs for a period of thirty-four weeks 
before the.announcement certain leakages to the market 
may be detected. 
The second major problem, namely of the confounding effects 
of a multitude of other factors on share prices, does seem 
a formidable barrier to the investigation. The proposed 
statistical model is an adequate technique to overcome this 
barrier. 
Share price changes are caused by innumerable factors which 
may be categorised into two broad groups : 
(1) Economy wide factors 
(2) Share specific factors. 
The first are those factors that affect all shares in the 
market to a greater or lesser extent. The second are 
those factors affecting only a particular share. Already 
mentioned in section 6.2.2 is a study by King (1966) which 
showed that more than 50% of changes in share prices are 
attributable to those factors corrunon to the market as a 
whole. Thus if a share's relationship with the rest of 
the market could be established, the effect of market wide 
factors could be elimin~ted. An estimation of this relation-
ship would reflect the extent to which the share was affected 
by particular events in relation to the rest of the market. 
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Thus the price changes during the period under observation 
could be compared to market changes in the same period and 
those changes attributable to the market factors eliminated 
thus exposing those changes attributable to specific share 
factors. It is of course imperative that this relationship 
(Beta} between the individual share and the market remains 
constant through time. If this assumption is contravened 
the common factors may be over- or under-accounted for 
in the period under observation. The first phase regression 
model applied to the inclusion data6 estimates the para-
meters of each share's relationship with a market index 
representing a market portfolio. Thus the market wide 
factors are captured, as it were, into the a and B constants. 
It should be emphasised, however, that the regression model 
captures more than just market wide factors; it also 
removes randomly distributed firm specific factors. Thus 
the longer the period of estimation the greater the capture 
of random particular events. If an examination is made 
of residuals for a selected period it could be argued that 
certain firm specific events were causing the configuration 
of residuals and not the event under observation. This 
argument is dispensed by the assumption of this random 
event occurrence. Throughout its life a share will be 
effected by a series of random events which will affect its 
co-variability with the market. Thus the effect of a 
simultaneously occurring random event (with the event under 
observation} will be reduced. An example of a criticism 
which could be levelled at the current study is that the 
169 
announcement of a switch to L.I.F.0 invariably occurs 
with the announcement of annual earnings, dividends, etc., 
and thus the observed reaction of share returns may be 
equally attributable to these simultaneously occurring 
events. Although the announcements of earnings and 
7 dividends are not random but seasonal, the reaction of 
the market to such announcements is random and consequently 
will at least partially be accounted for in the current 
methodology. Further, the cross-sectional aggregation and 
averaging of firms in the second phase will further dilute 
the effect of these confounding events. Moreover, the 
randomness assumption is reinforced by the fact that the 
cross-sectional aggregation is performed on sequences of 
residuals of different chronological time periods. The only 
common factor between such firms is the event in question 
and thus, in all probability, the reaction of the CARs 
in aggregate will be attributable to the common factor of 
a switch to L.I.F.0. 
The timing and confounding events problems are not totally 
independent for the longer the period around the event 
examined the greater the chance of the interference of con-
founding events, despite the dilution of such by the model 
as explained. However, if the exclusion period is too 
short some of the reaction may be missed, particularly in 
view of potential information leakages. Details of the 
decision on exclusion periods and timing will be presented 
in section 6.4 along with the research design. 
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The rationale behind the two phases has been referred to 
in section 6.2.2 . 
. The purpose of this brief discourse on the model was to 
clarify potential misconceptions of the model specified 
in section 6 .-5. 
6.4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
6.4.l OVERVIEW 
The methodology employed will be based on the two 
phase market model presented in section 6.2.2 
using the weekly returns of all the shares on the 
JSE that have announced and quantified the impact 
of a change to L.I.F.O and the weekly returns on the 
RDM 100 industrial index. 
A suggested quasi-equivalent control group of non-
change companies is set up as a comparative control 
in the study. Th~ results are then further analysed 
in terms of partitions based on the criteria discussed 
in chapter five. 
6.4.2 DATA 
(1) Selection of Firms 
A survey was undertaken to establish all the 
firms quoted on the JSE which employ L.r.F.O. 
This resulted in the selection of some thirty -two 
firms. (See appendix A&B) However, only those 
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firms meeting the following criteria were 
retained in the study : 
(1) All shares must have been quoted continuously 
from 18 July 1969 to 14 November 1980. 
(591 weeks) 
(2) The firms must not have undergone substantial 
changes at any one particular time. 
(3) The firm must not only have announced a 
switch to L.I.F.O but the effect must have 
been quantified. Any reversals on consol-
idation of L.I.F.O effects would disqualify 
a firm. 
(4) Because the RDM 100 index is employed, non-
industrial firms were ignored. 
(5) The announcement must have been made at least 
thirty-five weeks after the 18 July 1969, 
i.e. since 20/3/70 and before thirty-five 
weeks before the 14 November 1980, i.e. 
before 14 March 1980. 
These criteria resulted in a reduction of the 
population to twenty-one shares. (See Appendix A) 
Even firms making only partial changes to L.I.F.O 
were considered, for it is the first change to 
L.r.F.O that is of interest in this study of the 
accounting change. For example, a firm which 
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converts 50% of its stocks from F.I.F.O to 
L.I.F.O in one year and the rest in the 
following year can be viewed as having had an 
accounting change in the first year only. 
The change of method in the second year is 
merely an application of a method already in 
use. This is further justified when it is 
considered that the initial change reflects 
management's partiality to the method. 
(2) The timing of the announcement 
Unlike Sunder (1973) and Brown (1980) who used 
an arbitrary date of announcement an attempt 
was made in the current study to establish 
unequivocally that exact timing of the release. 
This was achieved by direct contact with the 
board of directors of each company in the study. 
The date supplied by the company official was 
the date on which the firm had released an 
announcement of the change to the public. This 
varied between the date the interim results 
were released to Reuters {press) to the date 
of posting the Annual Financial Statements. 
This date was then verified by reference to 
the source as claimed by the company and the 
date of the announcement {zero week in this 
study) was deemed to be the following Friday. 
Appendix A lists the firms in the study and the 
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date of the announcement. Although it is 
acknowledged that all market participants 
will not have received the information simul-
taneously, by allowing a lag until the following 
Friday, it is considered reasonable that the 
information can then be deemed to be publicly 
available. 
The problem of leakages referred to in the 
previous section should be borne in mind. 
However, this factor could not be controlled 
in the current study. 
(3) Share Price Relatives 
Weekly share prices and weekly values of the 
RDM 100 index were. available en a computer file, 
at the University of Cape Town, from 22 March 
1968 through 20 February 1976. The last 250 
weeks of data were purchased from the JSE-
and were interfaced with the above mentioned 
file. The result was that two new files were 
created, one containing the L.I.F.0 change 
firms (SWITCH x L.I.F.O) and one containing 
the non-change control group (SWITCH ¥ F. I. F .0) . 
The regression analysis was carried out with 
the use of the STA'I'JOB package and a series 
of transformation instructions were employed 
to derive the price relatives from the weekly 
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prices. Thus the first phase of the study 
was completed in one computer run. 
6.4.3 FORMULATION AND PROCEDURE 
Phase 1 
Having selected the firms and constructed the data 
file, an estimation was made of the parameters a 
and S for each share using the OLSR model based on 
the 520 observations (share returns) comprising the 
inclusion period. The inclusion period is defined 
as all weekly returns between 20 March 1970 and 14 
November 1980 (590 observations) less 70 weeks around 
the announcement date which were deleted. The 
deletion period consisted of 34 weeks before the 
announcement, the week of the announcement and 35 
weeks after the announcement. 
Thus the following model was used 
R.t ~ ~. + RDMlOOtB. + u.t 
J J . J J 
to calculate the a. and s. for all shares. 
J J 
Phase !I 
The weekly data of the deletion period were then 
converted to returns and applied to the following 
formula thereby deriving 70 residuals for each firm 
t = -34 I • • • ,+35 · 
where : -aj and sj were the parameters for share j 
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derived in phase l. 
The residuals so derived were aggregated and averaged 
cross-sectionally throughout the population so that 
70 average abnormal residuals defined by Ut were 
derived for the whole group : 
= t = -34, ... , +35 
where N = 21 for the full group. 
Finally, 70 cumulative abnormal average returns (CAR), 
defined by Ut' were derived for the group. 
t 
= L: t = -34, ~ • • • I +35 
i=-34 
These CARs were plotted and analysed graphically. 
The results are presented in chapter 7. 
Quasi-equivalent control~up design 
In order to ensure that the CAR configuration of the 
study group is peculiar to such group a number of 
earlier studies have constructed a test control 
group of firms not exposed to the event under observ-
ation. The objective of such control groups is to 
establish the randomness of the residuals in periods 
of non-occurrence of any particular event. 
Sunder (1973) did examine a group of firms announcing 
a change from L.I.F.O to F.I.F.O and observed non-
random behaviour in the post-announcement period being 
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negative in direction. However, his control 
group of 120 firms selected randomly did exhibit 
non-random behaviour. This non-equivalent 
control group design has been used in many studies 
amongst others that of Brown {1980) mentioned 
above. A criticism of this approach is that 
although it purports to be non-equivalent in that 
no attempt is made to match change firms to non-
change firms {which would be impossible), there is 
an implicit matching of deletion periods. The 
result of this may be that industry effects obscure 
the comparison of the control group with the study 
group, especially if firms are matched across 
industrial boundaries. Furthermore, it is possible 
that a particular industry may be disproportionately 
represented in the control group and thus render the 
latter not comparable. It should be noted that, 
although the control group is to provide evidence of 
the usual non-randomness of the residuals around 
the spurious date of a hypothetical change, the 
implicit matching contradicts the non-equivalency 
of the design. 
Another approach has been to incorporate a randomly 
selected control group as above into a portfolio 
of equivalent risk. This is referred to as an iso-
Beta portfolio analysis. Although the criticisms 
above apply here equally, this approach reflects 
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the possible unease felt. in using a non-equivalent 
control group within the current methodology. 
The use of a control group is not to provide 
support for the model itself (the model alone is 
quite adequate) but to establish the appropriateness 
of the model in the tested environment. 
In order to overcome the problems of a non-
equivalent control design the current study presents 
what it refers to as a quasi-equivalent control 
design. Acknowledging the difficulty in matching 
firms directly, the design addresses the problem 
of implicit matching. Thus the control group of 
non-changers were selected by matching each change 
firm with a non-change firm according to the 
following 
(1) The selection of a shadow firm from the same 
industry. 
(2) Employing the selection method of choosing 
the firms in the industry with the closest 
valuation of inventories at the date of the 
change firm's switch to L.I.F.O. 
Thus no attempt is made to match equivalent firms 
and the level of inventory holding is really a 
random selection technique. The current procedure 
does not purport to suggest that an equivalent level 
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of inventory holding will result in a similar 
impact of a change to L.I.F.O if the shadow firm 
made the change. The implications of change to 
L.I.F.O depend on a number of factors including 
the extent of the change, the stock mix, the rate 
of price increase for various combinations of stock 
etc. The selection procedure must be emphasised 
as being random within the industry. This approach 
should eliminate some of the inconsistencies of a 
non-equivalent control design. 
A group of non-change firms was selected (see 
Appendix C) and the data collected in the same way 
as in the case of study group. The shadow group 
was subject to the same procedures as the study group 
and the cumulative residuals were derived. The 
deletion period for each shadow firm was determined 
by the deletion period used with each partner in 
the study group. The resuits are presented in 
figures lB 81 2 B of chapter 7. 
Further analysis by partitionin~ 
The study group was then partitioned into pairs 
according to the following criteria : 
(1) High Beta risk / low Beta risk 
(2) High earnings impact / low earnings impact 
(3) Pre-1979 changes / 1979 and post-1979 changes. 
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The procedure was to classify all firms with a 
Beta above 0,75 as high Beta firms and those with 
Beta below 0,75 as low Beta firms. Firms which reported 
earnings which were less than 80% of the earnings 
that would have been reported under the F.I.F.O system 
were classified as high earnings impact firms. That 
is, firms whose F.I.F.O earnings were reduced by less 
than 20% were classified as low earnings impact firms. 
Finally, the pre-/post-1979 criteria refers to the 
date of the announcement and not the financial year 
of the firms. 
The result was 
2 groups in category (1) of 11 {high s> and 10 (low S) 
firms, 
2 groups in category (2) of 8 {high earnings impact) 
and 13 (low imp~ct) firms, 
2 groups in category (3) of 10 {pre-1Q79) and 11 
(post-1979) firms. 
Appendix A shows the date of the change, the Beta 
values and the percentage by which F.I.F.O earnings 
were reduced for all firms in the study group. 
The rationale for such an analysis is presented within 
the conceptual framework of chapter 5. 
The various hypotheses are stated in chapter 7 in which 
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the results are presented and interpreted. 
6.5 A DEFENCE OF THE MODEL AND METHODOLOGY 
The model will now be defended against popular criticisms 
and certain econometric issues will be addressed. 
6.5.1 ECONOMETRIC ISSUES 
The use of the OLSR technique has certain implicit 
assumptions. If these are contravened the model 
cannot be relied on to provide the best linear un-
biased estimate of the parameters a and s. 
The assumptions are : 
(1) Stationarity of data (linearity assumption) 
(2) The data should exhibit homoscedasticity 
(3) Independence of residuals 
(4) Normality of the distribution of data 
It must be emphasised, however, that assumptions (2) 
and (4) are only critical to the use of various tests 
of significance (F-tests, etc.) which are based on 
these assumptions. As these tests are not applied 
in the current study, a contravention of assumptions 
(2) and (4) will not effect the results. The re-
gression analysis will still provide the best linear 
unbiased estimate of a and S. This phenomenon was 
referred to in chapter 4 section 4.3.2. 
181 
The independence assumption 
Should the returns on shares be non-independent, the 
OLSR model would not provide the best linear un-
biased estimate of a and B· The tests carried out 
'by Affleck-Graves (1975) indicate that on the JSE 
the returns exhibit zero autocorrelation. This 
evidence will be relied on in the current study ; 
the assumption does not seem unreasonable. 
The stationarity assumption 
Essentially, the stationarity assumption states that 
the value of B is stable through time. If this is 
so, B estimates based on data from different periods 
of time will not be significantly different. 
Since there is a possibility that a firm's relative 
risk ($) varies through time and further,·in view of 
the possibility that the announcement of a change to 
L.I .F.O may cause an adjustment in this relative risk 
factor, the abovementioned assumption may not be 
valid. 
One method of diminishing the debilitating effect of 
non-stationarity is to base the S estimates on short 
periods of time. These short term data are more likely 
to exhibit stationarity than those of long periods. 
However, al though decreasing the probability of non-
stationarity the short term estimates may not adequate-
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ly capture the randomly occurring confounding 
events referred to in section 6.3. For this 
reason short term estimates alone are considered 
inappropriate. 
A number of methods of establishing more accurate 
B estimates have been used including Bayesian methods. 
The reader is referred to Ball (1972) and Basu (1978) 
for a description of some of these procedures. 
The approach taken in the current study has avoided 
the necessity of reducing the inclusion period. 
The procedure employed was to reperform the phase l 
estimates using only short term periods of data, 
namely 70 weeks prior to a 70 week exclusion period. 
No data after the exclusion period were used in view 
of the potential risk changes that may accompany a 
change to L.I.F.O. The CARs so derived are compara-
tively analysed with the CARs based on the long term 
data and the results presented in chapter 7. The 
conclusion drawn is that results based on short term 
data would result in a not significantly dissimilar 
configuration 6f CARs. For this reason the potential 
non-stationarity of S is not considered to be problem-
atic in the current study. 
6.5.2 THE INTERNAL VALIDITY OF THE STUDY 8 
The question of internal validity refers to whether 
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the configuration of abnormal returns derived 
in the study are in fact associated with an announce-
ment of a change to L .. I.F.O. 
The following issues are considered to be relevant in 
assessing internal validity : 
(1) The completeness of the market index 
(2) Cross-sectional information loss 
(3) The measurement of abnormal returns 
(4) Industry effects 
(5) The possible discretionary nature of a change 
to L.I.F.O 
(6) Internal management effects. 
(1) The completeness of the market index 
It has been explained in section 6. 3 how the 
common eventmethod in the cross-sectional allign-
ment of exclusion periods should cancel out certain 
of the confounding events effecting share returns. 
However, the use of a particular market index, 
in this case the RDM 100 industrial index, as a 
surrogate for a market portfolio may be an in-
adequate measure of all market wide events. To 
minimise the potential undermining effect of the 
possibility of the index not capturing all market 
wide factors, non-industrial shares were excluded 
from the study. This potential effect is not 
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considered to be critical in a study of 
purely industrial shares. 
(2) Cioss-sectional information loss 
The general problem of information disclosed 
in many companies'financial statements being 
captured into the market index and thus resulting 
in a 'wash out' of information effects is 
acknowledged. However, it is not considered a 
serious impingement on internal validity. 
Yet, in cases where the announcement of a change 
to L.I.F.O by one firm has a direct implication 
to another firm which subsequently changes to 
L.I.F.O, cross-sectional information transfer 
cannot be ignored. In this study all firms 
were scrutinised for this possibility and one 
example was discovered and dealt with as follows 
Huletts Aluminium Limited is 60,8% owned by 
Huletts Corporation Limited. Both companies 
are quoted on the JSE. 
The subsidiary company announced a change to 
L.I.F.O on a particular date which had a substantial 
effect on its earnings. This change had obvious 
implications for the holding company. A number 
of months later the holding company released its 
annual report wherein it announced a change to 
L.I.F.O and quantified the impact. However, the 
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change announced by the holding company was 
in reality the same change as that announced 
by the subsidiary company. At the date of 
the initial announcement the information on 
the impact on earnings was publicly available 
and thus this date was deemed to be zero week 
for both holding and subsidiary company. It 
would have been meaningless to take the date 
of the holding company announcement as zero 
week for itself. 
(3) The measurement of abnormal returns 
It has been claimed that an arbitrary selection 
of the length of exclusion/inclusion periods 
may in part be responsible for the configuration 
of CARs produced by the model. 9 
Further, work done by Ball (1972) suggests that 
the use of different combinations of exclusion/ 
inclusion lengths result in significantly 
different configurations. 
The use of a short term estimate in this study 
as a control for the potential non-stationarity 
of data has indicated that the results are not 
a function of the length of the inclusion period. 
Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that a 
researcher must ultimately decide on a particular 
exclusion period length in any study. The use 
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of an arbitrary exclusion length does seem 
unjustified in the light of Ball's study. 
The problem! that faces the researcher is that too 
short an exclusion period, although eliminating 
confounding effects, may also at least partially 
eliminate the effects of the event under observ-
ation. A too long period, on the other hand, 
may fail to eliminate confounding events which will 
obscure the effects of the event in question. 
Bearing the aforegoing in mind, a decision of 
34 weeks before and 35 weeks after the event in 
this study was based on the following factors : 
(1) It was decided to expand the period as 
long as possible, provided that the 
exclusion period included only one annual 
report. 
(2) The length was further designed to include 
one interim report in both the pre- and 
post-event periods to provide, as it were, 
a balance of confounding events. 
Thus it is respectfully submitted that the 
different configurations produced in Ball's 
alternative combinations were not really a function 
of the arbitrariness of the period but of the 
underlying effect of various events being excluded 
or included. A rationalised selection of period 
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with a view to establishing the effect of a part-
icular event therefore escapes the Ball criticism. 
It will have been noticed that no alternative 
research model has been specified in this thesis. 
This may seem strange in the light of criticisms 
in the past which have suggested that the CARs 
may be functions of the particular model employed. 
A recent study by Brenner (1979) however, has 
negated such criticisms and thus also the need 
to consider currently available alternative 
specifications. Brenner has tested five different 
specifications of the current model and found 
the results to be substantially the same. 
A recent paper by Affleck-Graves and Money (1981) 
has shown how various models estimating B on the 
JSE give substantially the same result. 
(4) Industr~fects 
This phenomenon is related to the inability of 
the market index to capture events peculiar to 
industries. The empirical evidence in the 
United States provided by King (1966) suggests, 
however, that these effects are likely to be 
insignificant in relation to the market wide factors. 
King indicated that industry effects were respons-
ible for less than 10% of the variance in share 
prices. Again it is questionable if the evidence 
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is transferable to the JSE, but in the absence 
of local evidence King's conclusion is a useful 
indication. Thus industry effects are not likely 
to undermine the results. 
It is submitted that a greater cause for concern 
with respect to these industry effects is the 
fact that the study group may contain a disprop-
ortionate representation of each industry. For 
example, in the current study 36% of the Paper and 
Packaging industry is included while quite obvious-
ly Paper and Packaging does not constitute 36% 
of the total market. The methodology of aggreg-
ation across different time periods should, 
however, dil°ute such effects. 
(5) The possible discretionary nature of a change 
to L.I.F.O. 
Demski claims that the events which caused the 
positive abnormal residuals in Sunder's study 
may have induced the change to L.I.F.O, rather 
than just being associated with such a change as 
claimed by Sunder. However, this is unlikely to 
be the case where, as in the current study, the 
pre-announcement CARs exhibit reasonably random 
behaviour. 
What remains of this criticism is that the non-
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random behaviour of the post-announcement resid-
uals may be a reaction to the announcement per~ 
or the change per se or both. 
It is acknowledged that this duality of cause 
cannot be distinguished. It is submitted, however, 
that in view of the discussion in chapter 5 the 
reporting of L.I.F.O may be regarded as non-
discretionary or at least neutral discretionary 
in as much as the motive for improved cash flow 
was likely to dominate. Thus the reaction is 
probably due to the implications of the change 
heralded by the announcement. 
(6) Internal man~gement effects 
Another phenomenon involving duality of cause 
may be the possible impact of a change to L.I.F.O 
on management behaviour. Demski (1973) claims 
that the observed behaviour of ~normal returns 
may not be due to the change itself but to the 
changed management style which may be induced by 
the change. This is possible where the change 
to L.I.F.O for external reporting coincides with a 
change to L.I.F.O for internal reporting. 
It is respectfully submitted that at best this 
phenomenon is a question of external validity 
since the behaviour of the abnormal returns has 
in fact been caused by the changes, albeit in-
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directly. 
6.5.3 THE EXTERNAL VALIDITY OF THE STUDY 
External validity is concerned with the generalised 
conclusion that can be drawn from such a study. 
It is conceded that the results of a study of the 
impact of a change to L.I.F.O on share returns is 
situation specific. However, within the conceptual 
framework presented in chapter 5 the results are 
likely to provide some insight on how the JSE reacts 
to accounting changes in general. The abovementioned 
duality of cause may of course restrain very general~ 
ised statements on the information consumption process. 
It is submitted that a general statement on the 
efficiency of the JSE is, nevertheless, justified. 
Although the market reaction to only one particular 
piece of in£ormation has been examined relating to 
only twenty-one shares, these twenty-one shares did 
constitute the full population (universe) of change 
firms on the JSE at the cut-off-date. Further, as 
there are no barriers to the purchase of such shares 
by investors, a sustained consistent over- or 
under-valuation of a particular group of shares 
relative to a specific piece of publicly available 
information indicates an inefficient market. Converse-
ly, a rapid adjustment in price by a number of shares 
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exposed to a common event would indicate an efficient 
market. 
The fact that only twenty-one shares were examined 
does not prevent a general statement of efficiency, 
for the existence of consistent inefficiency or 
efficiency relative to a particular event is reflective 
of the quality of the market. 
It should be emphasised that the efficiency of a 
market relates to the market participants and not 
to the shares themselves. In this study it is all 
the participants that are being tested in the absence 
of barriers to entry. The result will reflect the 
participants' aggregate ability to impound a piece 
of information with potent~al informational value. 
Finally, it is emphasised that no experience can 
claim to be perfect, particularly in an embryonic 
domain such as accounting. This quote from Campbell 
and Stanley (1966) is considered appropriate : 
"From the standpoint of the final interpretation 
of an experiment and the attempt to fix it into 
the developing science, every experiment is 
imperfect." (p.36) 
Before introducing the results, a justification is 
presented for the simultaneous testing of efficiency 
and the informational content of an accounting change. 
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6.6 A JUSTIFICATION FOR SIMULTANEOUSLY TESTING SHARE MARKET 
EFFICIE~~CY AND THE INFORMATIONAL CONTENT OF ACCOUNTING 
CHANGES 
Sunder (1973) and others have argued that in studies 
of capital market reaction to information a maintainec 
hypothesis is required. 10 That is, to test if the 
market has reacted efficiently to a piece of information, 
they argue, an a priori assumption of how the market 
should react must be made and this becomes the maintained 
hypothesis. Similarly, if a test of informational content 
is sought an a priori assumption of efficiency becomes 
the maintained hypothesis. Thus they conclude an attempt 
to test both efficiency and informational content is 
circular in that the maintained hypothesis is being tested 
as well. 
However, it is submitted that no such maintained hypothesis 
is required in this study. There are two elements to 
efficiency : 
(1) Speed of adjustment to new information, and 
(2) reaction only to information relevant to 
valuing shares, i.e. the market should not 
be deceived by purely bookkeeping entries. 
If informational value defines only that information 
relevant to valuing a share price correctly, it is 
acknowledged that as only an efficient market can be relied 
on to react only to such information, efficiency needs to 
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be the maintained hypothesis in tests of informational 
value. The current study, however, seeks only to 
establish whether the JSE perceived a change to L.I.F.O 
as having informational content. Naturally a reaction 
by the JSE to a change to L.I.F.O will be a function 
of its effi~iency. The positive questions to be answered 
are : what is the reaction of the JSE to a change to 
L.I.F.O? and, does the market perceive a change to L.I.F.0 
as having informational value? To answer these questions 
empirically no assumption on efficiency needs to be 
made. As the effects on earnings are inversely related 
to the economic impact of L.I.F.O the following pair of 
competing hypotheses may be set : 
!.!YPOthesis 111 
The market expectations of a firm are formed on 
the basis of the real economic value of the firm. 
Changes in market price represent changes in the 
market expectation of the firm's real value and 
thus accounting changes heralding an increase in 
economic value are associated with an upward adjust-
ment of price. 
Hypothesis 2 
The market expectations of a firm are formed on 
the basis of reported earnings. Thus accounting 
changes which decrease the reported earnings will 
be associated with a downward price adjustment 
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irrespective of any change in the economic value 
of the firm. 12 
Although these hypotheses intend merely to test the 
k . 0 13 1° t . b . h h mar et reaction to L.I.F. , is o vious tat t ey 
implicitly test efficiency as well. If hypothesis (2) 
is accepted the market is inefficient in that it is 
being deceived by the accounting numbers. 
The element of efficiency which requires the market to 
react quickly to new information can be directly observed 
by the examination of the CARs (defined below) around 
the time of the announcement. No a priori assumption 
is required vis a vis market reaction. 
All the possible outcomes of a simultaneous test of market 
efficiency and information impact are shown on figures 2, 
3 and 4.. These represent the cumulative abnormal residuals 
(CARs) (see below) during the period surrounding the date 
of the announcement. The expected value of each week's 
abnormal return is zero and thus by cumulatively totalling 
weekly values the weekly cumulative values should all be 
zero as well'. If there is a reaction a number of returns 
immediately after the announcement would depart from zero. 
However, once the information has been fully impounded 
the returns should return to zero and thus the cumulative 
residuals will be arranged parallel to the horizontal axis. 
Exhibits 1 and 2 of figure 2 show a once-off adjustment 
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x Week 0 is the week of the announcement. 
FIGURE 4 
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at week zero. Without a priori assumptions it can be 
stated that the market is efficient as far· as the speed 
of adjustment to new information is concerned. The 
results shown in exhibits 3 and 4 of figure 3 can also 
be interpreted without a priori assumptions. The market 
is inefficient as far as s9eed of adjustment is concerned. 
The information took a number of weeks to be impounded. 
It is thus possible in cases 1 through 4 to make a state-
ment on the market's efficiency of speed of adjustment. 
Further, it is possible in these cases to state what 
the reaction has been to this particular announcement, 
that is, positive or negative. It is submitted that in 
all cases with results defined by exhibits 1 through 4 
a statement on efficiency and impact can be made. 
However, in cases showing results such as exhibit 5 no 
statement can be made on efficiency. As there is no 
discernable reaction the interpretation could be that 
the announcement had .no informational value (it is in 
fact that there was no reaction) or that the market in-
efficiently ignored a signal relevant to the valuation 
of the shares. In.such a case a maintained hypothesis 
is required. 
It is acknowledged that no statement can be made on the 
other element of efficiency (that the market is not 
deceived by accounting numbers) in cases 1 through 4, 
without an a priori assumption on the informational content 
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of the announcement. A normative statement would have -
to be made on the way a market should react to the 
announcement, thus introducing a certain circularity. 
rn the framework proposed in chapter 5 this problem 
has been addressed and it was concluded that where the 
discretionary and translatable attributes are neutral 
and the economic implications and impact on accounting 
numbers are counter-directional the setting of the competing 
hypotheses 1 and 2 is justified. It is acknowledged 
that where hypothesis 2 is accepted and inefficiency 
concluded there has been an a priori assumption vis a vis 
information content, however it took the acceptable form 
of a competing hypothesis and not a maintained hypothesis. 
Consequently the logic is then void of circularity. 
It is accepted that in cases other than the one cited 
above circularity would prevent a simultaneous testing 
of efficiency and information content. Conclusions could 
still be drawn on the speed of adjustment and actual market 
reaction (ex post). 
A result as in exhibit 5 is not interpretable in any 
situation without a maintained hypothesis. Further, the 
speed of adjustment measurement is lost. 
As the current study examines an accounting change which 
is non-discretionary translatable and has a real economic 
implication with a counter-directional impact on earnings 
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a test of hypothesis 1 and 2 is possible without 
any a priori assumptions. Furthermore, the results 
will supply information on what the market reaction 
to L.I.F.O has been as well as whether the market 
has been deceived by the accounting numbers. The 
speed of adjustment element of efficiency is measurable 
by observation. All of these conclusions are not based 
on any maintained hypothesis and are justified provided 
the format of the results is not that of exhibit 5. 
It will be shown in chapter 7 that in the main the results 
fall into the format of exhibit 4. 
All the hypotheses are stated and tested in chapter 7. 
Although Sunder (1973) assumed market efficiency, his 
results are often quoted as supporting accounting in-
formation efficiency. 14 This is probably illustrative 
of how the problem of circularity does not apply to the 
studies of market reaction to a change to L.I.F.O. 
Sunder's assumption of efficiency does not seem to have 
been necessary to test his competing hypotheses. 
Fortunately Sunder's results supported the equivalent of 
hypothesis 1. What would the interpretation have been if 
the results supported hypothesis 2? : 
If informational value had been defined as information 
relevant to the valuation of shares and the test sought 
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to estab.lish whether a change to L.I.F.O was so relevant, 
an acceptance of hypothesis 2 would simultaneously 
suggest that the change did indeed have informational value 
and disprove the maintained hypothesis of efficiency. 
This would indeed be a circuitous conclusion! 
This section has illustrated some of the problems in hypo-
thesis setting. It is re-emphasised that the current study 
seeks to investigate the two elements of market efficiency 
referred to and to establish what the reaction to a 
change to L.I.F.O has been on the JSE. Thus it seeks to 
establish whether the announcement of a change to L.I.F.O 





l A glance through the contents of the two major journals 
The Accounting Review and The Journal of Accounting 
Research, will substantiate the statement. 
2. See Benjamin and Stanga (1977) and Lee and Tweedie (1975) 
for examples of this low response. 
3. The FFH has alternatively been referred to as the Monopolistic 
Information Hypothesis which posits that the accountant has 
a monopoly on information and thus the market will react 
to the accounting numbers irrespective of other information. 
4. See King (1966). 
5. See Sunder (1973). 
6. Remember the exclusion period around the time of the 
announcement is so excluded for econometric reasons 
(see section 6.3.2). 
7. The OLSR does not account for seasonal factors. 
8. Phase II computations were carried out with a specially 
written fortran programme. 
9. A defence of the model on these grounds is given in response 
to the criticisms put forward by Demski (1973), Meyers (1973) 
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~nd Benston (1980). 
10. See Demski (1973). 
11. See also Anderson and Meyers (1975). 
12. These.are essentially the hypotheses tested.by Sunder (1973). 
13. These hypotheses are tested in chapter 7. 
14. See Sunder (1973). 
15. ·See Dyckman, Downes and Magee (1975). 
,·,. 





The results of the empirical study will now be presented 
in a graphical form. The CARs for weeks -34 through 
+35 are presented for each group described in chapter 6. 
The results will be presented in pairs of graphs shown 
in table 2. Each set of CARs are plotted on a trans-
parency which enables the reader to view the pairs together 
and individually. Please note that one transparency in 
each pair is attached to the top of the backing page to 
facilitate the examination of each graph separately. 
The approach w'ill be to set up pairs of competing hypotheses 
in each section (see table 1) and test them. Tentative 
conclusions will be drawn in each section. An overall 
conclusion will summarise the results in section 7.3. 
The interpretation of cumulative graphs is not easy and 
the approach adopted in this analysis is set out. The 
model employed and the aggregation of CARs should distil 
confounding events so that the final CAR graph is likely 
to represent the impact of L.I.F.O only. This has been 
explained in chapter 6. The assumption of the methodology 
may not be a 10·0% description of reality and thus some 
of the CAR movement may be due to various other non-random 
I 
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effects albeit diluted on aggregation. In view 0£ this 
possibility,although the full deletion period will be 
presented and analysed for each price, the detailed 
interpretation and conclusion will concentrate on the 
eleven weeks surrounding the announcement of the change. 
Thus the g-raphs will be reproduced with only twenty-two . 
observations each, the CARs for weeks -11 through +10. 
It is submitted that this time period is the most accurate 
description of the impact. Although arbitrary, the reduced 
period of examination further diminishes the possibility 
of confounding events disturbing the expected residuals. 
Much time will not be devoted to trying to explain in 
detail the fluctuations observed during weeks -34 through 
-12 and weeks +11 and +35 as these may be due to spurious 
confounding events. The full deletion period is presented 
to give a full perspective only. 
As the graphs are cumulative the absolute position of an 
observation in any particular week is irrelevant. What 
is of importance in a week by week analysis is the relative 
position to the previous week's observation for this 
measures the CAR for a particular week. Further;in this 
particular study the period after week 0 (the week of the 
announcement) is the most interesting. These two factors 
taken together justifies the use of a sliding scale in 
·the analysis of the reduced period graphs. Each category's 
CAR value is equated to zero for week-1. 
I 










l & 2 3 & 4 5 & 6 7 & 8 9 & 10 11 & 12 
1 & 2 x x 
3 & 4 x 
5 & 6 x 
7 & 8 x 
9 x 
TABLE l 
smqvJARY OF THE HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED IN EACH SECTION 
OF CHAPTER 7 
Figure 1 A 
B 
Figure 2 A 
B 
Figure 3 A 
B 
Figure 4 A 
B 
Figure 5 A 
B 
Figure 6 A 
B 
Figure 7 A 
B 
Figure 8 A 
B 
Figure 9 A 
B 
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The full group of L.I.F.O changers weeks -34 through +35 
The quasi equivalent control group of non-changers 
for the same period 
The full group of L.I.F.O changers weeks -11 through +10 
The quasi equival~nt control group of non-changers 
for the same period 
High risk changers, weeks -34 through +35 
Low risk changers, weeks -34 through +35 
High risk changers, weeks -11 through +10 
Low risk changers, weeks -11 through +10 
Pre 1979 changers, weeks -34 through +35 
1979 and post 1979 changers, weeks -34 through +35 
Pre 1979 changers~ weeks -11 through +10 
1979 and post 1979 changers, weeks -11 through +10 
Large impact changers, weeks -34 through +35 
Low impact changers, weeks -34 through +35 
Large impact changers, weeks -11 through +10 
Low impact changers, weeks -11 through +10 
Long term Bet.a estimate full group L.I.F.O changers 
Short term Beta estimate full group L.I.F .0 changers 
N.B. All graphs representing weeks -11 through +10 are presented 
on a sliding scale with week -1 CAR of each pair being 
equated to zero. 
All graphs except 9B are the CARs derived from the long 
term estimates of Beta. 
TABLE 2 
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7.2.1 TESTING HYPOTHESES 1 & 2 AND 3 & 4 
This section tests the following two pairs of 
competing hypotheses . 
versus 
versus 
.!!Y.£2.the s'i s 1 
The market expectations of a firm are 
formed on the basis of the real economic 
value of the firm. Changes in market price 
represent changes in the market expectation 
of the firm's real value and thus accounting 
changes heralding an increase in economic · 
value are associated with an upward adjust-
ment of price. 
Hyr.othesis 2 
The market expectations of a firm are 
formed on the basis of reported earnings. 
Thus accounting changes which decrease 
the reported earnings will be associated 
with a downward price adjustment irrespective 
of any change in the economic value of the 
firm. 
Hypothesis 3 
The market is efficient with respect to the 
speed at which it impounds information. 
Thus it impounds such quickly. 
Hypothesis 4 
The market is inefficient with respect to the 
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speed at which it impounds information. 
Thus it impounds such slowly. 
To test these competing hypotheses it will be 
necessary to analyse figures IA and 2A only. 
Figures lB and 2B are presented to show how the 
configuration of residuals is different for the change 
firms and a quasi-equivalent control group of non-
change firms. This lends evidence to the varacity 
of the assertion that the reaction observed in the 
former is actually to the common factor of a change 
to L.I.F.O. The control group week O thus represents 
a spurious date in the history of each firm 
peculiar to each. Indeed there is no common factor 
to week 0 between the non-change firms. 
Using the comparison of figure 2 on the sliding scale 
it is obvious that the change firms have a marked 
downward trend which would support the assertion 
that the movements observed in the change firms are 
not merely a function of the model employed. 
The reader is now referred to figure lA by itself. 
The CARs fluctuate between nil and -4% settling back 
to nil in week -15. These fluctuations are fairly 
random and the cumulative abnormal return at week 
-15 is at the expected zero level. 
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However, for weeks -14 through -9 there does 
appear to be a certain non random behaviour. It 
seems that the change firms experienced a positive 
abnormal return for six weeks of cumulative value 
3
9, 
o. This is rather difficult to interpret. It 
may however be due to leakages of the impending 
announcement. Thus the trading activities of 
investors with preview knowledge of the switch 
to L.I.F.O may be responsible for this non-random 
behaviour. It may however be an inexplicable 
confounding event. This cumulative abnormal return 
is lost in the following three weeks and the CARs 
settle back to the expected zero value for the six 
weeks up to the week of announcement. 
After the announcement there is a definite occurence 
of abnormal positive return so that week +l has 
a cumulative value of 3,4% however this is immediately 
followed by a number of successive weekly negative 
abnormal returns so that the CAR for week +12 is 
-3,8%! This indicates a very negative impact of 
a L.I.F.O change considering the· negative abnormal 
return of -7,2% for the period +l through +12. 
Thereafter there follows rather volatile, however 
random fluctuations of the cumulative residuals. It 
is considered inappropriate to interpret extensively 
the behaviour of the CARs beyond week +12. 
I 
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Turning now to figure 2A attention will be 
directed to the 11 weeks before the announcement 
and the 11 weeks after the announcement (includingthe 
week of the announcement). Effectively this assumes 
the fluctuations before week -11 and ~fter week +10 
to be random or not a function of the announcement .. 
Obviously the longer the period of the analysis 
the greater the chance of confounding effects, 
obscuring the reaction to the announcement. 
Apart from the possibility of a leakage effect,the 
behaviour of the residuals immediately prior to 
the announcement is as expected, i.e. a random 
movement .along the zero line. 
There is a definite reaction in the week of the 
announcement. Considering the model qndmethodology 
employed .this can be confidently attributed to 
the announcem.ent of a switch to L.I.F.O. There is 
a very rapid increase in ~normal return to 4,3%, 
however this is followed by a slow but very definite 
trend downwards moving steadily down to a low of 
-5%,thus there was a cumulative negative return of 
8,4% in 7 weeks afterwhich the effect of L.I.F.0 
dissipitates and the residuals level off. Movements 
thereafter are not attributed to the effect of a 
change to L.I.F.O. 







positive reaction it seems that there is an overall 
negative reaction to L.I.F.O of about -4%. 
Further, it seems that the downward adjustment has 
taken at least 8 weeks. 
The interpretation does not intend to be dogmatic, 
however it appears that the potential efficiency 
exhibited by the rapid initial upward movement is 
seriously dragged by an overriding inefficiency which 
slowly impounds the signal negatively. 
As far as the hypotheses a£e concerned, Hypothesis l 
is rejected in favour of 2, and Hypothesis 3 is 
rejected in favour of 4. 
The implication then appears to be that the market 
is inefficient in respect of this piece of inform-
ation for two reasons : 
(1) The market appears to be deceived by the 
negative impact on earnings despite the 
improved cash position,. and 
(2) This negative impounding seems to take 
a long time. 
The obvious implication of this is that an individual 
who sells short shares of a L.I.F.O switcher would 
have earned an abnormal return of 4% based on 
publicly available information • 
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The movement of the residuals of a quasi-equivalent 
group of non-change firms was a random upward. 
Although a week by week comparative analysis between 
the two would be meaningless, the trend is apparent. 
An interpretation of the pair of graphs including 
the whole deletion period which is tempting is that 
after the change date the L.I.F.O firms had returns 
above the change firms in an absolute sense, implying 
that L.I.F.O had a relatively positive impact on 
share prices. This would be incorrect for a number 
of reasons. Firstly, week zero represents no 
particular event to any of the non-change firms 
thus the movement of residuals is just a function 
of an aggregation of numbers, resulting in a random 
pattern. Secondly, . the absolute values are irrelevant 
on a cumulative scale and thus a sliding scale 
comparison is more appropriate. 
Finally, the raison d'etre of the shadow group, 
as explained in chapter 6, was merely to ensure that 
the results of the study were not a function of the 
model. 
7.2.2 TESTING HYPOTHESES 5 & 6 
Hypothesis 5 
The relative risk of a firm is an exogenous 






pretation of a change to L.I.F.O. Thus 
there will be a differential market reaction 
to the announcement of a change to L.I.F.O by 
, high risk companies and low risk companies. 
versus 
!_!YEQthesis 6 
The relative risk of a firm is not an exogenous 
intervening variable in the market's inter-
pretation of a change to L.I.F.O. Thus there 
will not be a differential market reaction 
to the announcement of a change to L.I.F.O 
by high risk firms and low risk firms. 
The reader is referred to Figure 3A and B for an 
overview of the CARs for the full deletion period 
of the high risk firms (A) and the low risk firms (B) . 
The interpretation of the full period needs to be 
taken cautiously. Although the residuals exhibit 
fairly non-random behaviour in both cases up to 
week 9 both cumulating a return at just under +3%, 
the high risk firms show a defihite non-random 
pattern to week O. Week -9 to week 0 was an almost 
continuous period of negative returns resulting in 
an abnormal negative return of 4,5%. In the same 
period the low risk firms exhibited fairly random 
residual behaviour. Immediately after the chanye 
1:here seems to be a differential reaction with the 
215 
low risk firms showing an average abnormal return 
of 5,4% in two weeks having a CAR value of 7,4% 
in week +l. During the same two weeks the high 
risk firms showed an average abnormal return, of 
1,6%. Thereafter there was a period of definite 
non-random behaviour when abnormal negative returns 
were earned for 6 or 7 weeks before levelling out. 
Both groups showed abnormal positive returns for 
a number of successive weeks thereafter. 
Again it is tempting to draw conclusions from 
full deletion period and absolute values. From this 
perspective a differential reaction is discerned 
with the low risk firms having a net positive result 
and the high risk firm showing a net negative CAR. 
It is submitted that for reasons previously mentioned 
this interpretation would be incorrect. 
On closer inspection of the results (turn to figure 
4 A & B) on a sliding scale and for periods immediate-
ly around the change the differential reaction is 
less obvious. The differences in the pre change 
period have been referred to, however an interpretation 
is difficult, suffice to say that the abnormal 
positive return exhibited by the group as a whole 
which was subsequently reversed by a series of 
abnormal negative return seems to have been caused 
by the high risk firms. The reaction in the first 
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two weeks was considerably greater for the low 
risk firms, which suggests that the relative risk 
is an exogenous intervening variable. This could 
be explained by the fact that the market is more 
confident in the management of low risk firms. 
However, it should be noted that for the next 
seven or eight weeks both firms experience almost 
identical abnormal negative returns. The previous 
positive returns in the case of low risk companies 
cushioned this effect so that the residuals levelled 
off just below the point they were before the change. 
The interpretation is by no means obvious but 
hypothesis 5 is tentatively accepted in that although 
the effect of L.I.F.O was negative on both, the 
change seems to have had a less severe impact on 
returns in the case of low risk firms. This may 
be explained in terms of the market interpretation 
of management's motives and expectations. Perhaps 
the market is skeptical of any changes made by 
high risk firms. Further, the market may feel the 
change represents a risky way for an already risky 
firm to raise extra cash. 
It is interesting to note that the market took just 
as long to impound the information in both cases. 
Thus it is concluded that relative risk seems to 
be an exogenous intervening variable, however the 
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impact is negative for both high and low risk firms. 
7.2.3 TESTING HYPOTHESES 7 & 8 
versus 
Hypothesis 7 
The process of information consumption is 
static and thus the market reaction to similar 
changes is the same for any time period. 
Hypothesis 8 
The process of information consumption is not 
static and thus the market reaction to similar 
changes can be different in successive time 
periods as the market learns and becomes 
more efficient. 
Starting with a general review of figures 5 A & B 
it is seen at a glance that the post i979 set of 
residuals display non-random behaviour, albeit 
fairly volatile, between weeks -34 and O. The CAR 
value for week -1 being -1%. The same is not true 
for the pre 1979 change group. There seem to be 
three distinct phases in the pre change CARs for 
the group (A) . Weeks -34 through -25 display a se-
quence of negative returns amounting to -6,6% for 
this period. However, between weeks -25 and -9 there 
is a distinct trend of abnormal positive returns 
amounting to +12,6% for the period giving a CAR value 
in week -9 of +6%. This is reversed between week 
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-9 and the week of the announcement. The second 
phase referred to is broken by two reversals 
which may be considered random. No interpretation 
is really possible; however the week -13 through 
week -9 period of increase may be due to information 
leakages about the trend. This may have resulted 
in the general market viewing these shares as 
overvalued at week -9 according to the information 
set then publicly available, i.e. sans the information 
on the change. The downward trend may thus have 
been an adjustment downward in response to over-
valued shares. 
The reaction of the market seems to be the same for 
the two groups as the residuals move up for the 
first two weeks and then down for another 6-8 weeks 
before both enter a fairly random fluctuation pattern. 
There is, however, a completely different inter-
pretation possible when the residuals are placed 
on a sliding scale and the weeks surrounding the 
announcement are analysed. The reader is referred 
to figure 6. 
The period between -11 and 0 has been discussed. 
Both groups had the same initial positive reaction 
of the same magnitude for the same period. This 
reversed for both groups in week +2 (CAR +3%}. The 
downward trend however persisted considerably 
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longer for the pre 1979 change group and eventually 
bottomed out in week +11, having experienced a 
negative cumulative abnormal return of 10,8%. 
However, the post 1979 change group bottomed in week 
+7, thereafter a series of positive returns were 
earhed as ther~ was for the pre 1979 gr0up after 
week 11. 
This is a very interesting result for it implies 
that in the case of the most recent changes to L.I.F.O 
the market reaction has still been negative but 
far less severe. The net negative return between 
week 0 and week +7 for the post 1979 change group 
was around 4%, however the net negative return for 
the pre 1979 change group between week O and 11 
was 7,8%! This implies that the market reaction 
has been almost halved in the most recent changes. 
This implies that hypothesis 8 should be accepted 
in that the information consumption procees seems . ( 
to be changing. The other very interesting aspect 
of this result is that the market impounded the 
information in the case of the post 1979 change group 
nearly 40% quicker than in the case of the pre 1979 
change group. 
The result is extremely encouraging for it appears 
as if the market is becoming educated with regard 
to L.I.F.O and although it still seems to be deceived 
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by the accounting numbers it is impounding the 
information more quickly and less severely. 
This may be explained by the fact that as more 
and more companies start changing to L.I.F.O the 
market becomes increasingly aware of the implications 
of such. However, traditional concern over the 
accounting earnings figures still seems to prevail. 
7.2.4 TESTING HYPOTHESES 9 & 10 
versus 
Hypothesis 9 
Although the market seems to be reacting to 
the accounting numbers, the fact that a 
change to L.I.F.O has a positive effect on 
cash flow, the negative reaction to the earnings 
will be dampened in the cases where the 
economic benefit is greatest even though in 
such cases the negative impact on earnings will 
be the greatest as well. 
Hypothesis 10. 
The market reacts in the direction of the 
impact on earnings of a change to L.I.F.O. 
Thu3 the magnitude of the reaction will be 
directly proportional to the magnitude 
of the impact on the earnings. 
An examination of figures 7 A & B together shows 
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the CARs for the full deletion period. 7(A) 
presents the residuals for those firms changing 
to L·I.F.O which had a large impact on earnings 
and 7(B) the residuals of L.I .F.O companies for 
which the change had a relatively low impact on 
the earnings that would have been reported by the 
F.I.F.O system. Again it is difficult to interpret 
the pre change pattern and indeed it is probably 
pointless. However, this partition criterion 
results in two groups which display a very similar 
and fairly random configuration of CARs up to the 
week of the change. This is to be expected in a 
period during which no common event with informational 
value impacted the firms. The pattern after the 
week of the announcement of a change to L.I.F.O 
is quite different for each group. 
Interpreting the full deletion period after the 
change it seems that after a similar increase 
in abnormal returns there was a more significant 
series of negative returns for the high impact 
group. However, thereafter there seems to have been 
a recovery reflected by a period of positive abnormal 
returns not matched in the case of the low impact 
firms. It is tempting to interpret this as follows. 
Although the negative reaction was greater in the 
case of the high impact firms (consistent with 
hypothesis 10} the market eventually, after eight 
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or nine weeks, realises that the larger theimpact 
on earnings the greater the economic benefit and 
vice versa. Thus it readjusts so that the net effect 
in week +35 is a +6,4% abnormal return for the 
period since the announcement, compared to a -7% 
abnormal return for the same period in the case of 
the changes with a low impact. A possible explanation 
for this could be that the market is reasonably 
inefficient in that it is temporarily deceived by 
the accounting numbers, however after some time 
the news filters through that L.I.F.O heralds a 
decreased tax liability with attendent improvement 
in cash position and there is an adjustment upward. 
An explanation for the differential reaction in the 
case of changes to L.I.F.O with relatively low 
earnings impact may be that the market views 
skeptically the motives of management where the 
benefit is not so great. It may interpret such 
changes as reflecting management's desperation·for 
cash. This interpretation may be that the net 
negative impact in the case of low impact changes 
is a blind response to the numbers, however after 
the drastic negative reaction to the high impact 
changes market participants may investigate a 
little deeper and their findings of an improved 
economic well being results in trading activities 
which precipitates a revision of prices upwards. In 
any event the market's inefficiency with regard to 
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speed of adjustment to information seems irrefutable 
in the current model. 
The above analysis, although intuitively attractive, 
is vulnerable to the potential criticism of the 
effect of confounding events in that reactions ± 20 
weeks after the announcement are unlikely to be 
due to the announcement. 
To ensure a consistent evaluation of the reaction, 
interpretation will be confined to the period 
immediately after the event. This represents the 
most likely reaction to L.I.F.O, and escapes the 
criticism of confounding events. 
The reader is now referred to figures 8 A & B where 
the CARs are presented on a sliding scale for the 
weeks immediately before and after the announcement, 
for a more investigatory analysis and interpretation. 
The initial reaction to the announcement was about 
a 4% positive abnormal return in the case of the 
low impact firms (B) while it was about 3% for the 
high impact firms. Thereafter there followed a 
period of abnormal negative returns for both groups. 
There was a startling negative abnormal return of 
± 11,5% for the period between week +l and week +7 
for the high impact firms whereas the negative 
abnormal return for the low impact firms for the 
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same period was only about 4%! Admittedly by 
week +10 about 2,5% of this had been regained by 
the high impact firms. It must be emphasised however, 
that the returns after week +7 may be part of the 
expected random return. Week +7 represents the 
end of a non-random period of abnormal returns, 
in both cases . 
.. 
Thus at this level, hypothesis 9 must definitely 
be rejected in. favour of the acceptance of hypothesis 
10. It seems that the conclusions drawn in section 
7.2.1 are supportedr The market seems to react in 
the direction of the earnings figures and not in 
relation to the economic implication of the change. 
It is interesting to note that in the case of both 
groups the market took the same amount of time 
to negatively impound its reaction to an announce-
ment of a change to L.I.F.O. 
It is submitted that this latter conclusion on the 
limited period graphs is superior to the former 
full deletion period for reasons mentioned. 
7.2.5 TESTING HYPOTHESES 11 & 12 
!:!Ypothesis 11 
Due to the non stationarity of the data used 
to estimate the Betas of the change firms, 
the use of short term Beta estimates is likely 
versus 
225 
to result in a substantially different 
configuration of CARs than those presented 
in figure 2A, which were based on long term 
estimates of Betas. Thus the OLSR model is 
inappropriate. 
Hypothesis 12 
Due to the stationarity (or acceptable level 
of non stationarity} of the data used to 
estimate the Betas of the change firms, the 
use of short term Beta estimates is likely 
to result in substantially the same configuration 
of CARs as presented in figure 2A, which were 
based on long term estimates of Betas. 
Thus the OLSR model is appropriate. 
The reader is referred to figure 9 A & B. It is 
noted that figure 9A is a reproduction of figure 
2A for the readers convenience. 
Little analysis is required. It is patently obvious 
that the two graphs are almost identical and would 
certainly not lead to a different interpretation 
as to theimpact of the announcement of a change to 
L.I.F.O. 
Thus hypothesis 12 can be confidently accepted. The 
short term Beta estimates are substantially the 
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same as the long term Beta estimates. This result 
is consistent with a data set of stationary data. 
It is submitted that the fears expressed in chapter 6 
on tlie potential non-stationarity of data are allayed. 
7. 3 A SUM1"'1.ARY OF 'rHE HYPOTHESIS TESTING (SEE TABLE 3} 
The results present some very interesting information, 
and taken as a whole provide a certain insight into the 
process of information consumption by the JSE. 
To summarise, it seems that to date the market has reacted 
negatively and slowly to the announcement of a change to 
L.I.F.O. Further, it seems that the relative risk of the 
change company is an exogenous intervening variable in 
the information consumption process, where a change to 
L.I.F.O by high risk companies is not received well by 
the market. The negative market reaction is directly 
proportional tci the size of the impact on earnings suggesting 
a further degree of inefficiency in that the market is 
deceived by the accounting numbers which mask the underlying 
economic reality. 
However, there is a gleam of hope! The market seems in 
the case of the most recent changes to be i~pounding the 
informational content of a change to L.I.F.O substantially 
more quickly and although still in sympathy with the earnings 
figures, the effect has been less drastic. 
~27 
These conclusions are of course reached within the 
constraints of the model and methodological issues 
reviewed in chapter 6, the most pertinent of which may 
be the duality of the announcement, that is, the behaviour 
of the residuals prior to th.e change may be a function of 
a set of factors conunon to L.I.F.O changers and peculiar 
to them and not due to the change itself. This problem 
of post selection bias has been referred to in chapter 6. 
As regards situation specific inferences, namely answers 
to such questions as -What has the market reaction been 
to a change to L.I.F.O on the JSE? post selection bias 
is irrelevant as these conunon factors are inseparable from 
the. change itself. The problem is encountered when one 
moves out of the specific domain and attempts generalised 
conclusions. It is posited that if only certain types 
of firms change to L.I.F.O, the reaction observed in this 
study may have been to those characteristics defining the 
type of firm and not to a change itself. The implication 
would be that a generalised conclusion on the future 
reaction of the market to a change to L.I.F.O would only 
apply to firms sharing these characteristics with the 
current group. Thus the real value of the study as far 
as accounting information is concerned is that the reaction 
has been negative. However, this obviously provides useful 
insight into the possible reaction of future changes not-
withstanding the possibility of post selectiori bias. 
As far as generalised conclusions on market efficiency, 
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again a situation specific inference can be drawn, namely 
that the market is information inefficient in respect of 
the announcement of a change to L.I.F.O. It could be 
argued (as mentioned in chapter 6) that as only 21 firms 
have been studied, inferences cannot be drawn as to the 
efficiency-of the market as a whole. It has been submitted 
that as the 21 firms represent the universe of L.I.F.O 
changers (at the date of cut off for this study) and as 
there are no barriers to the purchase or sale of these 
shares on the market, the existence of a group of over-
valued (according to thi.s naive market) shares for a number 
of weeks is unjustified in an efficient market. It is 
submitted that to be efficient a market must impound all 
relevant information quickly and unbiasedly so that no 
shares are over-or undervalued according to the publicly 
available information set. 
The final conclusions of this study and selected implications 
will conclude this thesis in chapter 8. 
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Hypotheses Reject Accept 
-
1 x 
v 2 x 
3 x 
v 4 x 
5 x 
v 6 x 
7 x 
v 8 x 
9 x 
. v 10 x 
11 x 
v 12 x 
TABLE 3 




CONCLUSION AND IMPLICA'I'IONS 
8.1 THE CONCLUSIONS 
The results presented in chapter 7 indicate that the 
announcement of a switch to L.I.F.O has a substantial 
negative impact on share returns. This negative impact 
seems to be directly proportional to the extent to which 
the F.I.F.O earnings are reduced by the new valuation 
method. Thus it would appear that the market reacted to 
the accounting numbers rather than to the economic message 
inherent in a change to L.I.F.O. 
Further, this negative impact is impounded into 
prices rather sluggishly. This factor taken with the 
reaction to the accounting numbers which were counter-
directional to the economic implications suggests the 
double inefficiency of the JSE. Not only was the market 
unable to see through the accounting numbers but it took 
a long time to adjust to the announcement. 
An alternative interpretation is however possible. The 
negative abnormal returns observed in the post announcement 
period may not be caused by the announcement itself but 
may be a function of a selection bias. That is,only a 
certain type of firm may switch to L.I.F.O, firms in 
which management anticipate a cash crisis and a change to 
L. I. F. O represents an effort to avert such. This interpret-
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ation implies that the informational value of L.LF.O 
cannot be ascertained. The selection bias criticism was 
reviewed in the context of Sunder's study in chapter 6. 
There it was suggested that non-random behaviour prior 
to the announcement may have been due to exceptionally 
good times experienced by L.I.F.O firms, and not leakages 
of information on the impending change. It is however 
respectively submitted that the post-selection bias 
criticism is not a valid criticism of the results per se 
but merely a criticism of the validity of the model. 
A considerable portion of this thesis has been devoted to 
presenting and explaining the research methodology. Certain 
assumptions were raised and examined for reasonability. 
One of the assumptions was that the methodology adequately 
controlled confounding events. The selection bias argument 
implies that certain confounding events such as 'bad times' 
and 'good times' are not adequately controlled. To 
entertain an interpretation of the results that implicitly 
denies the propriety of the model is untenable. Post 
selection bias remains a vacuous concept unless specific 
confounding events can be established, that are not 
controlled. 
In any study the results are subject to the assumptions 
of the model employed. Thus the initial interpretation 
is tentatively accepted based on the ability of the model 
to capture and eliminate the effect of confounding events. 
The selection bias criticism is relegated to the level of 
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a general skeptism of the model and is thus dismissed. 
Further it is concluded that the relative risk of firms 
is an exogenous intervening variable in the information 
consumption process. 
The conclusion of the double inefficiency of the JSE 
must however be tempered. It was acknowledged in chapter 
5 that the information consumption process was likely 
to be highly complex with innumerable intervening variables 
mediating between the announcement of the change and the 
market reaction. This complexity implies that an a priori 
assumption on how the market should react may not be 
justified. The statement on inefficiency vis a vis speed 
of adjustment remains. In view of the positive impact 
a change to L.I.F.O seems to have in a market of proven 
efficiency,1 and in view of the probable neutrality of 
the endogenous intervening variables proposed in the 
conceptual framework of chapter 5 this a priori assumption 
on the impact of a change to L.I .• F.O of share prices, does 
not seem an unjustified leap of faith. The double in.,.. 
efficiency of the JSE is thus concluded, however, cautiously. 
An insight provided into the information consumption process 
is that the relative risk of a firm as measured by the 
B mediates between the accounting change and the market 
response to that change. Further it is concluded that the 
market is developing in that the reaction to the most recent 
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announcements has been less severe and this has been 
impounded considerably quicker. 
An attempt will not be made to generalise the results 
to other accounting changes for it is acknowledged that 
they are situation specific to L.I.F.O. It is likely 
however that the market (the JSE) is likely to react 
naively to accounting changes in particular and accounting 
numbers in general. 
8.2 THE IMPLICATIONS OF A NEGATIVE MARKET REACTION TO THE 
ANNOUNCEMENT OF A CHANGE TO L.I.F.O. 
Under this section the specific implications of a negative 
response are considered. The next section deals with the 
general implications of an inefficient market. 
8.2.1 THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATIONS 
L.I.F.O precludes the recognition of inventory 
holding gains in times of rising prices and thus 
leads to a decreased tax liability. A change in 
• 
accounting method from F.I.F.O to L.I.F.O thus 
heralds an increase in the economic value of the 
firm. Despite this implication the announcement 
of a change to L.I.F.O. on the JSE has received a 
negative reaction. 
There may be a number of reasons for the seeming 
' 
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reluctance of firms to change to L.I.F.o,2 however 
two particular reasons seem the most likely : 
(1) A fear of an adverse effect on share 
prices due to the decreased reported 
earnings. 
(2) A fear of deflation or erosion of the 
base layers which would reverse the 
tax advantages. 
It would appear that at the present time the 
apparent reluctance on the part of corporations is 
well founded. However, in view of the observed 
differential reaction of the market to changes 
prior to 1979 and to changes after 1979, it is 
conceivable that in time the market will become 
more efficient."-The market will have to be 
continually monitored until the condition of 
efficiency is achieved, only then will the fears of 
potential change firms be allayed. 
8.2.2 THE IMPLICATIONS FOR INVESTORS 
As the announcement of a change to L.I.F.O appears 
to have some impact on share returns a prior 
knowledge of such an announcement is likely to be 
of some value to investors. It is likely that 
the announcement of a change to L.I.F.O by a firm 
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in an investor's portfolio will dampen the 
overall performance of the portfolio. It is 
strongly emphasised however that prior knowledge 
of an impending change to L.I.F.O does not imply 
that an abnormal gain is realisable in a short 
sale arrangement.3 This is so because the study 
does not refer to absolute prices. All that can 
be said about short sale arrangements based on the 
anticipated negative impact of a change to L.I.F.O 
is that any profit released in such a deal will be 
greater and any loss incurred will be less than 
would have been if no announcement was made. 
8.2.3 THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LEGISLATOR 
No attempt will be made in this thesis to venture 
into the domain of welfare economics, that is the 
conclusions will not be extended beyond the private 
value of information. However, the following 
observation is considered appropriate. 
The legislator has, by the promulgation of 
S 22 (5) in the Income Tax Act No.SO of 1962 
interjected into the reporting process. In terms 
of this section any person (including juristic 
persons) wishing to adopt L.I.F.O must also report 
L.I.F.O in any financial statements issued to 
shareholders. The motives for such a restriction 
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defy rationality, and the effect in the 
South African environment at a market level 
seems to be disastrous. Firms and their share-
holders, which have changed to L.I.F.O are being 
penalised with a negative adjustment of their 
share price. 
In view of this observation it is not surprising 
that Haggie Rand Limited on consolidation reversed 
the impact of L.I.F.O on the earnings of its 
subsidiaries which had changed to L.I.F.O. This 
reversal was achieved by merely reinstating the 
L.I.F.O earnings of the subsidiaries to a F.I.F.O 
basis for the sole purpose of consolidation into 
the group earnings. Therefore the group earnings 
escaped the negative effect of a change to L.I.F.O 
and thus the group is likely to have averted the ~ 
penalty of a downward price adjustment. 
As the group as a whole is not a taxable entity 
it is beyond the ambit of the tax act and in view 
of the results of this study quoted companies 
considering a change to L.I.F.O would be wise not 
to report the earnings based on this method of 
valuation. 
The further implications of legislative interjectio!l 
into the accounting process, such as the possible 
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hampering of the development of sound accounting 
principles will not be considered in this thesis. 
8.3 THE IMPLICATIONS OF AN INEFFICIENT SHARE MARKET 
8.3.1 THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS 
0 
The results of this study indicate that the EMH 
is not a valid assertion in the context of the JSE. 
This is so bec~use the results are inconsistent 
with two of the basic tenets of the EMH ; 
· (i) That prices adjust rapidly to information 
(ii) That prices react only to information 
relevant to valuation. 
The major implication of this contradiction of the 
EMH is that the perspective supplied in chapter 4 
of the implications of the EMH are at present 
irrelevant in South Africa. 
The implications of the seeming inefficiency of 
the JSE will be briefly considered in the light of 
the approach taken in chapter 4. 
It must be emphasised that inefficiency per se is not 
likely to be a permanent feature in view of the 
current results and therefore the discussion in 
chapter 4 is still of relevance locally. 
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8.3.2 THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ECONOMY AS A WHOLE 
Within the constraints of the limited ambit of the 
efficiency concept expounded earlier, an inefficient 
share market would not be a desirable feature of 
a capitalist economy. 
The pricing mechanism is likely to be upset and 
thus there will be a sub-optimal redistribution 
of wealth among market participants, the result of 
which is really a welfare question. 
Furthermore, pervasive inefficiency will ultimately 
lead to a sub-optimal allocation of financial 
resources among firms ultimately leading to a 
misallocation of real resources in the economy. 
This will manifest in the reduced welfare of society. 
No attempt is made to suggest the exact chain of 
events in such· a situation, however it seems apparent 
that if the economic signals emitted by the market 
are spurious, it is likely that the economy will 
move to a sub-optimal condition. 
8.3.3 THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INVESTMENT COMMUNITY 
The implications of a prior knowledge of a change to 
L.I.F.O on the JSE have been referred to in section 
8.2.1 above. The fact, however that the market is 
inefficient implies that a prior knowledge is not· 
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requisite. After the announcement, the adjustment 
process takes as long as eight weeks to impound 
the negative effect, thus giving investors adequate 
time to adjust their portfolios accordingly. 
The general implication of an inefficient market is 
that the past-time of fundamental analysis is a 
worthwhile pre-occupation. The analysis of publicly 
available information should thus be useful in 
fereting out over-or under-valued shares. 
The major implication of the results of this study 
to the investment community of the JSE is that modern 
portfolio theory is likely to be inappropriate 
in that certain implicit assumptions of such are 
contravened. Modern portfolio theory is based on 
certain assumptions which if valid would be consistent 
with market efficiency. Evidence of market inefficiency 
thus casts serious doubts on the propriety of thes.e 
assumptions on the JSE. 
8.3.4 THE IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL REPORTING 
The implications of these results are rather serious 
for the. accounting standards setting bodies. The 
simplified decision process illustrated in figure 1 
of chapter 4 would be inappropriate. Extreme care 
would need to be excercised in allowing different 
accounting methods for financial reporting, as the 
market seems to be unable to look behind the numbers, 
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as it were. A tempting short-term solution to the 
standard setting problem is to allow only one 
method of accounting for particular events. This 
would pre-empt the problem of accounting changes 
once all firms used the same method. The drawback 
of-such a solution is that the market would never 
become information efficient and the development of 
accounting principles would be prevented. It is 
submitted that such a 'straight-jacket' policy by 
the standard setters would ultimately be a worse 
evil than information inefficiency. 
Standard setting in an inefficient market environment 
is an almost impossible task. The will o' wisp 
nature of price reaction to accounting information 
in such a market confounds any attempt at providing 
an optimal information set. The concept of an 
optimal information set is quite vacuous in such 
an environment. 
The accounting profession as a whole is confronted 
with the task of assisting in the development of 
a more sophisticated information consumption process. 
The conclusion reached in chapter 4 that the standard 
setters should actively discourage na1ve investors 
from analysing accounting information, in an efficient 
market is even more immenent in an inefficient 
market. As it is the preponderance of naive investors 
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that results in market inefficiency, an improved 
communication between accountant and professional 
investor should improve the situation. The 
accountant in South Africa will have to acknowledge 
the subjective nature of the numbers he produces 
to-the users of such. The results of this study 
suggest that the users of financial statements, in 
aggregate, believe the accountant to have a monopoly 
on economic information. 
It is submitted that as an inefficient market 
environment is likely to be a restrictive constraint 
on the development of an optimal set of accounting 
standards, and considering the social function of 
accounting vis a vis information production and 
resource allocation, the accounting profession has 
a responsibility to ensure that the aggregate user 
understands the numbers produced. 
It is acknowledged that the results of this study 
are not immutable, however they do constitute the 
first evidence of how the JSE reacts to accounting 
information. The conclusion is not encouraging. 
It is submitted that it is imperative that the 
accounting acader.-iicians mount a programme of ongoing 
research on the information consumption process in 
order that the standard setters and accounting 
. statement preparers become more familiar with the 
•. 
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domain in which they operate. A description of 
the market condition may alter accountants' 
strategy to discharge their social responsibility. 
8.4 THE RESULTS CONSIDERED WITHIN THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
OF CHAPTER 5 
The framework seems to have provided a useful base from 
which to conduct empirical research. The partition 
criteria were proved valuable in that a differential 
reaction was observed between each sub group. Furthermore 
the counter-directional effect of economic implication and 
earnings impact of a change to L.I.F.O facilitated the 
hypothesis setting and testing. 
However, a major cause for concern is that a translatable 
accounting change with no underlying economic implication 
may not be neutral in an inefficient market. 
Although it is felt that this study has provided a certain 
insight into the information con.sumption process of the JSE 
a great deal of further research is required to understand 
a very complex process. It is hoped that the conceptual 
framework provides a vehicle for such research. 
8.5 CONCLUSION AND SUM..~RY 
To summarise, the results indicate evidence rejecting the 
EMH on the JSE, as the market reacted only sluggishly to 
the announcement of a change to L.I.F.O and in the direction of 




of the positive impact on the present value of the 
firm. This evidence should be of value to future capital 
market researchers. 
The evidence presented that a change to L.I.F.O has a 
negative impact on share returns directly proportional to 
the negative impact on earnings should afford the accounting 
researcher a useful insight into the accounting process. 
Furthermore, the results provide evidence of a differential 
reaction depending on the relative risk (S) of the firm 
making the change. The high risk firms experience a far 
greater negative reaction than the low risk firm. 
The study further provides hope for both capital market 
and accounting researcher. It seems that the market may 
be becoming more efficient, in that the most recent changes 
to L.I.F.O invoked a far less severe negative market reaction 
and this reaction was more swift. 
Finally, it is emphasised that the results and conclusions 
are as valid as the model and methodology employed. Every 
attempt has been made in the execution of this study to 
provide empirically valid results and conclusions within 
the bounds of modern technology. 
The study will have achieved its purpose if it brings the 
concept of market efficiency and its implications to the 
attention of the South African accountant and prompts further 




2. Only 32 firms on the whole of the JSE. 
3. A short sale arrangement is a sale of shares at the current . 
price for future delivery. The seller normally only 
purchases the shares immediately before delivery thereof 
























L.I.F.O FIRMS INCLUDED IN THE STUDY 
Firm Date of 
Annm.mcerrent r reduction of F.I.F.O 
Anglo Alpha Cerrent Limited 1 March 1979 
AECI Limited 11 March 1976 
The Natal Chemical Syndicate Ltd 23 August 1979 
Seardel Investrrent Corporation Limited 31 August 1979 
African Cables Ltd 1 October 1976 
Huletts Aluminium Ltd 1 June 1977 
National Iblts Ltd 26 Septenber 1975 
Stewarts and Lloyds of S.A. Ltd \ 22 Noverrber 1979 
Vereeniging Refractories Ltd 1 20 February 1980 ' 
Coates Brothers (S .A.) Ltd 24 January 1980 
Kohler Brothers Ltd 15 February 1980 
~tal Box S.A. Ltd 1 Jillle 1977 
Sappi Ltd 9 March 1976 
Huletts Corporation Ltd 1 June 1977 
Rornatex Ltd 30 April 19 79 
Sterns Diarrond Organisation Ltd 13 June 1979 
Trek Beleggings Limited 23 April 1975 
Steelrretals Limited 27 Septerrber 1976 
I~tal Closures Group S.A. Limited 7 February 1980 
Suncrush Limited 21 March 1975 














































L.I.F.O FIRMS EXCLUDED FROM THE STUDY 
Rustenburg Platinum Holdings Limited 
Haggie Limited 
Malbak Limited 
Associated Engineering (S.A.) Limited 
Sasol Limited 
Scottish Cables (S.A.) Limited 
Edgars Stores Limited 
Cullinan Holdings Limited 
The Union Steel Corporation of S.A. Limited 
Plate Glass and Shatterprufe Industries Ltd 









(used L . I . F. O 
from date of 
floatation) 












CONTROL (SHADOW) GROUP OF NON-CHANGE FIRMS 
l Everite Limited 
2 Sentrache~ Limited 
3 Plascon Evans Paints Limited 
4 Rex Trueform Clothing Co. Limited 
5 ASEA Electric South Africa Limited 
6 African Oxygen Limited 
7 Globe Engineering Works Limited 
8 Dorman Long Vanderbijl Corporation Limited 
9 Dunswart Iron & Steel Works Limited 
10 Press Supplies Holdings Limited 
11 Evelyn Haddon & Co. Limited 
12 Nampak Limited 
13 Carlton Paper Corporation Limited 
14 Lonrho Sugar Corporation Limited 
15 African and Overseas Enterprises Limited 
16 Gresham Industries Limited 
17 Chemical Holdings Limited 
18 Reunert & Lenz Limited 
19 Trio-Rand (S.A.) Beperk 
20 Unie-Wyn Beperk 
21 Sam Steele Holdings Limited 
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